Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts by Arnow-Richman, Rachel
Boston College Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 2 Article 3
3-31-2016
Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts
Rachel Arnow-Richman
University of Denver Strum College of Law, rarnow@law.du.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rachel Arnow-Richman, Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts, 57 B.C.L. Rev. 427 (2016),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol57/iss2/3
  427 
MODIFYING AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACTS 
RACHEL ARNOW-RICHMAN* 
Abstract: This Article addresses the problem of “mid-term” modification of 
employment—the common employer practice of introducing adverse changes 
in incumbent employees’ terms of employment on penalty of termination. It 
calls for a universal reasonable notice rule under which courts would enforce 
mid-term modifications only where the worker received reasonable advance 
notice of the change. An employer’s sudden imposition of new terms prevents 
employees from exercising what is often their only form of bargaining power 
—the ability to credibly threaten departure. Rejecting retrograde judicial ap-
proaches that turn on the presence or absence of consideration, the Article ar-
gues for a “procedural good faith” rule that directly polices the risk of coer-
cion consistent with contemporary contract modification law. Courts should 
enforce mid-term modifications only where the employer provides enough 
advance notice to allow the employee time not only to meaningfully consider 
the proposed change, but also to compare and secure alternate work.  
[E]very social structure . . . has a fundamental problem with conflicting 
needs for certainty and for flexibility.1 
—Ian R. Macneil 
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 1 Ian R. Macneil, Bureaucracy, Liberalism and Community—American Style, 79 NW. U. L. 
REV. 900, 911 (1984). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Long-term employment relationships are constantly in flux. Worker re-
sponsibilities, terms of compensation, job titles, company policies, employ-
er-provided benefits, and a variety of other conditions of work are routinely 
altered over the course of what is often a multi-year, highly dynamic profes-
sional and personal relationship. In cases involving at-will employment—
the vast majority of such relationships—the economic realities and power 
dynamics are such that changes in terms are likely to be introduced unilat-
erally by the employer for purposes of advancing its own business inter-
ests.2 The worker is often presented with a set of non-negotiable terms, less 
favorable than the ones ostensibly governing the parties, and asked to ac-
cept on the implicit or explicit threat of termination.3 
The contractual enforceability of these “mid-term modifications,”4 as 
this Article refers to them, has significant ramifications for the economic 
                                                                                                                           
 2 The author has described this problem previously in the context of employer-imposed arbi-
tration and noncompete agreements, both of which require the employee to give up critical back-
ground rights to the advantage of the employer. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap 
Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 
637 (2007) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts] (arguing against court enforce-
ment of delayed term, or “cubewrap,” employment contracts). This Article considers the enforce-
ment of these documents under somewhat different circumstances and in relation to judicial treat-
ment of other types of employer-initiated changes in terms, most notably the unilateral modifica-
tion of employee handbooks and personnel policies. See infra notes 42–133 and accompanying 
text. 
 3 To be sure, not all changes in terms will be adverse to the employee. In the context of em-
ployee handbooks, for instance, an employer may choose to augment or enhance existing benefits 
and compensation policies in the interest of maintaining employee morale, improving retention, 
and positioning itself as an employer of choice in the market for quality employees. See, e.g., 
Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1263–64 (N.J.) (noting in a dispute over 
contractual enforceability of a handbook termination policy that past modifications of the hand-
book had almost always favored employees), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985). In such con-
texts, however, one can assume that the employee is amenable to the change. This Article focuses 
on adverse changes where the quality of employee assent is likely to be in question. 
 4 In adopting this term, this Article means to distinguish between true modifications—
situations in which employers genuinely decide to adopt new terms and polices during the course 
of an ongoing relationship—and the human resources practice of providing “new” terms upon the 
commencement of work that were not revealed at the time the offer of employment was extended 
and accepted. Elsewhere this author has described the latter type of agreement as a “cubewrap” 
contract and argued that such agreements should be categorically unenforceable in situations 
where the employer could have provided the terms in advance. See generally Rachel Arnow-
Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of Employee Bargaining Pow-
er via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963 [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, 
Worker Mobility] (arguing courts should not enforce “cubewrap” noncompete agreements provid-
ed upon or shortly after commencement of employment); Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, 
supra note 2 (defining and arguing against the enforcement of cubewrap noncompete and arbitra-
tion agreements). In the literature of restrictive covenants, a noncompete signed subsequent to the 
start of employment has also been referred to as an “afterthought” agreement. See Jordan Leibman 
& Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of Post-Employment Noncompetition Agreements Formed 
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success of corporate actors and the livelihood and wellbeing of individual 
workers. Employees want to be able to rely on consistent compensation and 
benefits. Employers genuinely require flexibility to deal with changes in 
personnel matters and external economic circumstances. Despite this, the 
common law has developed neither a coherent legal framework for analyz-
ing mid-term modifications, nor a theoretical basis for understanding exist-
ing doctrine. 
Judicial treatment of mid-term modification controversies reveals two 
broad categories of approaches. Under what this Article calls the “unilateral 
modification” approach,5 courts typically permit employers to change terms 
at their discretion.6 These courts theorize that because at-will employment 
may be terminated at any time, continued employment constitutes consider-
ation for any changed terms the employer might chose to impose.7 In con-
trast, some courts follow what this Article calls the “formal modification” 
approach.8 These courts require the employer to provide an additional bene-
fit beyond continued employment—such as a raise, bonus, or other employ-
                                                                                                                           
After At-Will Employment Has Commenced: The “Afterthought” Agreement, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1465, 1523–28 (1987). The use of that term, however, does not distinguish between terms that 
genuinely arise during the course of employment and those that could have been provided in ad-
vance of hire. This Article considers only the former. 
 5 See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Employment Law Inside Out: Using the Problem Method to 
Teach Workplace Law, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29, 44–46 (2013) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, In-
side Out] (adopting this terminology). 
 6 See, e.g., Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 78-79 (Cal. 2000) (holding that notice plus 
offer of continued employment constituted consideration for modification of job security policy 
six years after its promulgation); Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, 255 P.3d 1058, 1063 
& n.3 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (holding continued employment to be sufficient consideration for a 
noncompete signed two years after the start of employment); Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 
N.E.2d 99, 109 (Ill. 2006) (holding continued employment to be sufficient consideration for an 
arbitration program added one year after the start of employment); infra notes 42–133 and accom-
panying text. 
 7 See, e.g., Asmus, 99 P.2d at 78; Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1063; Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109; infra 
notes 42–133 and accompanying text. There are a number of important variations on this approach 
that this Article distinguishes infra notes 42–133 and accompanying text. In the noncompete con-
text, for instance, a handful of courts require that the employer actually retain the employee for an 
unspecified amount of time, as opposed to offering a mere promise of continued employment. See, 
e.g., McRand, Inc. v. Van Beelen, 486 N.E.2d 1306, 1313 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (“We also hold that 
continued employment for a substantial period is sufficient consideration to support the employ-
ment agreement.”). More importantly, in the context of handbook modification, some courts have 
required the employer to provide reasonable notice of the unilateral modification. See, e.g., As-
mus, 999 P.2d at 78 (Cal. 2000) (“The general rule governing the proper termination of unilateral 
contracts is that once the promisor determines after a reasonable time that it will terminate or mod-
ify the contract, and provides employees with reasonable notice of the change, additional consid-
eration is not required.”); infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. This Article argues that the 
latter approach should be adopt as the universal rule for determining the enforceability of mid-
term modifications, at least in those situations in which the relationship remains at will. See infra 
notes 215–295 and accompanying text. 
 8 See Arnow-Richman, Inside Out, supra note 5, at 47. 
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er promise—in recognition of the fact that the employer remains free to 
terminate the employee at will subsequent to the changed terms.9 Under this 
view, the mere promise of continued at-will employment is illusory and 
cannot supply the requisite consideration for a change in contract terms.10 
This Article problematizes the assumptions underlying both approach-
es. First, it argues that the unilateral and formal modification approaches 
give undue attention to consideration in determining the enforceability of 
contractual modifications. Contemporary modification doctrine has system-
atically moved away from the historical inquiry into consideration in favor 
of an approach grounded in fairness and voluntariness.11 Courts’ use of con-
sideration as the touchstone for enforcement reflects a retrograde under-
standing of modification law that aims to satisfy formalistic rules of con-
tract formation at the expense of assessing the legitimacy of the employee’s 
assent to modification. In reality, at-will employees have no “choice” in 
consenting to mid-term modifications, irrespective of whether they receive 
“new” or “separate” consideration in supposed exchange for the new terms. 
Second, the Article argues that neither the unilateral nor formal modi-
fication approach properly balances the competing policy goals that animate 
contemporary modification law. The historical rationale for a strict new 
consideration requirement in determining the enforceability of a modifica-
                                                                                                                           
 9 See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1145 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (holding that 
to modify a handbook “[s]eparate consideration, beyond continued employment, is necessary”); 
J.M. Davidson, Inc., v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 228 (Tex. 2003) (holding, in context of arbitra-
tion agreement signed by incumbent employee, “[a]t-will employment does not preclude for-
mation of other contracts between employer and employee, so long as neither party relies on con-
tinued employment as consideration for the contract”); Labriola v. Pollard Grp., Inc., 100 P.3d 
791, 796 (Wash. 2004) (holding that “independent consideration is required at the time promises 
are made for a noncompete agreement when employment has already commenced”); infra notes 
42–133 and accompanying text. 
 10 In the particular situation of changes to prior policies that allegedly altered the employee’s 
at-will status, courts have put forth a different but related analysis, namely, that because the em-
ployer has lost its right to freely to terminate the relationship, its continuation of the employee’s 
employment cannot serve as consideration for new terms. See, e.g., Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1145 
(“[C]ontinued employment alone is not sufficient consideration to support a modification to an 
implied-in-fact contract. Any other result brings us to an absurdity: the employer’s threat to breach 
its promise of job security provides consideration for its rescission of that promise.” (emphasis 
omitted)). As discussed infra notes 148–159 and accompanying text, this is essentially an applica-
tion of the traditional common law pre-existing legal duty rule. 
 11 The culmination of this trend is the Uniform Commercial Code’s (“UCC”) adoption of a 
good faith modification rule, which explicitly rejects the common law’s pre-existing legal duty 
rule and the requirement of “new” consideration to support a modification. See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) 
(AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAW 2015) (“An 
agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding.”); id. 
§ 2-209 cmt. 2 (“[M]odifications made [under subsection (1)] must meet the test of good faith 
imposed by this Act.”); infra notes 178–212 and accompanying text. 
2016] Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts 431 
tion was to protect against possible coercion.12 The flip side of that concern 
is the need for flexibility, particularly in long-term relationships where mar-
ket circumstances and the needs of the parties will likely change over 
time.13 Commercial law’s rejection of the consideration rule reflected a de-
sire to better balance these goals, requiring a good faith showing of the need 
for the modification and making the inquiry into coercion direct and explic-
it.14 Mid-term modification law, however, with its continued focus on con-
sideration, prioritizes flexibility. Under the unilateral modification rule, em-
ployers have free reign to change terms of employment at any time, regard-
less of their content or the quality of employee assent, whereas under the 
formal modification rule, employers need only implement their preferred 
terms contemporaneous with a modest pro-employee adjustment, which 
often is itself tied to continued employment.15 
Instead, this Article advocates for a universal reasonable notice rule in 
assessing the enforceability of mid-term modifications.16 Drawing on case 
law developments in the handbook modification context,17 the Article pro-
poses that mid-term modifications unilaterally imposed by employers in at-
will relationships should be enforceable only where the employer provides 
reasonable advance notice of the change.18 Reasonable notice would mean 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See 2-7 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 7.1 (2015), LexisNexis (attributing 
the rule to “tough cases in which one contracting party has been subjected to a holdup game, so 
that the promisor [agreed to the modification] under some degree of economic duress”); infra 
notes 148–159 and accompanying text. 
 13 See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Clas-
sical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 900–01 (1978). 
 14 See U.C.C. § 2-209(1); infra notes 178–212 and accompanying text. 
 15 Formal modification courts typically recite that additional consideration can take the form 
of a promised promotion, raise, or other benefit, disregarding the role of employment at will. See, 
e.g., Labriola, 100 P.3d at 794 (“Independent consideration may include increased wages, a pro-
motion, a bonus, a fixed term of employment, or perhaps access to protected information.”); Hop-
per v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 541 (Wyo. 1993) (“The separate consideration 
. . . would include promotion, pay raise, [or] special training . . . .”). At one point, Texas law 
seemingly required that a valid consideration have value independent of continued employment. 
See Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642, 646–48 (Tex. 1994) (construing em-
ployer’s reciprocal promise to provide initial training as forming an immediately binding bilateral 
contract and distinguishing situations in which provision of training or confidential information 
was subject to continued employment); see also Richard A. Lord, The At-Will Relationship in the 
21st Century: A Consideration of Consideration, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 707, 739–42 (2006) (dis-
cussing the wisdom of Texas’ historical approach). The Texas Supreme Court, however, has since 
retreated from this approach. See Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 
644, 650-51 (Tex. 2006) (enforcing noncompete signed after the start of employment based on 
employer’s promise to provide confidential information over the course of employee’s continued 
at-will employment despite illusory nature of employer’s promise where such information was in 
fact provided resulting in a binding unilateral contract). 
 16 See infra notes 213–295 and accompanying text. 
 17 See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 71; infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 215–295 and accompanying text. 
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an amount of time necessary for the employee to assess the significance of 
the change and consider alternatives, in particular the possibility of finding 
alternate employment.19 Such an approach is more consistent with main-
stream contract doctrine, lends greater clarity and predictability to existing 
law, and better balances the competing policy goals of flexibility and fair-
ness for both parties. 
A few disclaimers are in order. First, there are reasons to question 
whether, as a matter of policy or supervening law, certain substantive terms 
of employment should be deemed unenforceable irrespective of when or 
how an employee agrees to them. For instance, commentators have long 
expressed concern that noncompetes may unfairly constrain workers’ ability 
to earn a living,20 and recent research has suggested that such agreements 
may suppress innovation and impede economic growth.21 This Article does 
not engage those questions, taking the majority rule enforcing reasonable 
noncompetes as a given.22 It does, however, recognize and endorse the vari-
ous jurisdiction-specific limitations that constrain enforceability in particu-
                                                                                                                           
 19 In making these assertions this Article parts company with the recent Restatement of Em-
ployment Law, which ostensibly endorses a reasonable notice approach to handbook modifica-
tions. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“An employer may pro-
spectively modify or revoke its binding policy statements if it provides reasonable advance notice 
of, or reasonably makes accessible, the modified statement or revocation to the affected employ-
ees.”). In contrast to the Restatement, this Article advocates for an expansive understanding of 
reasonable notice, sufficient to enable the employee to conceivably find replacement work. See, 
e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 71 (upholding modification of employee handbook where plaintiff-
employees had six months’ advance notice of the disputed modification). In addition, this Article 
limits the rule to situations involving at-will employees, recognizing a distinction where the em-
ployee was previously promised long-term job security. The Article expands on these points in 
juxtaposition to the Restatement’s position in greater detail infra notes 215–262 and accompany-
ing text. 
 20 See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 652–
53 (1960) (explaining that covenants not to compete have the effect of reducing a person’s value 
in the competitive marketplace, and are neither efficient nor fair, because the cost to employees 
bears no relation to the risk of injury to employers and often overprotects employers). 
 21 See, e.g., ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE 
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 34–35 (2013) (rejecting “orthodox” view that noncompetes are 
necessary to incent investments in workers and developing a “dynamic” model in which employee 
mobility creates positive externalities that inure to the benefit of all employers); Ronald J. Gilson, 
The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and 
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577–78 (1999) (suggesting that the growth of 
Silicon Valley may owe in part to the mobility of its workforce and consequent knowledge spillo-
vers enabled by California’s ban on employee noncompetes). 
 22 The key exception is California, which refuses to enforce employee noncompetition agree-
ments. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600–16602.5 (West 2008); see also HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 480-4(d) (LexisNexis 2015) (“[I]t shall be prohibited to include a noncompete clause or a nonso-
licit clause in any employment contract relating to an employee of a technology business.”); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006) (voiding employee noncompetition agreements). 
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lar circumstances.23 The arguments advanced in this Article, precluding en-
forcement of mid-term modifications absent reasonable notice, would oper-
ate in addition to, not instead of, those rules.24 
Second, this Article accepts the regime of employment at will which 
permits either party to terminate the employment relationship for any or no 
reason and recognizes that many employees lack the ability to bargain for 
particular terms of employment.25 It seeks neither to dismantle the dominant 
rule nor correct for employees’ limited bargaining power.26 Rather the Arti-
                                                                                                                           
 23 Most jurisdictions require employers to demonstrate a “legitimate” or “protectable” interest 
in trade secrets, confidential information, or customer relations as a threshold to enforcement, and 
then limit enforcement to that which is reasonably necessary to safeguard the interest asserted. See 
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“A promise to 
refrain from competition . . . is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than 
is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by 
the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public.”). 
 24 The same is true with respect to the various judicially-imposed limitations on the substan-
tive terms of employee arbitration agreements grounded in the unconscionability doctrine. See, 
e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 693–94 (Cal. 2000) (finding 
unconscionable an arbitration agreement that limited recovery of a successful employee to back 
pay yet preserved the employer’s right to file claims against employees in court); see also David 
Horton, Unconscionability Wars, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 13, 19 (2011) (describing how 
unconscionability has become such a critical tool in invalidating arbitration agreements as to ap-
pear “less like a traditional contract defense and more like a specialized anti-arbitration measure”). 
Many of these limitations appear to survive the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011), which struck down the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s application of California’s unconscionability rule precluding class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements as inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act. See gen-
erally Jerett Yan, Note, A Lunatic’s Guide to Suing for $30: Class Action Arbitration, the Federal 
Arbitration Act and Unconscionability After AT&T v. Concepcion, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 551 (2011) (concluding that courts have read Concepcion narrowly as precluding only a per se 
ban on class action waivers, leaving intact the fact-intensive unconscionability analysis that courts 
had applied to arbitration agreements generally). 
 25 The employment at will rule has at times been articulated as permitting parties to terminate 
without notice, as well as without reason. The author contends in a prior Article that this formula-
tion is incorrect and that employment at will does not defeat the general contract rule that parties 
to an agreement of indefinite duration must provide reasonable notice of termination. See Rachel 
Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for Rea-
sonable Notice of Termination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1582–83 (2014) [hereinafter Arnow-
Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law]. The proposal advanced in this Article 
could rest on that same premise. That is, if employers must provide reasonable notice of termina-
tion, they must similarly provide reasonable notice of changes in terms. This Article, however, 
independently justifies the adoption of a reasonable notice approach to mid-term modifications so 
that neither a court nor the reader need accept the conclusions of the author’s earlier work. 
 26 A large body of scholarship has criticized employment at will from various ideological and 
methodological perspectives and argues in favor of a rule constraining employers’ ability to ter-
minate without cause. See generally Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual 
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) 
(arguing for additional limits on an employer’s right to discharge employees); Cynthia L. Estlund, 
How Wrong Are Employees About Their Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6 
(2002) (asserting that a default rule allowing discharge only for cause and requiring employees to 
waive their “right to for-cause protection” would bring the law in line with employees’ expecta-
434 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:427 
cle aims to leverage existing contract doctrine and its underlying justifica-
tions to enable employees to exercise the limited bargaining power they 
have. The result is not a level playing field, but one on which employees are 
better positioned to play according to (and perhaps despite) the governing 
rules. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the problem of mid-
term modification of at-will employment terms and the incoherence in ex-
isting law.27 It examines three recurring situations—the unilateral imposi-
tion of covenants-not-to-compete, arbitration agreements, and employee 
handbook modifications subsequent to the start of employment. Part II turns 
to the law of contract modification outside the employment context, expos-
ing how principles of voluntariness and good faith have informed contem-
porary doctrine.28 Part III explores how the principles underlying main-
stream contract modification law might inform courts’ treatment of mid-
term modifications of employment at will, proposing a reasonable notice 
rule that would grant employees sufficient opportunity to consider proposed 
changes in terms and seek alternate employment.29 Part IV considers possi-
                                                                                                                           
tions); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89 
(2008) (pointing to patchwork nature of current laws and regulations relating to termination as 
justification for policy change); Arthur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termina-
tion, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631 (1988) (arguing employers should have to present a plausible reason for 
termination); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At Will: Toward a Co-
herent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996) (proposing federal wrongful 
discharge statute); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change 
in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979) (arguing just-cause termination rule should replace at-will 
employment); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Wrongful Dismissal Legislation, 35 UCLA L. REV. 65 (1987) 
(discussing policy arguments justifying increased restrictions on employers’ ability to dismiss 
employees); Nicole B. Porter, The Perfect Compromise: Bridging the Gap Between At-Will Em-
ployment and Just Cause, 87 NEB. L. REV. 62 (2008) (proposing “compromise” statute between 
just-cause termination and at-will employment); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: 
Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56 (1988) (discussing 
debate over wrongful dismissal and employment at will); Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will 
in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65 (2000) (outlin-
ing history of at-will employment doctrine in American law); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the 
Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 106 (2002) (arguing for an information forcing just cause “de-
fault rule”). Elsewhere, the author engages this scholarship, concluding that employees would be 
better served by a statutory rule requiring advance notice or severance pay rather than just cause. 
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, From Just Cause to Just Notice in Reforming Employment Termina-
tion Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 296, 
324–25 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Just 
Cause to Just Notice]; Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment At Will, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 72 (2010). For purposes of this Article, however, the author accepts em-
ployment at will and its existing just-cause-based exceptions as the governing legal framework. 
 27 See infra notes 34–139 and accompanying text.  
 28 See infra notes 144–212 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 215–295 and accompanying text. 
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ble obstacles to implementing a reasonable notice rule and the inherent lim-
its of the approach.30 
I. CHANGED TERMS OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT 
Mid-term modification is a recurring and pervasive problem that af-
fects a variety of substantive employment terms and implicates several dif-
ferent bodies of employment law. This Part provides an overview of the 
mid-term modification problem, beginning in section A with a definition of 
mid-term modification that distinguishes these legally significant and ad-
verse changes in terms from other informal adjustments in workplace rela-
tionships.31 Section B examines how courts have approached mid-term 
modifications across three common scenarios—the unilateral imposition of 
covenants-not-to-compete, arbitration agreements, and employee handbook 
modifications subsequent to the start of employment.32 Section C considers 
possible doctrinal and policy explanations for courts’ inconsistent ap-
proaches to mid-term modifications, concluding that courts have failed to 
justify their disparate approaches to enforcement.33  
A. The Mid-Term Modification Problem in Employment Law 
Delineating the problem of employment contract modifications re-
quires some initial understanding of what constitutes an employment con-
tract, itself a tenuous thing. Most workers lack a formal written contract 
purporting to define all of the initial terms of the engagement.34 Rather, the 
terms of their agreement are likely found in multiple documents and, per-
haps more importantly, in oral statements and tacit understandings.35 For 
those employees that do have formal written agreements, they are likely to 
be “incomplete.”36 It is impossible to imagine a contract that sets out all of 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See infra notes 300–388 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 34–41 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 42–133 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 134–139 and accompanying text. 
 34 Common exceptions include written contracts for executive or other high-level employees 
and collective bargaining agreements for unionized employees. 
 35 See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Foreword: The Role of Contract in the Modern 
Employment Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, 
Foreword] (describing the “multiple sources of obligation and expectation” in workplace relation-
ships). 
 36 An incomplete contract is one containing “gaps,” that is, areas in which the parties’ writing 
fails to define their rights and obligations. See Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling 
Gaps in Deliberately Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 399 & n.25. There is a rich 
literature addressing why such gaps exist and how courts should fill them. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 
YALE L.J. 87 (1989); Ben-Shahar, supra; Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Con-
tracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297 (2014); Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law-
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the terms and expectations of what is likely to be an evolving and potential-
ly long-term work relationship. Even if it could be done at the outset, it 
would likely change over time. 
The “relational” nature of employment is thus the reason why rules of 
modification are both necessary and elusive.37 Currently, both workers and 
employers operate in a state of perpetual uncertainty as to which promises 
are contractually binding, which reflect extra-contractual norms, and which 
are mere aspirations, not rising to the level of a promise at all.38 The inevi-
table disputes take various forms. Frequently, an employee asserts that he or 
she was contractually promised some form of job security or a specific term 
or benefit of employment. The employer may respond that the particular 
promise was not made, was not contractual, or, if it was contractual, that the 
particular promise was revised or retracted. In another class of disputes, it is 
the employer who seeks to enforce an allegedly binding promise of the em-
                                                                                                                           
suit: A Social Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191 (2009); Juliet P. 
Kostritsky, Taxonomy for Justifying Legal Intervention in an Imperfect World: What to Do when 
Parties Have Not Achieved Bargains or Have Drafted Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 
323; Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements 
and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-
Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (2003). 
 37 The term “relational contract” is often used to describe long-term contracts between parties 
whose behavior and expectations regarding contract performance and termination are heavily 
influenced by their extra-contractual understandings, which may not be reflected in the letter of 
their agreement. On the general subject of relational contract theory, see IAN R. MACNEIL, THE 
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1980); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 737 (2000); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 
VA. L. REV. 1089 (1981); Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. 
L. REV. 340 (1983) [hereinafter Macneil, Values in Contract]. For a consideration of the problems 
posed by changes in circumstances and contract modification within relational contracts, see Mac-
neil, supra note 13. For articles applying relational contract theory to the specific context of em-
ployment, see Robert Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149 
(2005); Paul J. Gudel, Essay, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. 
L. REV. 763 (1998). 
 38 See Arnow-Richman, Foreword, supra note 35, at 2–3. As the author has previously ex-
plained, 
Given the multiple sources of obligation and expectation in the workplace, it is often 
difficult to determine what should happen in the event of a dispute. Which of the 
parties’ promises are gratuitous and which carry the force of law? . . . [S]ome work-
place “promises” are not even statements, but are simply implicit in the parties’ un-
derstanding of how things work between them. 
Id. Some commentators use the term “social contract” or “psychological contract” to describe the 
extra-contractual expectations of employers and employees. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo et al., 
Justice, Employment, and the Psychological Contract, 90 OR. L. REV. 449, 462 (2011); Denise M. 
Rousseau, Psychological and Implied Contracts in Organizations, 2 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 121, 
123 (1989); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Chang-
ing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 550 (2001). 
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ployee, such as a promise not to compete or to arbitrate any disputes, made 
at or after the start of employment. 
No single theory of employment contracts can resolve all of these dis-
putes. It makes sense, however, to treat at least a subset of them uniformly, 
at least where the factual context suggests that contract modification rules 
should apply. This would include all situations where the employer, acting 
as the drafting party, explicitly alters previously governing terms during the 
course of the employment relationship with the intention that the new terms 
are themselves contractually binding—what this Article calls “mid-term 
modifications.” 
Several recurring fact scenarios fall within this frame. First, an em-
ployer may ask an incumbent employee to sign a contractual document re-
linquishing pre-existing background rights. Where an employer imposes a 
noncompete, for instance, it requires the employee to give up his or her de-
fault right to compete post-employment.39 Similarly, where the employer 
imposes an arbitration agreement, it requires the employee to forego his or 
her right to litigate disputes in court in favor of the private process selected 
by the employer.40 Second, employers may make changes to their own in-
ternal policies that eliminate previously conferred contractual benefits. If 
the employment relationship is governed by a contractually binding person-
nel policy or employee handbook, the employer’s alteration of those docu-
ments in ways adverse to the employee has the effect of extinguishing pre-
viously held contractual rights. 
All of these scenarios are distinguishable from the informal “changes” 
in employment “terms”—staffing decisions, work instructions, personnel 
actions, etc.—that parties likely anticipate as part of the natural ebb and 
flow of a dynamic work relationship. In contrast, a mid-term modification 
                                                                                                                           
 39 A noncompete, in effect, extends the employee’s tort duty of loyalty, which otherwise en-
dures only as long as the employment relationship continues and specifically preserves the em-
ployee’s right to prepare to compete post-departure. See, e.g., Jet Courier Serv., Inc. v. Mulei, 771 
P.2d 486, 498 (Colo. 1989) (applying the planning and preparations exception to the duty of loyal-
ty); Scanwell Freight Express STL, Inc. v. Chan, 162 S.W.3d 477, 479–81 (Mo. 2005) (same); see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.04 (“Throughout the duration of an agency relation-
ship . . . . an agent may take action, not otherwise wrongful, to prepare for competition following 
termination of the agency relationship.”). 
 40 This includes statutorily conferred rights, such as the right to a jury trial in pursuing anti-
discrimination claims. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” 
and Lost in the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 383 (1996) (asserting that en-
forcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements “permits the relegation of public-law statutory 
discrimination issues to a forum in which the advantages of judicial review and the relative com-
petence of judges presiding over public trials can be discarded in favor of a procedurally defective 
private forum”); Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Private Resolution of Public Disputes: Employment, 
Arbitration, and the Statutory Cause of Action, 32 PACE L. REV. 114, 129–31 (2012) (suggesting 
that enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements inappropriately subjugates statutory regula-
tion of the employment relationship to principles of private contract). 
438 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:427 
(1) is implemented through a formal writing; (2) alters an established and 
enforceable term of the relationship;41 (3) inures to the detriment of the em-
ployee; and (4) is implemented by the employer with the intent that it will 
be prospectively binding. Given the commonalities in form and effect, it 
makes sense to conceptualize these changes as a distinct problem and apply 
a common doctrinal framework in assessing their enforceability. As the next 
section explains, however, courts have not taken a uniform approach to 
mid-term modifications. 
B. Mid-Term Modifications and the Appeal to Consideration 
Employment law currently does not conceive of mid-term modifica-
tions as a distinct doctrinal problem. Rather, courts respond contextually to 
the recurring factual scenarios described above. The jurisprudence, howev-
er, reveals a common doctrinal split. In all three contexts, courts divide over 
whether the employer must provide “additional” consideration for the 
change in terms. Some courts find a binding modification in the employer’s 
mere retention of the employee, yet others require an additional benefit to 
the worker to as a quid-pro-quo for the adverse modification. 
This section describes these two approaches—what this Article refers 
to as the “unilateral modification” approach and the “formal modification” 
approach—as well as some of the permutations that courts apply in particu-
lar factual scenarios.42 As this section demonstrates, courts widely favor 
unilateral modification when analyzing mid-term noncompete agreements,43 
whereas in the arbitration context they are more likely to demand separate 
consideration in the form of a reciprocal promise to arbitrate.44 In the hand-
book context, the law is more contested.45 The balance appears to be in fa-
vor of unilateral modification, but only where the employer has supplied 
reasonable notice of the change,46 and the dissenting view in favor of for-
mal modification has been cogently articulated.47 
                                                                                                                           
 41 In this context, “enforceable” means a term that either derives from background common 
law or statutory law or that has been conferred contractually, as through a binding personnel man-
ual. 
 42 See Arnow-Richman, Inside Out, supra note 5, at 44–46 (adopting this terminology). 
 43 See, e.g., Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1063; infra notes 48–75 and accompanying text. 
 44 See, e.g., Clemmons v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 397 S.W.3d 503, 507–08 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2013); infra notes 76–103 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
 46 See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 78; infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
 47 See, e.g., Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1153–60 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); infra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
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1. Covenants-Not-to-Compete: Continued Employment as Consideration 
The most developed jurisprudence on the enforceability of mid-term 
modifications is found in the context of noncompetes.48 Unlike arbitration 
agreements and employee handbooks, noncompetes have been used by em-
ployers for centuries, and the law dates back just as far.49 Most jurisdictions 
have addressed the question whether mid-term noncompetes are enforceable 
and under what conditions, and the law is relatively settled. The majority of 
courts have adopted a unilateral modification approach under which em-
ployers may introduce mid-term noncompetes as a condition of continued 
employment.50 
Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, a 2011 decision from the 
Colorado Supreme Court, provides an example.51 In that case, the defend-
ant-employee was a mid-level manager who had been hired to help the 
company expand its urban-centered operations into outlying mountain re-
gions.52 Two years into the relationship, the employer asked the defendant 
to sign a one-year noncompete.53 The employee obliged, but quit the fol-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Lord, supra note 15, at 729 (“Virtually all of the reported decisions concerned with the 
enforceability of promises in an at-will relationship involve disputes regarding the enforceability 
of restrictive covenants.”). 
 49 See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 [350]; see also Daniel P. 
O’Gorman, Contract Theory and Some Realism About Employee Covenant Not to Compete Cases, 
65 SMU L. REV. 145, 179–82 (discussing sixteenth-century English law’s rejection of noncom-
petes and subsequent development of the rule of reason); Stone, supra note 38, at 594–95 (dis-
cussing eighteenth-century English courts’ scrutiny of noncompetes in order to protect the guild 
system). 
 50 Several articles have explored under what circumstances noncompetes introduced post-hire 
should be considered enforceable given the at-will nature of employment. See Leibman & Nathan, 
supra note 4, at 1572–73 (arguing for creation of wrongful discharge statute that would make 
termination for refusal to sign “afterthought” noncompete actionable and require employer to 
provide written notice of employee’s wrongful discharge rights upon introducing agreement); 
Lord, supra note 15, at 761–67 (demonstrating that the various judicial rationales for enforcing 
post-hire noncompetes are theoretically flawed and that courts are effectively enforcing such 
agreements absent consideration); Tracy L. Staidl, The Enforceability of Noncompetition Agree-
ments when Employment Is At-Will: Reformulating the Analysis, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 95, 
118 (1998) (concluding that noncompetes entered into on threat of termination should be unen-
forceable absent a reciprocal employer promise to terminate only for just cause). The author’s 
work in this vein has focused on the particular problem of noncompetes introduced on the day the 
employee begins work or shortly thereafter, a scenario that raises the additional concern that the 
employer may have acted strategically in delaying delivery of the noncompete terms until after the 
employee accepted the job. See Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note 4, at 966–67; Ar-
now-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 638–41. The following section draws on all 
of these works. 
 51 255 P.3d 1058. 
 52 Id. at 1060. 
 53 Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, No. 2004-cv-160, 2007 WL 5333883, at *3 
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 20, 2007), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 224 P.3d 355 (Colo. App. 2009), rev’d, 
255 P.3d 1068. 
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lowing year to accept a position with a competitor.54 In the subsequent suit 
by the employer for breach of the parties’ agreement, the employee con-
tended that the contract was not validly formed because he had not received 
anything in return for his commitment.55 The Colorado Supreme Court re-
jected this argument, holding that the employer had a legal right to termi-
nate the employee at the time that it proposed the noncompete.56 Conse-
quently, its offer to retain the employee in exchange for his promise consti-
tuted a forbearance of the employer’s legal right to terminate, creating a 
sufficient consideration for the agreement.57 
The unilateral modification approach applied in Lucht’s is appealing 
from both an administrative and doctrinal perspective. It is easy to apply 
and it is technically correct under the prevailing interpretation of employ-
ment at will. If one accepts the premise that employers can terminate at any 
time for any or no reason, it follows that they may change terms at any time 
and for any or no reason.58 Each moment of the relationship is a new 
agreement to continue employment on whatever new terms the parties 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1060. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 1061 (“In the context of employment, an employer has a legal right to terminate an at-
will employee at any time because employment at will is a continuing contract between an em-
ployer and an employee that is terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee.”). 
 57 Id. at 1062–63; see also, e.g., Perma-Liner Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Sewer & Drain, Inc., 630 
F. Supp. 2d 516, 522–23 (E.D. Pa. 2008); Lowry Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Head, 984 F. Supp. 1111, 
1115 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Digitel Corp. v. Deltacom, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1486, 1496 (M.D. Ala. 
1996); Mouldings, Inc. v. Potter, 315 F. Supp. 704, 713 (M.D. Ga. 1970); Mattison v. Johnston, 
730 P.2d 286, 290 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Research & Trading Corp. v. Powell, 468 A.2d 1301, 
1305 (Del. Ch. 1983); Ins. Assocs. Corp. v. Hansen, 723 P.2d 190, 191–92 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986); 
Ackerman v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 652 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ind. 1995); Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Rich-
ter, 657 P.2d 589, 591–92 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Cent. Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram Assocs., 622 
S.W.2d 681, 685 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Cellular One, Inc. v. Boyd, 653 So.2d 30, 34 (La. Ct. App. 
1995); Brignull v. Albert, 666 A.2d 82, 84 (Me. 1995); Simko, Inc. v. Graymar, 464 A.2d 1104, 
1106 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983); Raines v. Bottrell Ins. Agency, Inc., 992 So.2d 642, 646 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2008); Comp. Sales Int’l, Inc. v. Collins, 723 S.W.2d 450, 451–52 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); 
Sec. Acceptance Corp. v. Brown, 106 N.W.2d 456, 462–63 (Neb. 1960); Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 
936 P.2d 829, 831–32 (Nev. 1997) (per curiam); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d 
1310, 1312 (N.H. 1979); Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 378 A.2d 1164, 1167 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1977); Lake Land Emp’t Grp. of Akron, LLC v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 32 (Ohio 
2004); Cent. Adjustment Bureau v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28 (Tenn. 1984); Summits 7, Inc. v. 
Kelly, 886 A.2d 365, 372 (Vt. 2005); Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 380 S.E.2d 922, 
926 (Va. 1989), overruled on other grounds, Home Paramount Pest Control Co. v. Shaffer, 718 
S.E.2d 762, 766 (Va. 2011). 
 58 As noted previously, the author rejects this premise in an earlier work, arguing that em-
ployment at will is subject to the general contract rule that parties to an agreement of indefinite 
duration must provide reasonable notice of termination. See Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming 
Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1580–83. The point, however, is that if one accedes 
to the dominant understanding, a unilateral modification rule is the logical corollary. 
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choose.59 This is an odd way to look at the employment relationship, a mat-
ter to which this Article returns in the next section.60 For present purposes, 
it is enough to observe that the characterization yields dissatisfying results 
in the context of a mid-term noncompete. The legal principle underlying 
courts’ inquiry into the sufficiency of continued employment is that “new” 
consideration is ostensibly required for a contract modification: the party 
adversely affected should receive something in exchange for the less favor-
able terms.61 If the employer merely continues the employee’s at-will em-
ployment, that employee is no better off than before the mid-term modifica-
tion with respect to compensation, benefits, and job security. Now, however, 
he or she is subject to additional—and potentially onerous—obligations 
post-employment.62 
For these reasons, some courts have rejected unilateral modification in 
favor of a formal modification rule under which employers must provide 
consideration additional to continued employment.63 Labriola v. Pollard 
Group, Inc., a 2014 Washington Supreme Court decision, illustrates this 
approach.64 Similar to Lucht’s, it involved an at-will sales employee who 
was asked to sign a noncompete several years into his employment.65 The 
court held that, although the agreement would have been enforceable had it 
been executed upon hire,66 an agreement executed post-hire could only be 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1063 (“By virtue of the nature of at-will employment itself, the 
presentation of the [noncompete] agreement was an offer to renegotiate the terms of [Defendant]’s 
at-will employment, which [Defendant] accepted by continuing to work.”); Columber, 804 N.E.2d 
at 32 (“The presentation of a noncompetition agreement by an employer to an at-will employee is, 
in effect, a proposal to renegotiate the terms of the parties’ at-will employment.”). 
 60 See infra notes 134–139 and accompanying text. The author has discussed this issue else-
where. See Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1563–
70 (discussing the disconnect between at-will employment and unilateral contract theory). 
 61 This is essentially a statement of the pre-existing legal duty rule under general contract law, 
although courts addressing mid-term modifications do not invoke the doctrine by name. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (“Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor 
which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration.”); see infra notes 
148–159 and accompanying text. It pertains, however, only where there is a pre-existing “legal 
duty” to perform, something that is absent in employment-at-will relationships. 
 62 See Lord, supra note 15, at 772 & n.149 (citing Columber, 804 N.E.2d at 34 (Resnick, J., 
dissenting)) (“[I]n the end, the employer simply winds up with both the noncompetition agreement 
and the continued right to discharge the employee at will, while the employee is left with the same 
preexisting ‘nonright’ to be employed for so long as the employer decides not to fire him.”). 
 63 See, e.g., Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983); Poole v. 
Incentives Unlimited, Inc., 548 S.E.2d 207, 209 (S.C. 2001); Labriola, 100 P.3d at 794–95; Hop-
per, 861 P.2d at 541. 
 64 100 P.3d at 794–96. 
 65 Id. at 792; see Lucht’s, 255 P.3d at 1060. 
 66 Oddly, almost every jurisdiction that rejects continued employment as sufficient considera-
tion for a mid-term noncompete is willing to enforce one entered into at the commencement of at-
will employment, notwithstanding the fact that an employer’s promise to hire is equally “illusory.” 
See, e.g., Poole, 548 S.E.2d at 209 (“[O]rdinarily employment is . . . sufficient consideration to 
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enforced upon a showing of “independent consideration,” such as “in-
creased wages, a promotion, a bonus, a fixed term of employment, or per-
haps access to protected information.”67 None of these were provided to the 
defendant-employee, who experienced no change in status after the non-
compete.68 Thus, the court found no consideration for the agreement and 
refused to enjoin the employee’s subsequent competition.69 
It is uncertain whether the formal modification approach actually ad-
dresses the problem that inspired it. As Labriola illustrates, some of the 
most common forms of additional consideration recognized by formal mod-
ification courts, including pay raises and promotions, are themselves de-
pendent on continued employment.70 It is difficult to explain how such de-
pendent benefits can confer actual value to the employee, constituting valid 
consideration, when the underlying promise to continue employment re-
mains discretionary.71  
                                                                                                                           
support a restrictive negative covenant, but where the employment contract is supported by the 
purported consideration of continued employment, there is no consideration when the contract 
containing the covenant is exacted after several years employment and the employee’s duties and 
position are . . . unchanged.”); see Lord, supra note 15, at 715 (discussing this paradox). Only 
Texas has rejected the idea that mere at-will employment can constitute consideration for a non-
compete under any circumstances, including at the time of hire. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp 
Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 852 (Tex. 2009) (finding enforceable noncompete 
entered into at the time of at-will hire based on employer’s implicit promise to provide confiden-
tial information which employee in fact received). Thus, whatever the wisdom of hinging nocom-
pete enforceability to the presence of consideration “additional” to at-will employment, Texas law 
is at least internally consistent on this point. 
 67 See Labriola, 100 P.3d at 794. 
 68 See id. at 795 (“Prior to execution of the 2002 noncompete agreement, Employee was an ‘at 
will’ Employee. After Employee executed the noncompete agreement, he still remained an ‘at 
will’ employee . . . .”). 
 69 Id. at 796; see also Access Organics, Inc. v. Hernandez, 175 P.3d 899, 904 (Mont. 2008) 
(finding no consideration because employee received no additional benefit in exchange for signing 
a noncompete four months into employment); Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 220 S.E.2d 
190, 195 (N.C. 1975) (finding no consideration because employee received no additional benefit 
in exchange for signing a noncompete after eight-and-a-half years of employment); Socko v. Mid-
Atl. Sys. of CPA, Inc., 126 A.3d 1266, 1275–76 (Pa. 2015); Poole, 548 S.E.2d at 209 (finding no 
consideration because employee’s “duties, position, and salary were left unchanged”); cf. Free-
man, 334 N.W.2d at 630 (rejecting as consideration indirect benefit that inured to employee as a 
corporate shareholder); Hopper, 861 P.2d at 541 (finding sufficient consideration because em-
ployee received a pay raise after signing a noncompete while already employed). At least one state 
has codified this approach. See OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295 (2015) (requiring that a noncompete 
must either be presented to the employee in advance of employment or “entered into upon a sub-
sequent bona fide advancement of the employee by the employer”). 
 70 See Labriola, 100 P.3d at 794 (citing as examples of additional consideration “increased 
wages, a promotion, a bonus, a fixed term of employment, or . . . access to protected infor-
mation”). 
 71 See Lord, supra note 15, at 741 (observing that a “promise of a raise cannot be considera-
tion for an at-will employee's promise not to compete, since the promised raise might never be 
given, and the employee could be terminated immediately after signing the covenant”). 
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Perhaps for this reason, other courts sympathetic to the position of the 
employee have tinkered with the application of the unilateral modification 
approach rather than search for some new or additional benefit. Thus some 
courts have held that continued employment counts as consideration only if 
expressly indicated: either the agreement must recite that the employee’s 
promise is in exchange for retaining employment, or the employer must 
make clear that absent the employee’s assent he or she will be terminated.72 
Others require that the employer actually retain the employee for an inde-
terminate period of time.73 In such jurisdictions, the promise of continued 
at-will employment ostensibly constitutes consideration, but enforcement of 
the agreement hinges on the degree to which the employee actually benefit-
ed from the promise.74 
Whether these tweaks in fact mitigate the harsh effects of a pure uni-
lateral approach,75 they are the exceptions rather than the rule. In most ju-
risdictions, continued employment alone is sufficient consideration to sup-
port a noncompete agreement added during the course of employment. In 
those states, employers may freely introduce noncompetes at any point in 
the employment relationship, subject only to the noncompete-specific re-
strictions imposed by state law on the scope of those agreements. Defenses 
to enforcement based on contract formation principles have little traction. 
2. Arbitration Agreements: The Reciprocal Promise to Arbitrate 
Courts appear more willing to police contract formation in cases in-
volving mid-term arbitration agreements. As in the noncompete context, 
some courts find consideration for the change of terms in the employer’s 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See, e.g., Ackerman, 652 N.E.2d at 509 (finding consideration because employer explicitly 
promised continued employment); NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 520 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) 
(finding no consideration because employer did not “condition[] employment or promise[] to do 
anything in exchange for [the employee] signing the covenant”). 
 73 See, e.g., Cent. Adjustment Bureau, 622 S.W.2d at 685 (finding consideration where em-
ployees received continued employment for “years” after signing noncompete); Brignull, 666 
A.2d at 84 (finding consideration where employee received continued employment for three years 
after signing noncompete); cf. Diederich Ins. Agency, LLC v. Smith, 952 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2011) (finding insufficient consideration where employee was terminated three months 
after signing noncompete). 
 74 This is arguably the most logically flawed of the various approaches. These courts essen-
tially hold that an illusory promise can be cured by gratuitous post-hoc performance, a concept 
anathema to the notion that consideration requires a “bargained for” exchange. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71; see Lord, supra at note 15, at 765 (critiquing such courts for con-
cluding that “what was initially a bad bilateral bargain . . . can become a good unilateral con-
tract”). 
 75 An approach that enforces mid-term noncompetes only if explicitly agreed to on penalty of 
termination creates a perverse incentive for employers to threaten their employees and to follow 
through on their threats when their demands are not obliged. 
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continued employment of the employee.76 But in contrast to noncompete 
law, courts assessing mid-term arbitration agreements incline toward a for-
mal modification approach, scrutinizing the content of the agreement to de-
termine whether the employer made a reciprocal promise. Absent an em-
ployer promise to arbitrate its own claims or otherwise be bound by the pol-
icy, many will reject the agreement as unenforceable for lack of considera-
tion despite the promise or presence of continued employment.77  
Clemmons v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., a 2013 Missouri 
Court of Appeals decision, offers an example of this reciprocal promise re-
quirement.78 In that case the employee served as the defendant-football 
team’s controller until he was terminated at age sixty.79 In his subsequent 
age discrimination suit, the employer sought to enforce the arbitration 
agreement the employee had signed in the second year of his thirty-eight 
year career.80 The Missouri Court of Appeals held the agreement was unen-
forceable for lack of consideration.81 It found that the employer made no 
reciprocal promise to arbitrate, nor any other future promise to the employ-
ee in the parties’ agreement.82 The court concluded that the mere promise of 
continued at-will employment could not serve as consideration, reasoning 
that absent an express duration or other constraint on the employee’s ability 
to terminate “any alleged promise . . . was illusory and invalid.”83 It reached 
this result despite Missouri precedent recognizing continued employment as 
                                                                                                                           
 76 See, e.g., Tillman v. Macy’s, Inc., 735 F.3d 453, 462 (6th Cir. 2013); Soto v. State Indus. 
Prod., Inc., 642 F.3d 67, 75 (1st Cir. 2011); McNamara v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 570 F.3d 950, 956 
(8th Cir. 2009); Dantz v. Am. Apple Grp., LLC, 123 F. App’x 702, 709 (6th Cir. 2005); Tinder v. 
Pinkerton Sec., 305 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 2002); Kelly v. UHC Mgmt. Co., 967 F. Supp. 1240, 
1260 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Fahim v. CIGNA Inv., Inc., No. 3:98CV232, 1998 WL 1967944, at *3 (D. 
Conn. Sept. 10, 1998); Gadsden Budweiser Distrib. Co., Inc., v. Holland, 807 So.2d 528, 531 
(Ala. 2001); Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109; see also Richard A. Bales, Contract Formation Issues in 
Employment Arbitration, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 456–57 (2006) (discussing court decisions find-
ing continued employment sufficient consideration for arbitration agreement). 
 77 See, e.g., Batory v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 F. App’x 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2005); Caley v. 
Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1376 (11th Cir. 2005); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 603 (3d 
Cir. 2002); Melton v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71 F. App’x 701, 703 (9th Cir. 2003); O’Neil v. Hilton 
Head Hosp., 115 F.3d 272, 275 (4th Cir. 1997); Tinder, 305 F.3d at 736; Clemmons, 397 S.W.3d 
at 507; Toney v. EQT Corp., No. 13-1101, 2014 WL 2681091, at *3 (W. Va. June 13, 2014); 
Harmon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 270, 272 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); see also Bales, supra 
note 76, at 453–55 (discussing court decisions requiring some form of reciprocal promise by the 
employer for enforceable arbitration agreement). 
 78 397 S.W.3d 503. 
 79 Id. at 505. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 507–08. 
 82 Id. 
 83 Id. at 507 (explaining that “[t]he Chiefs could have fired Clemmons fifteen minutes after he 
signed the Agreement without suffering any legal consequences because his employment re-
mained at-will”). 
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consideration in the noncompete context, which it neither referenced nor 
distinguished.84  
Clemmons offers a straightforward example of the application of the 
formal modification rule in a state that applies the unilateral approach to 
noncompetes. Clemmons is factually unique, however. Few arbitration agree-
ments lack a reciprocal employer promise of some sort. An employer’s 
agreement to be bound to its chosen form of dispute resolution sacrifices 
little,85 while providing a form of return consideration distinct from contin-
ued employment that can ensure enforceability in the face of uncertain 
law.86 For this reason, a number of decisions enforcing mid-term arbitration 
agreements do so on the basis of the employer’s reciprocal promise without 
addressing the significance of continued employment at will.87 Others hold 
that both continued employment and the employer’s reciprocal promise 
                                                                                                                           
 84 See JumboSack Corp. v. Buyck, 407 S.W.3d 51, 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013); Collins, 723 
S.W.2d at 452; Ranch Hand Foods, Inc. v. Polar Pak Foods, 690 S.W.2d 437, 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1985). The Clemmons court also rejected the argument that Clemmons’s subsequent employment 
made up for this failure by noting, “A contract cannot be formed in retrospect.” 397 S.W.3d at 
507. That argument—however flawed in its logic—has been accepted by several courts, including 
in Missouri, in the context of mid-term noncompetes. See supra notes 48–75 and accompanying 
text. 
 85 The stakes for employers are especially low if the employer carves out any claims for 
which it might pursue emergency injunctive relief, such as misappropriation of trade secrets or 
breach of a restrictive covenant. Courts have split on whether an arbitration agreement that ex-
cepts the most common, and arguably the most critical, employer claims is so one-sided as to be 
unconscionable. Compare Grabowski v. Robinson, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1173–74 (S.D. Cal. 
2011) (finding an arbitration agreement carve-out exempting restrictive covenant, intellectual 
property, and other claims was lacking mutuality and thus unconscionable as such claims were 
more likely to be brought by the employer than the employee), and Colvin v. NASDAQ OMX 
Grp., Inc., No. 15-cv-02078-EMC, 2015 WL 6735292, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2015) (finding 
similar carve-out for intellectual property claims unconscionable), with Kepas v. eBay, 412 F. 
App’x 40, 48 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding a similar carve-out was sufficiently bilateral and not un-
conscionable because such claims were likely to be brought by both the employer and employee 
since the employer was a “technology company”), and Caley, 428 F.3d at 1378 (holding that alt-
hough the carve-out exempted likely claims by the employer and covered likely claims by the 
employee, it nevertheless was not unconscionable because mutuality of remedy is not required 
under Georgia law), and Fuqua v. SVOX AG, 13 N.E.3d 68, 82 (Ill. Ct. App. 2014) (holding arbi-
tration agreement carve-out for restrictive covenants was enforceable and not unconscionable 
where the employee successfully negotiated for a reciprocal carve-out). 
 86 See DAVID S. BAFFA ET AL., SEYFARTH SHAW, LLP, GUIDANCE FOR EMPLOYERS CONSID-
ERING MANDATORY ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS WITH CLASS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIV-
ERS 7 (2013), http://www.seyfarth.com/dir_docs/publications/GuidanceMandatoryArbitration.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GN9J-LJGT] (recommending that employer policies contain, in addition to a 
reciprocal promise, “processes that place limits on the timing and method for modifying the arbi-
tration agreement” to avoid illusory consideration problems). See generally Mandatory Arbitra-
tion of Employment Claims, 223 EMP. L. COUNSELOR 1 (2009) (calling attention to extent uncer-
tainty over existence of sufficient consideration for post-hire arbitration agreements). 
 87 See, e.g., Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d 470 (10th Cir. 2006); Batory, 124 
F. App’x 530; Caley, 428 F.3d 1359; Najd, 294 F.3d 104; O’Neil, 115 F.3d 272; Snow v. BE & K 
Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D. Me. 2001). 
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constitute the requisite consideration.88 Such decisions reveal a preference 
for the formal modification approach, but are sufficiently ambiguous as to 
leave open the possibility that the court would opt for a unilateral approach 
in the absence of a reciprocal promise.  
On the other hand, for some courts even a reciprocal promise is not 
enough to support a mid-term arbitration agreement. Some refuse to find 
consideration where the employer makes a reciprocal promise, but retains 
the right to modify the arbitration policy.89 Piano v. Premier Distributing 
Co., a 2004 New Mexico Court of Appeals decision, illustrates the distinc-
tion.90 There the employer adopted an arbitration agreement during the 
course of the employee’s employment, which provided that the employer 
was similarly bound to the process and could not change it absent a signed 
writing by the company owner.91 The court refused to enforce the agree-
ment for lack of consideration. It held that neither the employer’s promise 
of continued employment nor its promise to abide by the policy constituted 
consideration for the modification.92 Regarding the former, the court held that 
at-will employment could not constitute consideration because it “placed no 
constraints on Defendant's future conduct,” leaving retention of the employee 
entirely within the company’s discretion.93 Regarding the latter, it held that 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Brondyke v. Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1096 (S.D. Iowa 2013) 
(holding that the employee’s “continued employment and the parties’ mutual promise to resolve 
their disputes in binding arbitration constitute consideration”); Nuzzi v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 
No. 3:09-CV-116, 2009 WL 3851364, at *4–5 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 16, 2009) (deciding that the em-
ployer “allowing plaintiff to continue to work for them constituted adequate consideration” and 
“that the employer is willing to give up its own legal right to defend itself in court, and submit its 
defense to arbitration, constitutes consideration”); Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 F. Supp. 2d 891, 
895 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (concluding that “both the plaintiffs’ continued employment and the par-
ties’ mutual promises to be bound by the Program serve as adequate consideration to make an 
enforceable contract” (emphasis added)); cf. Soto, 642 F.3d at 73–74 (holding that continued em-
ployment was sufficient consideration, and finding that there was mutual obligation because the 
arbitration agreement would only stand if both parties stipulated to it). 
 89 Snow, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 14–15 (holding that the employer’s unilateral authority to modify 
the arbitration agreement made its promise to arbitrate insufficient, illusory consideration); Piano 
v. Premier Distrib. Co., 107 P.3d 11, 16 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Harmon, 697 N.E.2d at 272 
(holding that no consideration was given to the employee for agreeing to arbitrate where the em-
ployer reserved the right to amend or terminate the program at any time and because employees 
were at will). See generally Michael L. DeMichele & Richard A. Bales, Unilateral-Modification 
Provisions in Employment Arbitration Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 63, 69–74 
(2006) (discussing some courts’ refusal to enforce arbitration agreements when employers reserve 
right to modify). 
 90 107 P.3d 11. 
 91 Id. at 13. 
 92 Id. at 14–16. 
 93 Id. at 14. 
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the employer’s ability to unilaterally modify the agreement without need for 
employee approval rendered its promise to arbitrate equally illusory.94  
To be sure, there are some courts that apply a unilateral modification 
rule to mid-term arbitration agreements, consistent with the majority ap-
proach to midterm noncompetes.95 But for others, a different set of rules 
appears to be afoot,96 and few courts acknowledge, let alone defend, the 
distinction.97 One explanation for closer scrutiny of arbitration agreements 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. at 16; see Bales, supra note 76 at 455–57 (describing how courts have found at-will 
employment insufficiently binding on employers to be consideration). But see Blair, 283 F.3d at 
604 (deciding that consideration existed because employer could unilaterally alter arbitration 
agreement only after putting any changes in a writing and submitting them to employee); Sisneros 
v. Citadel Broad. Co., 142 P.3d 34, 43 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (finding adequate consideration be-
cause the employer could not unilaterally alter or terminate the arbitration policy once employee’s 
claims had accrued). 
 95 Jurisdictions that appear to apply a consistent unilateral rule to both contexts include Illi-
nois, compare Melena, 847 N.E.2d at 109 (arbitration agreement), with Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 
24 F.3d 941, 947 (7th Cir. 1994) (noncompete); Michigan, compare Tillman, 735 F.3d at 462 
(agreement), with Head, 984 F. Supp. at 1115 (noncompete); and South Dakota, compare 
McNamara, 570 F.3d at 956 (arbitration agreement), with Cent. Monitoring Serv., Inc. v. Zakin-
ski, 553 N.W.2d 513, 518 (S.D. 1996) (noncompete). For a rare example of a court explicitly 
relying on noncompete law in the arbitration context, see Dantz, 123 F. App’x at 709 (citing 
Columber, 804 N.E.2d at 31–32) (noting that the Ohio Supreme Court had recognized the suffi-
ciency of continued employment as consideration for a mid-term noncompete in upholding the 
disputed arbitration agreement). 
 96 The following jurisdictions appear to apply a formal modification rule to arbitration agree-
ments yet apply a unilateral modification rule to noncompetes: Washington, D.C., compare Jen-
kins v. United Healthcare, No. C.A. 7371-99, 2000 WL 298912, at *2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 
2000) (finding insufficient consideration for mid-term arbitration agreement despite employer’s 
continued employment of employee and mutual agreement to arbitrate), with Ellis v. James V. 
Hurson Assocs., Inc., 565 A.2d 615, 620 (D.C. 1989) (holding continued employment is sufficient 
consideration for a mid-term noncompete where employer actually employs employee for a sub-
stantial period); Georgia, compare Caley, 428 F.3d at 1376 (holding employer’s promises to arbi-
trate its claims and pay costs of arbitration were sufficient consideration for a mid-term arbitration 
agreement), with Mouldings, 315 F. Supp. at 713 (holding continued employment is sufficient 
consideration for a mid-term noncompete); Maine, compare Snow, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 14–15 
(holding continued employment was illusory consideration where handbook containing arbitration 
agreement was modifiable and disclaimed contractual status), with Brignull, 666 A.2d at 84 (hold-
ing continued employment is sufficient consideration for a mid-term noncompete); Maryland, 
compare Mould v. NJG Food Serv. Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 674, 679 (D. Md. 2013) (holding contin-
ued employment is insufficient consideration for a mid-term arbitration agreement and that a mu-
tual promise to arbitrate is required), with Simko, 464 A.2d at 1106 (holding continued employ-
ment is sufficient consideration for a mid-term noncompete); and Missouri, compare Baker, 450 
S.W.3d at 777 (holding that neither continued employment nor reciprocal promises to arbitrate 
constitute sufficient consideration for a mid-term arbitration agreement where employee is at 
will), with Collins, 723 S.W.2d at 452 (holding that continued employment is sufficient considera-
tion for a mid-term noncompete). 
 97 For a rare but stark example, see Jenkins, 2000 WL 298912, at *1–2 & n.1 (citing Ellis, 565 
A.2d 615) (“Although there is case law that permits the court to conclude that continuing em-
ployment with a company after receipt of its arbitration policies may constitute a binding agree-
ment, this court concludes that the instant set of facts does not warrant this conclusion.”); cf. 
Baker, 450 S.W.3d at 792 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “apply[ing] one rule 
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may be the various constraints imposed by the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”), which limits the grounds on which courts may void arbitration 
agreements. Although courts subject noncompetes to state law restrictions 
on their scope and effect, they are expressly prohibited from developing any 
state-specific enforcement limitations that single out arbitration agree-
ments.98 This means that courts have no way to police arbitration agree-
ments other than through the identification of contract formation defects. 
The more incisive examination of these issues in the arbitration context may 
reflect a policy choice by some courts to restrict arbitration through the few 
legal tools ostensibly available to them.  
Another possibility is that courts choose to rest enforcement on the 
employer’s reciprocal promise rather than continued employment in service 
to the U.S. Supreme Court’s separability doctrine. Where an arbitration 
agreement ostensibly governs the parties’ dispute, the FAA limits judicial 
jurisdiction to determining whether the arbitration agreement was validly 
formed.99 In a series of cases, the Court has interpreted this to mean that 
courts should decline to rule on challenges to arbitration that rest on the 
contractual legitimacy of the parties’ overall contract.100 By focusing on the 
reciprocal promise to arbitrate and resisting an assessment of the validity of 
continued employment, courts implicitly sever the agreement from the larg-
er relationship for purposes of adjudicating contractual validity.101  
                                                                                                                           
to an employee’s non-compete promises but . . . a different rule if the case involves an employee’s 
arbitration promise”). 
 98 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). The Act states, 
[A] contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to 
perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbi-
tration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law 
or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 99 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (“[U]pon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbi-
tration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the 
parties to proceed to arbitration . . . .”). 
 100 See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448 (2006); Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967); see also Stephen J. Ware, 
Arbitration Law’s Separability Doctrine After Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. 
L.J. 107, 115–17 (2007) (discussing sources and contours of the doctrine). 
 101 See, e.g., Cheek v. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atl., Inc., 835 A.2d 656, 666 (Md. 2003) 
(invoking separability doctrine in declining to follow case law recognizing an offer of at-will em-
ployment as consideration for an arbitration agreement entered into at the start of employment). 
This is not to suggest that the separability doctrine requires this approach. Indeed, the scope (and 
wisdom) of the doctrine is subject to significant dispute. See Richard C. Reuben, First Options, 
Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts 
with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 827, 845 (2003) (arguing that “separability 
perverts contract law because it assumes away the fundamental principle of contractual consent” 
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Alternatively, courts’ reliance on a reciprocal promise may simply be a 
means of sidestepping the difficult question of consideration in the context 
of at-will employment. If the employer has promised to arbitrate, then the 
court need not struggle to reconcile the “illusory” nature of at-will employ-
ment with the contractual requirement of a binding exchange.  
Either way, it is difficult to square the rejection of continued employ-
ment as consideration in the arbitration context with the majority rule ac-
cepting it in the noncompete context. From a doctrinal perspective, once the 
employee’s assent is established, the question whether the employer provid-
ed consideration for the modification is the same.102 Particularly in those 
jurisdictions that adopt the unilateral approach for mid-term noncompetes, 
one would expect courts to similarly treat continued employment at will as 
sufficient consideration for an employee’s promise to arbitrate. Indeed 
courts are precluded from applying contract principles in ways that “disfa-
vor” arbitration agreements.103 Yet many appear loath to rest enforcement 
on continued employment alone. Whatever the reason, when it comes to 
arbitration, courts generally hinge their decision on the presence or absence 
of a reciprocal promise by the employer and require one that is truly bind-
ing. 
                                                                                                                           
and “should be repudiated as archaic, unworkable”); Ware, supra note 100, at 121 (arguing that 
separability is incompatible with the contractual approach to arbitration, since it separates arbitra-
tion law from defenses to enforcement); cf. Kenneth R. Davis, A Model for Arbitration Law: Au-
tonomy, Cooperation and Curtailment of State Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 195–96 (1999) 
(arguing that compelling arbitration under the separability doctrine despite allegations of fraud 
“would trample the aggrieved party’s freedom of contract”). But see Alan Scott, Everything You 
Really Need to Know About “Separability” in Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 1, 3 (2003) (arguing that despite criticism from respectable academics, separability is “abun-
dantly unproblematic[]”). 
 102 Mid-term arbitration agreements may take the form of general employer policies, and can 
consequently raise assent issues not present in the case of noncompetes, which are always formed 
through an individually signed, written agreement. Where, for instance, the employer notifies its 
workforce of its arbitration policy through an e-mail or by web posting, treating the employee’s 
choice to continue employment as acceptance seems suspect. Courts generally require that, at a 
minimum, the employee had actual notice of the arbitration policy for purposes of assent regard-
less of their position on continued retention of the employee as consideration. See, e.g., Campbell 
v. Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 555–59 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that an e-mail 
announcing a new arbitration policy did not give the employee sufficient notice for purposes of 
assent); Hudyka v. Sunoco, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 712, 716–17 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (same); Acher v. 
Fujitsu Network Commc’ns, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 26, 36–37 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding that an 
employee did not have notice of an arbitration agreement posted on the employer’s website). 
Courts have occasionally imposed a higher threshold for assent akin to a knowing and voluntary 
standard. See Bales, supra note 76, at 449–50. It is likely, however, that such an approach violates 
the FAA’s interdiction against state law rules that disfavor arbitration. See id. at 450. 
 103 Concepcion, 536 U.S. at 363–65. At least one dissenting opinion has contended that the 
failure to follow state law regarding noncompete formation to arbitration agreements violates the 
FAA. See Baker, 450 S.W. at 792 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
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3. Employee Handbooks: Unilateral Modification Plus Reasonable Notice 
Employee handbooks and personnel policies present a third mid-term 
modification scenario, with yet another set of variations. In this context, 
courts have similarly split between those permitting unilateral modification 
and those requiring formal modification. In contrast to both noncompete 
and arbitration law, however, courts applying the unilateral modification 
approach to handbook and policy revisions generally require employers to 
supply reasonable notice of the proposed change.104 Thus, handbook law 
appears to offer something of a middle way between the approaches reflect-
ed in the noncompete and arbitration jurisprudence.105 
Asmus v. Pacific Bell, decided by the California Supreme Court in 
2000, is perhaps the definitive case.106 At issue was Pacific Bell’s discon-
tinuance of its Management Employment Security Policy (“MESP”), which 
promised management employees “employment security through reassign-
ment to and retraining for other management positions” in the event of job 
elimination.107 After approximately six years, Pacific Bell replaced its 
MESP with a policy designed to decrease managerial staff through sever-
ance and benefit incentives.108 A group of affected managers sued for 
breach of contract.109 The employer conceded for purposes of the litigation 
that the original policy was contractually binding and that no material eco-
nomic event precluded its continued enforcement.110 The California Su-
                                                                                                                           
 104 See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 71. 
 105 See Katherine M. Apps, Good Faith Performance in Employment Contracts: A “Com-
parative Conversation” Between the U.S. and England, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 883, 901 
(2006) (describing the reasonable notice of handbook modification rule as an “unsurprising . . . in-
between approach” adopted in the face of “conceptual confusion over the appropriate policy and 
legal basis for handbook variation”). For other articles discussing courts’ struggle to determine the 
appropriate legal standard for enforcing handbook modifications, see W. David Slawson, Unilat-
eral Contracts of Employment: Does Contract Law Conflict with Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WES-
LEYAN L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2003); Brian T. Kohn, Note, Contracts of Convenience: Preventing 
Employers from Unilaterally Modifying Promises Made in Employee Handbooks, 24 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 799, 804–05 (2003); Jason A. Walters, Comment, The Brooklyn Bridge Is Falling Down: 
Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree’s Assent, 32 CUMB. L. 
REV. 375, 375–76 (2002); Bryce Yoder, Note, How Reasonable is “Reasonable”? The Search for 
a Satisfactory Approach to Employment Handbooks, 57 DUKE L.J. 1517, 1517–22 (2008). The 
following section draws from these works. 
 106 999 P.2d 71. 
 107 Id. at 73. 
 108 Id. at 73–74. 
 109 Id. at 74. 
 110 Id. The original policy contained a clause stating that it “will be maintained so long as 
there is no change that will materially affect Pacific Bell’s business plan achievement.” Id. at 73. 
The fact that the policy contained this express limitation was arguably critical to the resolution of 
the case, but was disregarded by the majority based on the stipulations of the parties. See id. at 84–
89 (George, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that the MESP was a contract with a fixed duration un-
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preme Court held that Pacific Bell was not required to provide additional 
consideration to its workforce in exchange for retracting the MESP other 
than continued employment of the affected workers.111 Rather, the court 
concluded that an employer may unilaterally terminate a contractual per-
sonnel policy “as long as its action occurs after a reasonable time, and is 
subject to prescribed or implied limitations, including reasonable notice.”112 
The court did not expound either on the meaning of “implied limitations” or 
what would constitute “reasonable notice.” A vigorous dissent asserted that 
formal modification—requiring new consideration from the employer and 
actual employee assent—was the proper approach.113 
Of all of the mid-term modification scenarios, it is surprising that 
courts would favor unilateral modification in the handbook context given 
the nature of the underlying rights. As Asmus illustrates, the terms at issue 
in handbook modification disputes generally involve limitations on the em-
ployer’s right to terminate.114 This would appear to do away with the ra-
tionale for the unilateral modification approach articulated by courts in the 
noncompete and arbitration contexts. If the employer’s original handbook 
altered the at-will nature of the relationship, then the employer is no longer 
in a position to lawfully terminate the employee and rehire on new terms. 
Whereas the employee faced with a mid-term noncompete or arbitration 
agreement is at will, the employee in the handbook context is ostensibly 
protected by the policy’s original terms. Unilateral modification in this con-
text would appear to be the equivalent of a breach of contract. 
Those decisions eschewing unilateral modification in the handbook 
context—and most commentators opining on the subject—take this posi-
tion.115 For instance, Demasse v. ITT Corp., a 1999 Arizona Supreme Court 
decision, involved the retraction of a handbook policy providing that em-
ployees would be terminated in reverse order of seniority in the event of a 
company layoff.116 A subsequent version of the handbook eliminated the 
                                                                                                                           
der which the employer’s ability to terminate the policy was conditional on its demonstration of a 
material change in circumstances). 
 111 Id. at 81 (majority opinion). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 89–90 (George, C.J., dissenting). The dissent’s primary argument, however, was that 
the propriety of the modification should have been determined based on the material alteration 
clause contained in the original policy. Id. at 84–89. 
 114 At least this is true for cases that are litigated. It is easy to imagine disputes arising over 
changes in other policies, such as vacation, compensation, and benefits policies. In those situa-
tions, the unilateral modification argument, whatever its worth, retains its integrity. 
 115 For a critique of the unilateral modification plus notice rule and, in particular, the Restate-
ment of Employment Law’s adoption of this position, see Matthew W. Finkin et al., Working 
Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Employment Contracts: 
Termination, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 93, 130–33 (2009). 
 116 984 P.2d at 1140. 
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seniority-based policy and provided that employees would be selected for 
layoff based on performance and ability.117 In a breach of contract claim by 
laid-off employees, the Arizona Supreme Court, on certified question from 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, concluded that effective 
modification requires both employee assent and “separate” consideration.118 
Assent, according to the court, means affirmative steps taken with 
knowledge of the proposed change.119 Separate consideration requires 
something beyond mere continued employment. Anything else, reasoned 
the court “brings us to an absurdity: the employer’s threat to breach its 
promise of job security provides consideration for its rescission of that 
promise.”120 
Despite the “absurdity,” the Restatement of Employment Law recently 
approved the holding in Asmus, adopting unilateral modification upon rea-
sonable notice as the proper test for determining the enforceability of hand-
book revisions.121 Tellingly, the Restatement drafters did not offer a con-
tracts-based rationale for its rule, but rather analogized the promulgation 
and alteration of employer policies to the administrative agency rulemaking 
process whereby agencies adopt and revise regulations upon notice and 
comment.122 
This notion that handbook rights arise outside the traditional contract 
framework may explain the reluctance of some courts to apply a formal 
modification analysis to revisions. The Supreme Court of Michigan said as 
much in addressing the issue in 1987 in Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting 
Co.123 In that case, the original manual expressly provided that employees 
could be discharged only for cause.124 A few months before the plaintiff’s 
termination, the employer removed the “for cause” phrase from the manual, 
substituting a statement that employment was at will.125 On certified ques-
tion from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the court rejected 
the contract-based arguments of both parties, holding that employer policies 
                                                                                                                           
 117 Id. at 1141. 
 118 Id. at 1142, 1145. 
 119 Id. at 1145 (“[T]he employee does not manifest consent to an offer modifying an existing 
contract without taking affirmative steps, beyond continued performance, to accept.”). 
 120 Id.; see also Apps, supra note 105, at 893 (“This [unilateral modification] approach has 
drastic results for employees . . . as, by refusing to accept the new terms, they are caught between 
a metaphorical rock and a hard place. . . . [T]he employment contract practically evaporates.”). 
For other decisions rejecting the unilateral modification approach, see Torosyan v. Boehringer 
Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 99 (Conn. 1995); Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 708 N.E.2d 
1140 (Ill. 2009); Brodie v. Gen. Chem. Corp., 934 P.2d 1263, 1268–69 (Wyo. 1997). 
 121 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06; Asmus, 999 P.2d 71. 
 122 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.05 cmt. b. 
 123 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich. 1987). 
 124 Id. at 114. 
 125 Id. 
2016] Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts 453 
could be revoked unilaterally upon reasonable notice.126 The court ex-
plained its decision by invoking the underlying rationale for judicial recog-
nition of binding employer policies. Such policies are enforceable, accord-
ing to the court, not as a matter of strict contract law, but because employers 
implicitly benefit from the more productive and committed workforce that 
good personnel policies occasion.127 Although employees reasonably expect 
employers to abide by their policies while they are in force, they also under-
stand that those policies will change in accordance with the needs of the 
business: “The very definition of ‘policy’ negates a legitimate expectation 
of permanence.”128 
Even in jurisdictions that purport to treat handbooks as the equivalent 
of traditionally formed contracts, a close reading of the cases reveals skepti-
cism about the scope and legitimacy of the employees’ original job security 
rights. The litigation posture of handbook modification cases generally pre-
sumes both that the employer’s original policy eliminated the right to termi-
nate at will and that it became contractually binding. This was the case in 
Demasse, where the Arizona Supreme Court, adopting the formal modifica-
tion approach, emphasized that its decision was based on the phrasing of the 
certified question, which incorporated those premises.129 The dissent, in 
contrast, questioned whether the manual contained binding promises in light 
of the employer’s inclusion of a disclaimer130 and implied that even a con-
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. at 121. 
 127 Id. at 119. As the court explained, 
[A]n employer who chooses to establish desirable personnel policies, such as a dis-
charge-for-cause employment policy, is not seeking to induce each individual em-
ployee to show up for work day after day, but rather is seeking to promote an envi-
ronment conducive to collective productivity. The benefit to the employer of pro-
moting such an environment, rather than the traditional contract-forming mecha-
nisms of mutual assent or individual detrimental reliance, gives rise to a situation 
“instinct with an obligation.” 
Id. (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980)); 
see also Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. 
REL. L.J. 326, 343 (1993) (“The notion of a bargained-for exchange in this setting is a . . . conven-
ient and understandable [fiction]. These advantages have induced courts to stretch unilateral con-
tract theory in order to achieve a desirable policy result: the enforcement of handbook promises 
that benefit employers by creating legitimate expectations among the work force.”). 
 128 Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 120. 
 129 Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1148 (“[T]he question certified requires us to assume the handbook 
and whatever other dealings may have taken place between ITT and the Demasse employees cre-
ated a contractual provision that restricted ITT’s ability to discharge.”). 
 130 The disclaimer was itself added subsequent to the original policy, see id. at 1141, but the 
dissents did not address this detail, see id. at 1153–60 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part); id. at 1160–61(Martone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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tractually binding layoff policy could not have altered the employees’ at-
will status.131 
Thus, the strongly divergent opinions in the handbook context may 
best be explained by different views of the facts rather than the law. Courts 
espousing unilateral modification plus notice may be misapplying their rule, 
granting summary judgment to employers in situations that call for a factual 
inquiry into the job security status of the affected employees.132 This should 
not obscure the critical innovation of a reasonable notice requirement as a 
supplement to the unilateral modification approach. The additional require-
ment of reasonable advance notice has the potential to temper the harsh ef-
fects of the “pure” unilateral rule frequently applied to noncompetes and at 
times to arbitration agreements. Part III will explore this possibility further 
in calling for a uniform reasonable notice approach to mid-term modifica-
tions of at-will relationships.133 For now it is sufficient to note that the 
handbook cases further muddy the water for any attempt to discern a coher-
ent approach to mid-term modifications. 
C. The Law and Policy of Mid-Term Modification Jurisprudence 
As the preceding section demonstrates, the law of mid-term modifica-
tions is inconsistent at best. There appear to be two basic approaches: uni-
lateral, under which continued employment alone will suffice as considera-
tion; and formal, under which some form of “separate” consideration is re-
quired. Courts’ preference for one approach over the other, as well as the 
nuances in how those approaches apply, vary by jurisdiction and within ju-
risdictions across different substantive areas. 
It is difficult to explain these deviations from a doctrinal perspective. 
Courts analyzing mid-term modifications generally treat employment as a 
unilateral contract under which the employer’s offer of employment consti-
tutes an enforceable promise to pay the employee if he or she performs ac-
cording to the proffered terms.134 Only one side is bound—the employer—
                                                                                                                           
 131 Id. at 1156 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Certainly one can draw a 
meaningful distinction between the rights conferred by a seniority-based layoff policy and the 
rights conferred by manuals that explicitly or implicitly promise discharge only for cause. Where 
employers are free to terminate at will, even if obliged to follow certain protocols in exercising 
that right, modifications of their personnel polices should seemingly be analyzed in the same way 
that other mid-term agreements are analyzed. This Article revisits this distinction infra notes 316–
344 and accompanying text. 
 132 This Article returns to this question in greater detail infra notes 372–388 and accompany-
ing text. 
 133 See infra notes 215–295 and accompanying text. 
 134 See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 81 (describing a company’s management security policy as 
an “implied in-fact unilateral contract,” the modification of which was accepted by employees via 
their continued employment); Torosyan, 662 A.2d at 96 (“To determine the contents of any par-
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and only if the employee chooses to accept. As will be discussed in Part III, 
unilateral contract theory is a poor fit for employment, and bilateral contract 
analysis can arguably provide a more accurate and coherent description of 
the relationship. But accepting the prevailing framework, courts’ analysis of 
mid-term modifications does not follow from their initial premises. If the 
employment relationship is a unilateral contract that employees are free to 
reject and employers free not to renew at any point, then unilateral modifi-
cation should be the unequivocal rule for all modifications with the limited 
exception of cases in which the at-will relationship has been altered. This 
would mean that a pure unilateral approach would apply equally to all non-
compete and arbitration modifications, and courts would not need to scruti-
nize whether a particular arbitration policy included a reciprocal, non-
modifiable promise on the part of the employer. Handbook modification 
cases would also follow a pure unilateral modification rule except where the 
employer had previously contracted to provide long-term job security, as 
opposed to some other type of employment benefit. In those situations, 
formal modification would be the rule. Notice would seem to have no place 
in the analysis. 
The absence of doctrinal consistency would be understandable if 
courts’ deviation from general rules of contract law reflected a coherent pol-
icy choice. But courts’ consideration of the policy implications of their de-
cisions is both minimal and simplistic. In the noncompete context, for in-
stance, some decisions espousing the minority view in favor of formal mod-
ification invoke fairness to the employee as a justification. These courts 
point out that an employee who receives nothing other than continued at-
will employment in exchange for signing a noncompete has received noth-
ing more than what he or she already had—a job with no secure future.135 
                                                                                                                           
ticular implied contract of employment, the factual circumstances of the parties’ relationship must 
be examined in light of legal rules governing unilateral contracts.”); Pine River State Bank v. 
Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Minn. 1983) (describing employer’s personnel manual as an “of-
fer of a unilateral contract” that the employee accepted through “continued performance of his 
duties despite his freedom to quit”); Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1267 (describing an employer’s person-
nel manual as “an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract—the employees’ bar-
gained-for action needed to make the offer binding being their continued work when they have no 
obligation to continue”); see also 2-6 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 6.2 (discussing use of unilateral 
contract theory in employment law); Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. 
REV. 551, 559–67 (1983) (discussing employment law’s expansion of unilateral contract theory); 
Yoder, supra note 105, at 1523 (discussing courts’ application of unilateral contract analysis to 
handbooks). 
 135 See Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (N.C. 1944) (“A consideration cannot be constituted 
out of something that is given and taken in the same breath—of an employment which need not 
last longer than the ink is dry upon the signature of the employee . . . .”); Labriola, 100 P.3d at 
795 (“Employer did not incur additional duties or obligations from the noncompete agreement. 
Prior to [its] execution . . . Employee was an ‘at will’ Employee. After Employee executed the 
noncompete agreement, he still remained an ‘at will’ employee . . . .”). 
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This is a legitimate critique of the unilateral modification approach, but one 
that can equally be levied at the formal modification approach. Requiring 
the employer to provide a raise, promotion, or other benefit in addition to 
continued employment does not change the employee’s at will status.136 The 
extent to which the employee receives anything of value for the agreement 
still rests on the employer’s discretionary decision to continue employment. 
On the flip side, those decisions espousing unilateral modification in 
the handbook context often invoke employers’ need for flexibility. Accord-
ing to these decisions, employers must maintain freedom to adjust their in-
ternal policies in the face of changing market conditions.137 Such decisions 
also note employers’ need for uniformity and the administrative burdens of 
a formal modification rule requiring new consideration and individual em-
ployee assent.138 The invocation of these business interests, however, ne-
glects to account for the fact that the employers in such cases elected to 
commit to the original policy on which they intended their workforce to 
rely.139 Contract enforcement is about giving effect to the legitimate expec-
tations engendered by voluntary promises. To the extent employers find 
themselves hemmed in by their policies or unable to efficiently administer 
them, these are problems of their own making.140 
II. CONTRACT MODIFICATION LAW 
What the law of employment modification lacks, the law of main-
stream contract modification may be able to supply. Contract law under-
                                                                                                                           
 136 The author has raised this concern previously in the particular context of handbook modi-
fication. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to Working Group on Chapter 2 of the Proposed 
Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the Restatement in Its Place, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. 
POL’Y J. 143, 155 (2009) (“[H]ow much do workers stand to gain from . . . a rule requiring the 
employer to provide separate consideration in addition to . . . notice of a change in handbook 
terms? It is easy . . . for the employer to grant the worker an extra vacation day, or some other 
peppercorn, in satisfaction of that requirement.”). 
 137 See, e.g., Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1156 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 138 See, e.g., Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 119–20 (“If an employer had amended its handbook from 
time to time, . . . the employer could find itself obligated in a variety of different ways to any 
number of different employees, depending on the modifications which had been adopted and the 
extent of the work force turnover.”). 
 139 Professor David Slawson has made a related argument that permitting unilateral modifica-
tion of handbooks deprives employers of the ability to offer contractually binding job security in 
situations where they genuinely wish to promote employee retention and possibly avoid unioniza-
tion. See Slawson, supra note 105, at 31. 
 140 See id. at 29 (“[A]n employer that finds itself with a confusing mix of unjustifiably differ-
ent employment [handbook] rights for different employees has only itself to blame. If making 
contracts unwisely were a sufficient reason for getting out of them, contracts would be of little 
value to anyone.”). 
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stands modification as the inevitable result of imperfect prediction.141 Life 
changes. This is the reason that parties contract to begin with: to stake out a 
reasonable space of security in the face of an uncertain future—as well as 
the reason they may seek to modify those same contracts—as where chang-
es in circumstances reach beyond what was or could have been anticipated 
at the outset of their relationship.142 Thus, the law of contract modification 
must strike a balance between parties’ need for certainty and their need for 
flexibility.143 
Achieving that balance has been a struggle. Historically courts used 
consideration as the touchstone for determining the enforceability of modi-
fications, much as they use that doctrine today in the context of mid-term 
modifications of employment. But contract law has long since retreated 
from that approach in favor of one that emphasizes fairness and voluntari-
ness. The contemporary rule as to the enforceability of modifications, alt-
hough still contested in many ways, is ultimately about good faith.144 
This Part explores the evolution of the contemporary doctrine of good 
faith modification, laying the groundwork for a good faith-based analysis of 
mid-term modification of employment relationships.145 Section A discusses 
the traditional common law approach to contract modification under which 
enforceability depends on the presence of “new” consideration.146 Section B 
describes the erosion of this rule under the Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) and Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the contemporary 
law’s focus on good faith and voluntariness.147  
                                                                                                                           
 141 See Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680, 681 (1982) (“Contracting parties often desire to alter their 
agreements in response to changes in circumstances or of mind.”). 
 142 See Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 478 (“At 
the most basic level, contract law promises to remedy breaches of contract and provide security of 
expectations. It does this only indirectly and imperfectly. It helps reassure us about the stability of 
an ever changing and frightening world.”). 
 143 See Macneil, Values in Contract, supra note 37, at 362 (discussing the value of peace in 
contractual relations because “conflict exists between the need for measurement and specificity, 
for precision and focus, and for adherence to planning, and the need for flexibility to meet count-
less kinds of changed circumstances”). 
 144 See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) cmt. 2 (“[A]n agreement modifying a sales contract needs no con-
sideration to be binding. However, modifications made thereunder must meet the test of good faith 
imposed by this Act.”). 
 145 See infra notes 144–212 and accompanying text. 
 146 See infra notes 148–159 and accompanying text. 
 147 See infra notes 165–212 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Traditional Approach: Consideration and the Pre-Existing  
Legal Duty Rule 
Historically, the law of contract modification was the law of pre-
existing legal duties. That concept embraces the idea that a performance 
that a contracting party is already legally obligated to provide cannot consti-
tute consideration.148 If A is under contract to mow B’s lawn for $25, A’s 
promise to mow the lawn cannot support an additional, subsequent promise 
from B, such as a promise to pay an additional $5 for the job.149 The effect 
of the pre-existing legal duty rule (“PELDR”) is to render modifications to 
existing contracts unenforceable absent some new or additional considera-
tion from the party advantaged by the modification. 
The intent of the PELDR was to prevent coercion.150 Where a party is 
free to insist on favorable changes in terms post-contract formation, there is 
significant risk of overreaching. For instance, B might schedule A to mow 
her lawn before an important event, such as an open house for the sale of 
her property. When the time for performance arrives, A, knowing B’s situa-
tion, could seek to double the agreed-upon price on threat of non-
performance. B, having no time to find a replacement mower, would be 
compelled to agree. Strict application of the PEDLR prevents this type of 
“hold up game,” rendering B’s reluctant promise of increased compensation 
non-binding.151 
Ironically, contract law’s chestnut case evidencing the risk of coercion 
and the need for a strict PELDR involved a labor dispute—one in which the 
victim, at least as presented in the opinion, was the employer. In Alaska 
Packers’ Ass’n v. Domenico, a 1902 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit decision, fishermen who had been recruited to work in a remote area 
of Alaska during the winter salmon run refused to continue their work with-
                                                                                                                           
 148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“Performance of a 
legal duty owed to a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not 
consideration.”); see infra notes 178–212 and accompanying text. 
 149 2-7 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 7.1. An illustration is instructive: 
If A promises to build a house in return for B’s promise to pay a sum of money, this 
transaction creates a duty in A. But if, after this transaction has occurred, there is a 
subsequent agreement whereby B induces A to build the identical house in return for 
a second promise of new compensation, made either by B or by X, the consideration 
for this new promise is nothing but the performance by A of A’s already existing du-
ty created by the first transaction. 
Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. (“The [PELDR] had its origins in the striking down of coerced modifications. There 
have been tough cases in which one contracting party has been subjected to a holdup game, so that 
the promisor made the new promise under some degree of economic duress.”). 
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out an increase in their base wages.152 The employer agreed to the increase, 
but at the end of the season, refused to pay anything above the original con-
tract wages.153 Calling it a classic example of the type of strong-armed 
modifications the PELDR was designed to prevent, the court held for the 
company.154 
Yet strict application of the PELDR will often preclude enforcement of 
seemingly legitimate modifications. Returning to the prior hypothetical, 
suppose that the morning that A is to mow B’s lawn, the city issues an advi-
sory recommending that all citizens stay indoors due to excessive heat. Well 
before the time for performance, A advises B that he is willing to mow her 
lawn despite the advisory if she will agree to a modest price increase, and B 
gratefully agrees. The modification appears to be fairly reached and reason-
able in light of the circumstances, however, it too is likely unenforceable 
under a strict reading of the pre-existing legal duty rule. A was already obli-
gated to mow B’s lawn at the original price regardless of the temperature. 
A’s recommitment to providing that same service cannot supply considera-
tion for the additional money B has promised to pay. 
Not surprisingly, courts have been eager to avoid such results.155 Ini-
tially they did so by leveraging legal fictions in the context of seemingly 
fair modifications. Under what one might call the “rescission/new contract” 
approach, courts concluded that the parties had mutually agreed to forego 
their previously existing contract rights and entered into a replacement con-
tract.156 Under this view, each party agrees (as a theoretical matter) to give 
up its rights under the first agreement in exchange for the other party’s re-
lease of the same. The parties then agree (again, theoretically) to form a 
new agreement under the terms of the modification. Because this contract is 
ostensibly formed on fresh ground, the PELDR poses no obstacle to en-
forcement.157 
                                                                                                                           
 152 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902). 
 153 Id. at 101. 
 154 Id. at 104. There is of course another version to the story. The fishermen alleged that the 
netting and equipment supplied by their employer were of poor quality, reducing their catch and 
justifying the increase in their base pay. Id. at 101. The court found it not credible that the em-
ployer, which stood to profit from a large catch, would have provided inferior equipment. Id. But 
see Debora L. Threedy, A Fish Story: Alaska Packers’ Association v. Domenico, 2000 UTAH L. 
REV. 185, 211–12 (suggesting reasons why the employer might have had an incentive to reduce 
volume based on the size of the season’s run and the capacity of its cannery). Had the fishermen’s 
version of the facts been credited, it may it may have changed the result—the additional work 
necessitated by the poor nets could have been considered an additional detriment to the fishermen, 
justifying the increased pay. 
 155 See Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the U.C.C.: Good Faith 
and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852 (1979) (describing courts’ re-
sistance to the PELDR which acted as “a roadblock to the free adjustment of contracts”). 
 156 See id. at 853 (discussing this approach). 
 157 Id. 
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Alternatively, under what one might call the “nominal benefit” ap-
proach, courts simply found some token additional consideration flowing 
from the party seeking the modification to the party accepting it.158 Thus, in 
the price renegotiation between A and B, if A were to promise that, rather 
than begin the job at 8:30 a.m., as previously agreed, he will begin fifteen 
minutes earlier at 8:15, B’s promise to pay more for the job would become 
enforceable. It does not matter that this additional promise is a trifle or that 
the primary consideration sought by B’s promise continues to be the mow-
ing service A is already obligated to provide. Because courts do not inquire 
into the adequacy of consideration, all that matters is that something new 
has been supplied.159 
These early interventions proved problematic. In addition to lacking 
intellectually integrity, the approaches failed to achieve the desired result of 
policing modifications. The legal fiction of a rescission and new contract 
could apply to any situation, including those in which the “agreement” was 
procured in hasty or coercive circumstances.160 As for the nominal benefit 
theory, evidence of a trifle consideration arguably does more to suggest 
sharp practices than to assuage concerns over whether an agreement had 
been fairly modified. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts mitigates this 
problem somewhat, providing that an enforceable modification must differ 
from the original bargain “in a way which reflects more than a pretense of a 
bargain.”161 Courts have not vigorously enforced this caveat, however, and 
the doctrine of “sham” consideration appears to be one with limited bite.162 
A different approach was needed. 
                                                                                                                           
 158 Id. at 855. 
 159 2-7 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 7.20 (“[I]f the bargained-for performance rendered by the 
promisee includes something that is not within the requirements of the promisee’s pre-existing 
duty, the law of consideration is satisfied. . . . It is enough that some small additional performance 
is bargained for and given.”). The original Restatement of Contracts enabled such results, provid-
ing that a modification was enforceable if the return consideration differed in any way from what 
was presumed by the original bargain. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84(c) (AM. LAW INST. 
1932); see also Hillman, supra note 155, at 854 (describing the theory as “incentive for a promise 
to create sham consideration”). 
 160 See David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public and Pri-
vate Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 607, 618 
(“There are only a couple of problems with the rescission device: It has virtually no basis in reali-
ty, and it applies just as logically to a coerced modification as to an innocent one.”). 
 161 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73. 
 162 It appears that the sham consideration doctrine has been invoked primarily in situations 
where there is a true failure of consideration or a recited consideration is not actually transferred 
or agreed upon. See, e.g., Weed v. Weed, 968 A.2d 310, 314 (Vt. 2008) (holding that $10 recited 
consideration was not valid where deed was executed prior to receipt and money was not supplied 
until lawyer subsequently expressed concern about enforceability). It is unlikely to nullify a modi-
fication where there is an actual change in performance, however modest. See Snyder, supra note 
160, at 615–16 (expressing doubt whether the sham consideration doctrine can do much to pre-
clude coerced modifications as the doctrine merely asks whether consideration exists and not 
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B. The Modern Approach: Good Faith and Voluntariness 
Over time, the common law retreated further from the PELDR and the 
new consideration inquiry. Although concern remained over the risk of co-
erced modifications, it was clear that the absence of consideration was an 
inadequate proxy for the problem. The drafting of the Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts and the UCC reflected these developments by reframing the 
issue more directly around whether a particular modification is fair and fair-
ly reached. Subsection 1 discusses the Restatement’s departure from the 
PELDR.163 Subsection 2 explores the UCC’s rejection of the doctrine.164 
1. The Common Law Unanticipated Circumstances Exception 
In the case of the Restatement, the drafters retained the PELDR as a 
basic principle,165 but crafted an exception intended to capture those situa-
tions in which a modification is likely to be both fair and voluntary despite 
the absence of consideration.166 Under section 89, a modification of a con-
tract “not fully performed on either side” is enforceable so long as it is “fair 
and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when 
the contract was made.”167 The inquiry proposed by the drafters goes in part 
to the content of the new bargain: revised terms must be justified by unfore-
seen circumstances that the parties failed to account for.168 It also polices 
the process by which the modification is reached, albeit indirectly, through 
the requirement that the contract be fully executory. The risk of coercion is 
strongest where one party has fully performed and the other has not.169 The 
requirement that both sides still hold part of the original consideration os-
tensibly weeds out the most egregious overreaching scenarios. 
Angel v. Murray, a 1974 Rhode Island Supreme Court decision, exem-
plifies the application of the modern rule.170 There the promisor was a waste 
                                                                                                                           
whether it is adequate). For a more thorough discussion of courts’ treatment of nominal considera-
tion and the sham consideration doctrine, see Joseph Siprut, Comment, The Peppercorn Reconsid-
ered: Why a Promise to Sell Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding, but Should Be, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1809 (2003). 
 163 See infra notes 165–177 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 178–212 and accompanying text. 
 165 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73. 
 166 Id. § 89. 
 167 Id. 
 168 See id. § 89 cmt b. This limitation “goes beyond absence of coercion and requires an ob-
jectively demonstrable reason for seeking a modification.” Id. 
 169 Completion of construction post-payment is often cited as the paradigmatic scenario. A 
builder under contract to erect a house who has not fully completed the project, but has received 
all of his or her pay, is in a stronger position to extract a promise of additional compensation in 
exchange for completion than the builder who is still awaiting final payment. See Alaska Packers’ 
Ass’n, 117 F. at 102–03 (discussing this scenario). 
 170 322 A.2d 630, 636–38 (R.I. 1974). 
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collector under a five-year agreement to collect all residential waste in the 
city.171 In the third year of the contract he requested that the city pay him an 
additional sum per annum to reflect the fact that unanticipated real estate 
growth had led to an increase in the volume of waste to be collected.172 The 
city called a public hearing and agreed to the increase by vote of the city 
council. Upon a subsequent challenge to the modification,173 the court held 
that the increased payments were enforceable notwithstanding the fact that 
the collector was already under contract to collect all residential waste.174 It 
noted that the modification satisfied all three elements of Restatement sec-
tion 89: two years of collection services and payment for same were yet to 
be rendered, the increase in residential development went beyond that 
which had been typical of the community and anticipated at contract for-
mation, and the city agreed to the increase through a fair and open pro-
cess.175 
The adoption of Restatement section 89 was neither a watershed nor a 
panacea. Courts had already been avoiding the PELDR, and it is not clear 
that the Restatement had the effect of broadening those rulings.176 Nor have 
courts coalesced around the Restatement’s articulation of the circumstances 
justifying an exception, which arguably do a reasonable job of weeding out 
coercive modifications, but may not cast the net wide enough in saving le-
gitimate ones.177 The point, however, is that the Restatement placed an im-
primatur on what was a growing trend against formal doctrine. The excep-
tions had now officially swallowed the rule. 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Id. at 632. 
 172 Id. 
 173 The challenge was not by the city itself, but was brought by a concerned taxpayer follow-
ing the city’s expenditure of the additional sums. The fact that the city remained willing to abide, 
and indeed did abide, by its modification makes the case unique as an example of voluntariness. 
Id. 
 174 Id. at 637–38. 
 175 Id. 
 176 See Snyder, supra note 160, at 619 (concluding that Restatement section 89 does not “ad-
vance the doctrine much beyond those cases that would dig into the facts and find consideration 
somewhere . . . to support an equitable modification” under the prior law). 
 177 It is possible, for instance, that a modification may be fair and equitable although it is only 
partially executory, as where a significant and unanticipated obstacle to completion of executory 
performance is discovered or occurs after the promisee has received full consideration. B’s prom-
ise to provide additional compensation to A for mowing her lawn during an excessive heat adviso-
ry would be no less equitable if she happened to pay A his fee in advance the day before. See su-
pra notes 148–162 and accompanying text. Similarly, the modification seems fair and equitable 
despite the fact that, depending on the season or location, excessive heat could arguably have been 
foreseen. For these reasons, it is probably fair to characterize Restatement section 89 as replacing 
a technical rule with a technical exception. 
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2. Good Faith Modifications Under the UCC 
The UCC put the final nail in the coffin, rejecting the PELDR alto-
gether for transactions in goods. Section 2-209(1) of the Code states that a 
modification of a contract within the Act “needs no consideration to be 
binding.”178 The explicit purpose of the section is to do away with the 
common law’s overly technical treatment of modifications and grant parties 
greater latitude to adjust their relationship as needed.179 Rather than attempt 
to police modifications through consideration or other proxies, the drafters 
deferred the problem of potentially coercive modifications to the Code’s 
overarching duty of good faith.180 
Good faith has itself been a contested concept in mainstream contract 
law. Current article 1 of the UCC defines good faith simply as “honesty in 
fact” and “the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing.”181 The contours of the duty have been framed largely in theoretical 
terms. Commentators have debated whether good faith imposes a general 
duty—that is, a contractual obligation to avoid any form of “bad faith” be-
havior182—or whether good faith merely precludes the use of contractually 
reserved discretion to reclaim a foregone benefit.183 As such descriptions 
                                                                                                                           
 178 U.C.C. § 2-209(1). 
 179 Id. § 2-209(1) cmt. 1 (“This section seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and 
desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present 
hamper such adjustments.”); see Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1285–
86 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing history of section 2-209 and its rejection of the common law); 
Hillman, supra note 155, at 856 (same); Snyder, supra note 160, at 622–24. 
 180 See U.C.C. § 1-304 (“Every contract or duty within [the UCC] imposes an obligation of 
good faith in its performance and enforcement.”). Commentators have consistently lamented this 
indirect appeal to good faith, noting that the standard for fair modifications ought to appear in the 
actual text of section 2-209. See Hillman, supra note 155, at 900; Snyder, supra note 160, at 623–
24. 
 181 U.C.C. § 1-201(20). This adoption represented an expansion from the original definition, 
which was limited to subjective honesty alone, except in the case of merchants. U.C.C. §§ 1-
201(19), 2-103(1)(b) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LAW 2000). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts a similarly, and more explicitly, ex-
pansive view of good faith, one that “emphasizes . . . consistency with the justified expectations of 
the other party” and excludes conduct that “violate[s] community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a. 
 182 See Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 207 (1968) [hereinafter Summers, Good 
Faith]; Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualiza-
tion, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 818–21, 825–30 (1982). Professor Robert Summers has famously 
described good faith as an “excluder,” incapable of specific definition, that prohibits a variety of 
behaviors, including evasion and delay, willful underperformance, obstructing performance, and 
similar conduct. See Summers, Good Faith, supra, at 201. 
 183 See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 372–73 (1980). Professor Steven Burton has proposed a narrow 
definition of good faith that finds a breach only where a party abuses contractually conferred dis-
cretion to recapture opportunities sacrificed at contract formation. See id. For a useful summary of 
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suggest, questions as to the scope of good faith resonate principally in the 
context of disputed performance. The paradigmatic good faith case involves 
a party tendering performance that meets the letter of the parties’ agreement 
while violating the spirit of their bargain. In such cases, good faith serves as 
a tool of contract interpretation. 
Modification, on the other hand, presents an issue of contract for-
mation. The question is whether the new terms were fairly obtained and 
meaningfully accepted so as to obviate the need for consideration. In this 
context, the law reflects the themes of coercion and efficiency that heralded 
the abandonment of the common law rule. A modification is deemed en-
forceable where the party requesting the change acted “consistent with ‘rea-
sonable commercial standards of fair dealing . . .’ and . . . [was] motivated 
. . . by an honest desire to compensate for commercial exigencies.”184 The 
two-part inquiry tracks the objective and subjective components of good 
faith as defined in UCC article 1.185 Courts must examine the surrounding 
circumstances to determine whether the request for the modification was 
both commercially justifiable and honestly obtained.  
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s 1983 decision in 
Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp. is considered a leading case on 
good faith modification.186 The underlying dispute concerned a year-long 
contract for the sale of various types of steel tubing from Sharon Steel to 
Roth Steel.187 Subsequent to the agreement, significant changes in the steel 
market dramatically affected the price and availability of the product.188 
Sharon unilaterally notified Roth that it would not honor its prices, leading 
to protests and negotiation.189 Roth reluctantly agreed to a price increase 
and subsequently tolerated significant delivery delays, assuming they were 
the result of raw material shortages and Sharon’s allocation system.190 It 
later discovered that Sharon had prioritized large quantities of tubing for 
                                                                                                                           
the dominant theories of good faith, see Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an 
Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1025, 1033–49 (2003). 
 184 Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 146 (6th Cir. 1983) (citation omit-
ted). 
 185 See Jason Scott Johnston, Default Rules/Mandatory Principles: A Game Theoretic Analy-
sis of Good Faith and the Contract Modification Problem, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 335, 376–78 
(1993) (discussing relationship between the general duty of good faith and its application in the 
modification context); Irma S. Russell, Reinventing the Deal: A Sequential Approach to Analyzing 
Claims for Enforcement of Modified Sales Contracts, 53 FLA. L. REV. 49, 67–72 (2001) (discuss-
ing subjective and objective requirements of good faith for merchants under the UCC). 
 186 705 F.2d 134. 
 187 Id. at 137–38. 
 188 Id. at 138. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. at 138–39. 
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sale to a subsidiary capable of selling the product on the market at higher 
prices.191 Roth sued for breach.192  
Assessing the validity of the modification, the court had no difficulty 
concluding that the parties’ price adjustment satisfied the first element of 
the test for good faith. “[T]he single most important consideration,” the 
court explained, “is whether, because of changes in the market or other un-
foreseeable conditions, performance of the contract has come to involve a 
loss.”193 The court concluded that the multiple exigencies facing Sharon 
Steel would prompt an ordinary merchant to seek a price increase in order 
to avoid a loss on the contract.194  
On the second element, however, the court was more opaque. The re-
quirement of “subjective honesty,” it began, means that the modification 
“was, in fact, motivated by a legitimate commercial reason and . . . not of-
fered merely as a pretext.”195 Such language suggests a causal inquiry: the 
factfinder should determine whether the market change was the actual rea-
son for the requested modification. The court went on to say, however, that 
“the trier of fact must determine whether the means used to obtain the mod-
ification are an impermissible attempt to obtain a modification by extortion 
or overreaching.”196 Such language, by contrast, suggests an assessment of 
process: a court should determine whether the manner by which the modifi-
cation was secured created an unfair advantage.197  
Unfortunately, the court’s relatively brief analysis of the second ele-
ment of the UCC modification test does little to elucidate its meaning. The 
facts presented would have supported a conclusion that the modification 
lacked good faith from a causal perspective. One could argue that if Sharon 
had quantities of tubing earmarked for its subsidiary, then market conditions 
were not the direct, or at least not the sole, reason for its price demands and 
delivery delays. But the court did not focus on this. Rather it adopted the 
district court’s finding that Sharon had “threatened” not to sell steel as obli-
gated by the contract and that “consequently, Sharon acted wrongfully.”198 
In so doing it rejected Sharon’s argument that its unilateral price adjustment 
was contractually permissible in the face of industry-wide market condi-
tions, noting that this theory had not been offered at the time modification 
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 192 Id. at 140. 
 193 Id. at 147. 
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 196 Id. (emphasis added). 
 197 Indeed, the court dropped a footnote likening the inquiry to a procedural unconscionability 
analysis. Id. at 146 n.24. 
 198 Id. at 148. 
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was sought.199 Distinguishing cases involving legitimate invocation of con-
tractually reserved discretion, the court held that Sharon had not “rebutted 
the inference of bad faith that rises from its coercive conduct.”200 Thus, it 
appears the court’s decision was based on the manner in which the modifi-
cation was obtained: the buyer’s accession to the price increase was a re-
sponse to threatened non-performance rather than the product of reasoned 
negotiation.201 
In this way, the section 2-209 good faith analysis is reminiscent of the 
defense of economic duress, which focuses on the “wrongfulness” of the 
promisee’s behavior and its effects on the promisor. As traditionally con-
ceived, duress precludes enforcement of an agreement achieved by a 
wrongful threat that overcomes free will.202 As elaborated upon in the modi-
fication context, courts will refuse to enforce a supposedly voluntary modi-
fication where agreement was procured through a threat of breach and the 
subjugated party was unable to secure needed goods or services other than 
by acceding to the promisee’s new demands.203 In particular, courts look to 
whether the acquiescing party could have replaced the would-be breaching 
party by obtaining the promised performance through other means and re-
couping its losses through later litigation. In effect, the question is whether 
the party accepting the modification had an opportunity to “cover.”204  
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., a 1971 New York Court of Ap-
peals decision, provides an example.205 In that case, the parties were a gov-
ernment contractor engaged to build military radars, and the subcontractor 
supplying specialized gears for the radars.206 As a result of rising material 
costs, Austin, the subcontractor, threated to discontinue performance if it 
did not receive several additional subcontracts as well as retroactive price 
increases on gears already promised or provided.207 Loral, the government 
                                                                                                                           
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 See id. This is, of course, one interpretation from among many. For other readings of Roth 
Steel, see Johnston, supra note 185, at 379–90 (reading the second prong of the Roth Steel test as 
requiring an assessment of the promisee’s motive consistent with the foregone benefit approach to 
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doctrine of duress, tolerates some coercive modifications and arguing for an alternative test fo-
cused directly on coercion). 
 202 See 7-28 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 28.2. 
 203 See Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175; Meredith R. Miller, Revisiting Austin v. Loral: A Study in 
Economic Duress, Contract Modification and Framing, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 357, 358–61 (2006) 
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contractor, was obligated to provide the radars to the military under strin-
gent time constraints subject to liquidated damages and cancellation claus-
es.208 After contacting its other approved suppliers, none of whom could 
guarantee performance within its timeframe, Austin agreed to Loral’s de-
mands.209 In the subsequent dispute over the enforceability of the modifica-
tion, the New York Court of Appeals held that Loral’s concession was ex-
tracted by duress.210 Central to the court’s holding was Loral’s inability to 
find timely replacement gears and the consequences of a possible default. It 
noted that none of the replacement suppliers Loral contacted could guaran-
tee timely delivery and that, because Loral was producing a highly special-
ized military product, it would have been extremely risky to consider other 
non-approved vendors.211  
This is not to suggest that the law of modification is coextensive with 
the rule of duress.212 The point simply is that, whatever doctrine one ap-
plies, the contemporary law of modifications is about coercion, not consid-
eration. The common law continues to assume modifications without con-
sideration are unenforceable, but it allows an increasingly broad array of 
exceptions based on fairness and unforeseen circumstances. The UCC in-
verts the PELDR altogether. The Code assumes modifications are enforcea-
ble, provided they are objectively justified and honestly obtained. 
III. A CONTRACT LAW APPROACH TO MID-TERM MODIFICATIONS:  
THE REASONABLE NOTICE RULE 
The previous Part describes the contemporary approach to the en-
forcement of contract modifications in mainstream contract law, which em-
phasizes good faith and voluntariness. This Part reexamines mid-term modi-
                                                                                                                           
 208 Id. at 534. 
 209 Id. at 535. 
 210 Id. at 536. 
 211 Id. at 537. See generally Miller, supra note 203 (providing an extensive reconsideration of 
the Austin decision). 
 212 Duress sets an extremely high bar for voiding a contract to which parties objectively ap-
pear to have agreed. See generally Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress 
Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 443 (2005) (discussing courts’ limited application of the doctrine of 
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. . . [or] in terms of duress”), and Hillman, supra note 155, at 879 (arguing that contract modifica-
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restrictive when applied to a modification”). 
468 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:427 
fication jurisprudence through this lens. It argues that a reasonable notice 
rule, similar to that adopted by the California Supreme Court in the context 
of handbook modifications, should apply to all mid-term modifications of 
at-will employment. Section A argues that such a rule reflects the process 
concerns that underlie the notion of good faith modification by constraining 
employers’ ability to threaten immediate termination while retaining the 
basic principles of employment at will.213 Section B argues that reasonable 
notice also serves as the consideration required under traditional common 
law modification analysis.214 The proposed rule is therefore consistent with 
both the theory and doctrine of mainstream contract modification law. 
A. Reasonable Notice as Contractual Good Faith 
Mid-term modification jurisprudence, examined through the lens of 
contemporary contract law, appears starkly retrograde. Contrary to the 
UCC’s interdiction against overly technical applications of the considera-
tion doctrine, mid-term modification law is highly formalistic. Either con-
sideration is satisfied because the employer hypothetically forbore from 
exercising its right to terminate, or it is satisfied because the employer pro-
vided some independent, but often employment-dependent, benefit. In this 
way, both mid-term modification approaches are reminiscent of the early 
common law workarounds of the traditional PELDR.215 The unilateral ap-
proach is the equivalent of the traditional “rescission/new contract” excep-
tion, under which parties were deemed to have released one another from 
their original contract and formed a new one under new terms.216 The for-
mal approach replicates the “nominal benefit” exception under which courts 
seize on any identifiable change in the performance of the promisee to justi-
fy a conclusion that new consideration was supplied.217 
 What courts have failed to do in analyzing mid-term modifications is 
to consider whether a particular modification is consistent with the contem-
porary doctrine of contractual good faith. What a “good faith” modification 
looks like is far from obvious when that concept is imported to the em-
ployment context. Employers are free to hire on whatever terms they wish 
and terminate workers for any or no reason. Indeed, contemporary justifica-
tions for employment at will rest in large part on the need for significant 
deference to termination decisions given the costs of judicial assessment of 
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employer discretion.218 Allowing courts to assess employers’ rationale for 
modifying terms, consistent with good faith’s commercial reasonableness 
test, would be incompatible with these principles.  
Employment at will, however, does not preclude judicial inquiry into 
the manner in which a modification is obtained. This second prong of the 
UCC test can support an employment law reading of good faith that re-
quires reasonable advance notice of mid-term modifications. Such a rule 
strikes a balance between preserving flexibility and preventing coercion by 
ensuring that the employee has an opportunity to consider alternatives be-
fore acquiescing to the modification. Subsection 1 redefines the duty of 
good faith in employment law as a procedural obligation.219 Subsection 2 
demonstrates how a reasonable notice rule fulfills employers’ duty of pro-
cedural good faith in the mid-term modification context.220  
1. Redefining Good Faith in Continuing Employment Relationships 
Claims sounding in good faith have had little traction in the employ-
ment context. Courts historically have expressed concern that any constraint 
on employer discretion, even one tied to bad faith behavior, violates the 
doctrine of employment at will. Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 
a 1983 decision of the New York Court of Appeals, illustrates this view.221 
In that case, the court rejected a claim by an accountant allegedly fired for 
reporting financial mismanagement.222 Although the court acknowledged 
the existence of the implied duty of good faith as a general matter, it held 
that the application of the duty must be limited by “other terms of the [em-
ployment] agreement.”223 Noting that the law accorded the employer “an 
unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time,” the court assert-
ed, “it would be incongruous to say that an inference may be drawn that the 
employer impliedly agreed to a provision which would be destructive of his 
right of termination.”224 
                                                                                                                           
 218 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 
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Other jurisdictions have been less hostile to employee good faith 
claims than New York. But even those that accept such claims, have done so 
only in narrow circumstances involving the employer’s failure to pay de-
ferred compensation.225 This limited reading has been endorsed by the Re-
statement of Employment Law, notwithstanding scholarly criticism,226 and it 
appears that no court has adopted the broad definitions of good faith es-
poused by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and UCC in the context of 
employment at will.227  
Even so, it would be premature to write off the duty of good faith in 
employment altogether. Murphy and most other employment law cases ad-
dressing good faith do so in the context of termination rather than modifica-
                                                                                                                           
termination in employment law constrains courts in applying the duty of good faith in at-will em-
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 225 See, e.g., Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977) (per-
mitting cause of action for recovery of lost commissions where employee was terminated follow-
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 226 See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.07 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“The implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing applies to at-will employment relationships . . . . [It] includes the duty 
not to terminate or seek to terminate the employment relationship for the purpose of . . . prevent-
ing the vesting or accrual of an employee right or benefit . . . .”). For a critique of this position, see 
Finkin et al., supra note 115, at 138–41 (challenging the drafters of the Restatement to justify their 
departure from the application of good faith in mainstream contract law). 
 227 Cf. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAW 2015); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
1981); supra notes 178–212 and accompanying text. But see Finkin et al., supra note 115, at 138–
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ployment has led to pessimism among some employment law scholars as to the utility of the cove-
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notions of employment at will are likely to continue deterring courts from applying the duty of 
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success. See, e.g., J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest Pro-
posal to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 371–76 (1995); Henry H. Per-
ritt, Jr., Implied Covenant: Anachronism or Augur?, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 683, 684–87 (1990). 
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tion, and it is by no means clear that the same standard ought to apply.228 
Good faith arises from and endures only as long as the parties’ contract, and 
it is arguably in the course of their relationship that the duty does most of its 
work. In the commercial context, the defense of bad faith modification is a 
distinct doctrine separate and apart from the general breach of good faith 
duty claim. Indeed it is during renegotiation that parties are most likely to 
rely on relational norms like trust and fair dealing229—contexts and expecta-
tions that may not be well reflected in existing case law.230 When such mat-
ters are litigated, as with mid-term modifications, it may makes sense to 
apply a broader understanding of good faith than would be applicable in 
assessing an alleged breach of performance.  
Moreover, the inconsistency between employment at will and the duty 
of good faith arises primarily where the latter doctrine is equated with a 
substantive limitation on employer discretion—in Murphy, a limitation on 
the allowable reasons for termination. But good faith in employment can 
also be understood as a procedural obligation, one that requires employers 
to act fairly in carrying out discretionary modifications that are otherwise 
immune from substantive review.231  
A reasonable notice rule, similar to that adopted in the handbook cases, 
embodies that obligation. To be sure, no court has yet tied the unilateral 
modification plus notice approach to principles of good faith,232 and there 
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has been little scholarship exploring the connection.233 Yet, the doctrine and 
policy behind contemporary modification law appear to supply a ready 
foundation for the rule, as well as a basis for extending it to other mid-term 
modifications. Reasonable notice effectuates the goals of the second prong 
of the UCC modification test by policing the way in which employers se-
cure assent to their proposed modification. Irrespective of employment at 
will, an employer’s threat of immediate termination is a distinct form of pres-
sure that derives its power from the existing and, from the employee’s per-
spective, exclusive contractual relationship.234 Finding alternate employment 
takes time, and the best way to finance a job search is to remain employed.235 
                                                                                                                           
has been offered is an analogy to administrative agencies, which have the authority to issue and 
revise rules at their election subject to a notice and comment period. See Demasse v. ITT Corp., 
984 P.2d 1138, 1158 (Ariz. 1999) (en banc) (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting HENRY H. PERRITT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW & PRACTICE § 4.44 (3d ed. 1992)). 
As previously discussed, the Restatement of Employment drafters cite this analogy with approval. 
See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.05 cmt. b; supra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
Interestingly, these courts and commentators consider only the notice aspect of the administrative 
process in drawing this analogy. None suggest that employees ought to have a formal process 
through which to protest or influence the content of the employer’s proposed changes consistent 
with the administrative comment process. 
 233 The key exception is Apps, supra note 105, at 916–20, which explores the use of the good 
faith doctrine to support the handbook notice rule by reference to the comparable, but more expan-
sive requirement, of “mutual trust and confidence” under English law. Cf. Slawson, supra note 
105, at 23 (critiquing the unilateral modification plus notice approach, but asserting that the duty 
of good faith would limit an employer’s discretion to modify its handbooks and policies under any 
provision expressly reserving that right). 
 234 See Kadis v. Britt, 29 S.E.2d 543, 548 (N.C. 1944) (remarking that “[u]nemployment at a 
future time is disturbing—its immediacy is formidable” in rejecting unilateral modification ap-
proach to enforceability of mid-term noncompete). 
 235 It is unclear whether an employee terminated for refusing to accept a mid-term modifica-
tion could receive unemployment insurance. Employees may not receive compensation during 
unemployment resulting from a voluntary termination or termination for misconduct, including 
refusing work orders. See, e.g., Doby v. Okla. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 823 P.2d 390, 392–93 (Okla. 
Civ. App. 1991) (holding that employee who refused to take a drug test was terminated for mis-
conduct and thus was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits). At least some states 
will allow benefits to an employee terminated for refusing to accept unlawful or unreasonable 
terms of employment. See, e.g., Tourte v. Oriole of Naples, Inc., 696 So. 2d 1283, 1284–86 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that former employee who voluntarily resigned because her employ-
er required her to leave her secretarial position for a more “stressful” sales position was entitled to 
unemployment compensation benefits); Indianapolis Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Jones, 669 N.E.2d 
431, 432–35 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that former employee who voluntarily resigned follow-
ing employer insistence that she change shifts to one during which she had no child care was enti-
tled to unemployment compensation benefits). Regardless, unemployment insurance is a weak 
substitute for continued employment. Most workers receive approximately half of their weekly 
earnings, subject to a state-imposed cap. See Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative 
Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 444 (2014) 
(broadly describing U.S. unemployment system); Frans Pennings & Paul M. Secunda, Towards 
the Development of Governance Principles for the Administration of Social Protection Benefits: 
Comparative Lessons from Dutch and American Experiences, 16 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WEL-
FARE L. REV. 313, 331–33 (2015) (examining Wisconsin’s unemployment system). In addition, 
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The employer who requires a worker to accept a mid-term modification on 
penalty of immediate termination capitalizes on that reality, effectively pre-
venting the employee from meaningfully evaluating the new terms by 
“shopping around” prior to acceptance.  
In this way, the reasonable notice rule also reflects one of the core 
components of the economic duress doctrine. The modern version of the 
doctrine will void a contract where the promisee secures assent through an 
“improper threat . . . that leaves the [promisor] no reasonable alterna-
tive.”236 In the context of modification, an “alternative” refers to an availa-
ble source of the goods or services owed under the pre-existing contract.237 
Assent is deemed lacking in those cases where, due to the circumstances or 
the urgency of the promisee’s modification demand, the promisor is unable 
to find a replacement supplier.238 In the employment context, the equivalent 
supplier is a new employer, and the ability to find one hinges on the em-
ployee’s receipt of sufficient advance notice.  
                                                                                                                           
some evidence suggests that it is more difficult to find new work while unemployed than while hold-
ing a job. See generally Winnie Hu, When Being Jobless Is a Barrier to Finding a Job, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/nyregion/for-many-being-out-of-work-is-chief-
obstacle-to-finding-it.html [http://perma.cc/K4YH-T9LL] (discussing long-term unemployment’s 
effect on job applicants and state legislative efforts to prevent discrimination of unemployed); Jen-
nifer Peltz, NYC Adopts Tough Jobless-Discrimination Law, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 13, 2013), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nyc-adopts-tough-jobless-discrimination-law/ [https://
perma.cc/AUZ7-L3M7] (discussing New York City’s new law banning discrimination of unem-
ployed); Brad Plumer, Companies Won’t Even Look at Resumes of the Long-Term Unemployed, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/04/15/companies-
wont-even-look-at-resumes-of-the-long-term-unemployed/ [https://perma.cc/UAQ9-WNN2] (dis-
cussing reasons for and possible solutions to companies’ aversion to hiring candidates who are un-
employed); Megan Woolhouse, Project Aims to Assist Long-Term Unemployed: MIT Professor 
Launching Effort to Help Them Overcome Barriers, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 17, 2013), https://www.
bostonglobe.com/business/2013/11/17/the-science-rejection-helping-long-term-unemployed/sZRfIq
C77cyYQ2ZZNcgv7L/story.html [http://perma.cc/W8Y6-4WUT] (discussing study that found em-
ployers showed four times more interest in candidates experiencing short-term rather than long-
term unemployment, even if the former had less experience and fewer qualifications). 
 236 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175. 
 237 See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533 (N.Y. 1971); supra notes 
178–212 and accompanying text. 
 238 A similar rationale underlies the UCC’s rule requiring reasonable advance notice of con-
tract termination. See U.C.C. § 2-309 cmt. 8 (recognizing that “the application of principles of 
good faith and sound commercial practice normally call for such notification of the termination of 
a going contract relationship as will give the other party reasonable time to seek a substitute ar-
rangement”); Pharo Distrib. v. Stahl, 782 S.W.2d 635, 638–38 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989) (finding 
breach of contract because distributor’s provision of only six days’ notice of termination deprived 
the sub-distributor of “an opportunity to make appropriate arrangement[s],” such as finding a 
replacement supplier, unloading inventory, and making workforce adjustments). In a previous 
work, the author discusses this law in greater detail, proposing an analogous interpretation of em-
ployment law that would require reasonable advance notice of at-will termination. See Arnow-
Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1545–48. 
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To be sure, this is not a precise analogy. Employers have no underlying 
contractual obligation to retain workers employed at will. Hence, a threat of 
termination, regardless of its form, does not herald the breach of a legal du-
ty.239 Yet, the threat of breach standard is merely an elaboration on the re-
quirement that the promisee’s conduct be wrongful, and one of limited utili-
ty in the modification context.240 All modification demands are implicit or 
explicit threats not to perform a binding obligation;241 at the same time, a 
modification demand may be coercive even if it does not endanger pre-
existing legal rights.242 The question is how and under what circumstances 
the demand is made. Although the law inclines naturally toward legal base-
lines,243 other means of assessing coercion are possible and appropriate.244 
Thus, it has been suggested in the philosophical literature that a proposal 
may be coercive notwithstanding its legality where the offeror limits or un-
dermines the offeree’s freedom to create or pursue a more desirable situa-
tion.245 Such conduct distinguishes offers that merely exploit an offeree 
                                                                                                                           
 239 See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 83, 122–24 (1996) (explaining how an employer’s freedom to determine who to hire and 
whether to fire precludes application of the duress defense to employment arbitration agreements 
regardless of when the employee consented). 
 240 Indeed the meaning of “wrongful” or “improper” for purposes of establishing the general 
defense of duress has been equally if not more contested. Compare Giesel, supra note 212, at 448 
(emphasizing the lack of reasonable alternatives available to the promisor over the wrongfulness 
of the threat), with Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 717, 
718–20 (2005) (eschewing classic duress formulation in favor of enforcing contracts formed under 
a credible, rather than strategic, threat in order to preserve promisor’s ability to make a binding 
commitment to its choice of last resort). The Restatement offers a catalogue of circumstances 
under which a threat should be deemed “improper” for purposes of duress. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176. 
 241 See Hamish Stewart, A Formal Approach to Contractual Duress, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 175, 
198 (1997) (“[A]ny proposal to modify an existing contract could be construed as a threat of 
breach, but that would be a highly undesirable result . . . .”). 
 242 Id. at 183–85 (describing scenarios in which a proposal is not wrongful in the legal sense, 
but it appears that the promisor should be relieved of his or her promise due to business compul-
sion). 
 243 See Snyder, supra note 160, at 679 (asserting that such baselines are “within the compe-
tence of the law” in proposing a coercion-based UCC modification test that turns on the presence 
of a threat to deprive the victim of a legal right); Stewart, supra note 241, at 237–38 (rejecting 
“empirical theories” of coercion in favor of a legal baseline in proposing a narrow, formal account 
of duress that does not “depend on factors extrinsic to law itself”). 
 244 See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 204–21 (1987) (discussing various moral and non-
moral baselines for determining whether an offer is coercive). 
 245 See David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121, 133–34 (1981). 
Zimmerman uses the example of an employer who kidnaps and abandons a worker on a desert 
island where it is the only employer and then offers employment at a subsistence wage. Id.; cf. 
Giesel, supra note 212, at 492 (“Setting aside a contract on the basis of duress is just and justifia-
ble when one party has no reasonable alternative to the problematic bargain and when the other 
party has been proven to be particularly blameworthy regarding the constrained nature of the 
deal.”). 
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whose limited options owe to independent or pre-existing circumstances.246 
This framework describes precisely the situation of the at-will employee 
presented with a mid-term modification. The employee’s poor bargaining 
position owes principally to the dominant rule of employment at will, but 
the employer’s choice to present the modification on penalty of immediate 
termination exacerbates the pre-existing power imbalance.247 Having re-
ceived no advance warning, the employee must accept the new terms with-
out any realistic opportunity to better his or her bargaining position by seek-
ing an alternative offer. 
In sum, a reasonable notice requirement operates to separate wrongful-
ly exacted modifications from legitimate ones by ensuring a period of time 
between the announcement of a modification and its implementation. It re-
moves the threat of an immediate loss of income, which would otherwise 
force employee acquiescence. More importantly, it guarantees the employee 
a period of time in which he or she can rely on the old terms and consider 
alternatives.248 Rather than having to unconditionally accept the modifica-
tion, the employee has an opportunity to compose his or her response, 
whether it is an attempt at negotiation, an adjustment in expectations, or a 
decision to seek a “replacement supplier” in the form of a new employer.  
2. Achieving Good Faith Employment Modifications Through Reasonable 
Notice  
The proposed theory of procedural good faith has yet to be explicitly 
adopted by courts, but there is at least some case law demonstrating its po-
tential applicability. The Alaska Supreme Court has drawn the connection 
between good faith and advance notice of mid-term modifications in the 
context of an employer drug testing policy. Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drill-
ing Inc., a case heard in the Alaska State Supreme Court in both 1989 
(Luedtke I) and 1992 (Luedtke II), involved a drilling rig worker who was 
                                                                                                                           
 246 See Zimmerman, supra note 245, at 133–34. Zimmerman distinguishes an offer from a 
second island employer who has no part in confining the worker to the island but offers a similarly 
depressed wage, labeling this offer exploitive rather than coercive. Id. 
 247 In this way, this Article distinguishes its proposal from those that would set aside contracts 
in recognition of limited volitional capacity resulting from particular societal inequities. See, e.g., 
Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 171, 198 (2013) 
(calling for a broader duress doctrine that takes account of existing power imbalances between the 
parties in the context of spousal agreements). 
 248 Because of the advance notice requirement, one would anticipate that in most cases the 
employee would not be subjected to discharge for refusing to accept a mid-term modification until 
the date of implementation. It might be necessary, however, to recognize a cause of action for 
breach of the duty of good faith where the employer anticipatorily terminates the worker for an 
expected refusal to acquiesce. Of course, the employer would remain free to terminate for other 
reasons during the notice period consistent with employment at will. 
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suspended for testing positive for marijuana and terminated when he failed 
to appear for a retest.249 In its first decision, the court found nothing unlaw-
ful in the employee’s termination, concluding that the employer’s interest in 
safety outweighed the employee's interest in privacy.250 In the second deci-
sion, however, it held that the employer’s initial suspension of the employee 
violated the duty of good faith because the employer had failed to provide 
the worker with advance notice of its drug testing policy.251 Analogizing to 
the UCC, the court explained that the duty of good faith not only has sub-
stantive content, but also requires that the employer act in “a manner which 
a reasonable person would regard as fair.”252 
In many ways, Luedtke II is an outlier, sounding principally in privacy 
law and the public policy tort.253 It appears that the procedural limitations 
the court imposes on employer discretion owe more to the bodily integrity 
issues implicated in drug testing than to the court’s understanding of the 
contract rights of the employee.254 Yet, the connection the court draws be-
tween notice and the duty of good faith is informative. In adopting a rea-
sonable notice requirement, the court explains:  
We agree that there is no evidence of subjective bad faith on Na-
bors’ part, but . . . the covenant of good faith and fair dealing also 
requires that the employer be objectively fair. . . . As we stated in 
Luedtke I: . . . “[b]y requiring a test, an employer introduces an 
additional term of employment. An employee should have notice 
of the additional term so that he may contest it, refuse to accept it 
and quit, seek to negotiate its conditions, or prepare for the test so 
that he will not fail it and thereby suffer sanctions.”255 
In short, the court invoked all of the hallmarks of a modification achieved in 
good faith under the procedural prong of the mainstream contract rule.  
The handbook modification cases adopting a reasonable notice rule 
similarly provide guidance as to how a procedural good faith rule might 
operate. Asmus v. Pacific Bell, the key California Supreme Court decision 
from 2000, does not invoke the duty of good faith in its analysis, but the 
                                                                                                                           
 249 Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. (Luedtke II), 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992). 
 250 Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. (Luedtke I), 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1989). 
 251 Luedtke II, 834 P.2d at 1222, 1226. 
 252 Id. at 1224. 
 253 See id. In Alaska, the prohibition against terminations that violate public policy, a free-
standing tort in most jurisdictions, is “largely encompassed within the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.” Knight v. Am. Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 792 (Alaska 1986). 
 254 Luedtke I extensively discussed various sources of state law protection for individual pri-
vacy, concluding that the employer’s safety-based interest in drug testing had to be balanced 
against the employees’ rights. See Luedtke I, 768 P.2d at 1131–37. 
 255 Luedtke II, 834 P.2d at 1225–26 (quoting Luedtke I, 768 P.2d at 1137 (footnote omitted)). 
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facts of the case offer a clear illustration of procedural fairness consistent 
with such principles.256 There the employer took a series of steps leading up 
to the cancelation of its disputed management security policy. The original 
MESP included a disclaimer, cautioning managers that it would be main-
tained only so long as market conditions permitted.257 Four years after it 
issued the MESP, Pacific Bell sent a letter to managers stating that it was 
monitoring market conditions and might be forced to change the policy.258 
Two years later the company announced that it would terminate the MESP, 
but that the change would occur in six months.259 Thus, when the employer 
ultimately did change its policy, employees had known for six years that it 
could happen, for two years that it might happen, and for six months that it 
actually would.  
To be clear, the point here is not to endorse the particular result in As-
mus.260 Nor is it to suggest that every policy change should necessitate six 
years’ notice, or even six months’ notice.261 Rather it is to demonstrate the 
potential for a robust reasonable notice rule that can ameliorate somewhat 
the employee’s untenable position of having to choose between accepting a 
modification or facing immediate termination.262 A reasonable notice re-
quirement advances the policies behind contemporary modification law and 
in some cases will better serve workers that a formal modification approach 
                                                                                                                           
 256 Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 73 (Cal. 2000). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. at 73–74. 
 260 As previously discussed, the MESP at issue in the case provided that it would terminate 
only upon a material change in economic conditions. Id. at 73. Thus it appears that management 
intended the policy to be non-modifiable absent such a condition, in which case the court ought to 
have enforced the policy as written. See id. at 85 (George, C.J., dissenting) (“When an employ-
ment contract specifies that the employer’s obligations will be terminated upon the occurrence of a 
future event, the employer is bound by the contract unless and until the event occurs . . . .”); supra 
notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
 261 This Article takes up the question of the proper notice period infra notes 300–315 and 
accompanying text. 
 262 On this point this Article diverges significantly from the Restatement of Employment 
Law’s endorsement of the reasonable notice rule. The Restatement comments state that 
[o]rdinarily, the reasonableness standard is met when the notice is given in the same 
or substantially the same way the original statement was provided or made accessi-
ble. The ultimate question is whether the employer provided notice that was reason-
ably calculated to alert employees to any modification or rescission of material 
terms in prior policy statements. 
RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06 cmt. d. This suggests that the role of notice is merely to 
inform and that notice is effective if it achieves this purpose irrespective of how far in advance it 
is given. Such an interpretation is inconsistent with the contract modification notion of good faith 
previously discussed, as well as with the decided cases on which the Restatement drafters rely. 
The facts in Asmus strongly suggest that the California court expects an employer to do more than 
simply alert employees as to the policy change. See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 73–75. 
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which requires only a modest and employment-dependent consideration. 
Moreover, the rule accomplishes this in a way that is reasonably consistent 
both with employment at will and mainstream contract law.  
B. Reasonable Notice as Common Law Consideration 
The previous section argues that applying a reasonable notice rule to 
mid-term modifications better advances the policies underlying contempo-
rary contract modification law by ensuring a modicum of voluntariness in 
employees’ assent to proposed modifications, albeit within the constraints 
of employment at will. At the same time, a reasonable notice approach can 
satisfy the technical requirements of traditional common law to the extent 
they still exist. Although commentators have criticized the PELDR and 
courts strive to avoid its application,263 the requirement of consideration 
absent unforeseen circumstances remains the black letter rule for common 
law contract modifications.264 That reality, however, does not defeat the 
doctrinal legitimacy of a reasonable notice approach to mid-term modifica-
tions. Rather reasonable notice can itself provide the requisite consideration 
for employee agreement. Thus, although the principal contention of this 
Article is that mid-term modification law should advance principles of good 
faith rather than cleave to the doctrine of consideration, a reasonable notice 
rule actually does both. 
Courts’ struggles over the meaning of consideration in the mid-term 
modification context are reflective of a larger, long-standing problem in 
employment law. Because the employment-at-will relationship is of indefi-
nite duration, and both parties retain discretion to terminate, courts have 
often described the arrangement as an illusory contract.265 Basic principles 
of consideration require a commitment on the part of one party in exchange 
for the promise or performance of the other.266 A promisor who retains ab-
solute discretion to perform has made no commitment, and therefore pro-
vided nothing of value, that will bind the opposing party. 
For years courts have squared the seeming inconsistency between the 
at-will nature of employment and the formal requirement of consideration 
                                                                                                                           
 263 2-7 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 7.1 (describing the rule as “destined to be overturned” and 
noting that some courts have “refused to apply the rule, or ignored it” altogether). 
 264 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (“Performance of a legal duty owed to 
a promisor which is neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration.”); su-
pra notes 148–162 and accompanying text. 
 265 See Lord, supra note 15, at 714 (“Because the traditional rule allows either party to an at-
will relationship to put an end to it at any time, a promise by either the employer or the employee 
to continue an existing at-will relationship is by its nature illusory.”). 
 266 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71. 
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through appeals to unilateral contract theory.267 A unilateral contract in-
volves only one promise made with the intention of eliciting a discretionary 
performance by the promisee.268 There is no need for consideration in such 
a contract, or better stated, consideration is supplied, and a contract formed, 
only if and when the discretionary performance is rendered. Thus, in the 
case of employment, courts have theorized that the employer’s offer to em-
ploy, and more specifically to compensate, the worker under specified terms 
is an offer for a unilateral contract that binds the employer if the employee 
chooses to work.269 As classically formulated, this analysis leaves both par-
ties free to terminate, or more accurately, to revoke—the employer can re-
voke any time prior to receiving the agreed upon performance, and the em-
ployee was never bound to begin with. 
This model rests on an artificially discrete notion of the employment 
contract, one that is ill equipped to account for the larger relational context 
beyond the bare exchange of wages for work.270 In reality, parties to an em-
ployment relationship often make many promises, implicit and explicit, 
from which they reasonably develop expectations about the future.271 More 
importantly, they often make or solicit written promises with the intention 
that they be prospectively binding both at the outset and during the course 
of their relationship.272 Such commitments belie the notion that employment 
is unilateral. An employee who has restricted his ability to compete post-
employment is hardly in the position of the hypothetical offeree who, in 
entertaining an offer for a unilateral contract, is free to perform or not. To 
                                                                                                                           
 267 2-6 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 6.2. The recognition of employee handbooks as contractual 
documents has cemented this view. See Pettit, supra note 134, at 551–52 (discussing courts’ ap-
peal to unilateral contract theory in enforcing employer handbooks). 
 268 2-6 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 6.2. 
 269 See, e.g., Asmus, 999 P.2d at 81 (describing a company’s management security policy as 
an “implied in-fact unilateral contract,” the modification of which was accepted by employees via 
their continued employment); Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d 89, 96 
(Conn. 1995) (“To determine the contents of any particular implied contract of employment, the 
factual circumstances of the parties’ relationship must be examined in light of legal rules govern-
ing unilateral contracts.”); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 (Minn. 1983) 
(describing employer’s personnel manual as an “offer of a unilateral contract” that the employee 
accepted through “continued performance of his duties despite his freedom to quit”); Woolley v. 
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J.) (describing an employer’s personnel man-
ual as “an offer that seeks the formation of a unilateral contract—the employees’ bargained-for 
action needed to make the offer binding being their continued work when they have no obligation 
to continue”), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); 2-6 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 6.2; Yoder, su-
pra note 105, at 1523. 
 270 The foregoing discussion summarizes and expands upon issues discussed in the author’s 
prior work. See Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 
1563–68 (critiquing application of unilateral contract theory to employment relationships). 
 271See Arnow-Richman, Foreword, supra note 35, at 1–3 (describing complex mix of obliga-
tions, expectations, and informal promises between employers and employees). 
 272 Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1563. 
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the extent they are otherwise enforceable, the terms of the covenant contrac-
tually bind the employee, irrespective of his or her ability to decide whether 
and when to cease work. 
The existence of mid-term modifications underscores the inadequacy 
of a unilateral contract framework. Indeed, modification is anathema to uni-
lateral contract theory, which finds no contract until performance is already 
complete. To use the classic example, if A promises B she will pay him 
$200 if he walks across the Brooklyn Bridge, there is no contract and noth-
ing to modify until B crosses.273 A can choose to change the terms for any 
future performance, that is, she can tell B that she will pay him to cross 
again at a lower rate or under different conditions. But contract law does not 
allow her to alter the terms of her promise or the required performance dur-
ing the course of B’s crossing. Rather she must hold the promise open for a 
reasonable amount of time to enable B to complete the performance he has 
begun.274 In persisting with a unilateral contract framework, courts enforc-
ing mid-term modifications are effectively treating every change in terms as 
the completion of one contract and the start of a new one. This parceling out 
of work into a series of discrete performances accords neither with reality 
nor with party expectations.275 From the perspective of the employee, cer-
tainly, it feels more like the terms have changed while he was making his 
way across the bridge.276 
Viewed in this light, employment is better characterized as a bilateral 
contract of indefinite duration, one in which both parties make future-
looking promises yet preserve significant discretion as to their scope and 
duration. From this perspective, reasonable notice reveals itself as a means 
of limiting party discretion, thereby supplying the modicum of obligation 
necessary to render the relationship binding. This idea resonates with the 
broader duty of good faith that applies not merely in the context of modifi-
cation but throughout the contractual relationship as a way of ensuring that 
                                                                                                                           
 273 This example is generally attributed to Professor I. Maurice Wormser’s article The True 
Conception of Unilateral Contracts, 26 YALE L.J. 136, 136 (1916). See Hazel Beh & Jeffrey W. 
Stempel, Misclassifying the Insurance Policy: The Unforced Errors of Unilateral Contract Char-
acterization, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 85, 93 (2010). 
 274 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45. 
 275 Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 116 (Mich. 1987) (describing this charac-
terization as “strikingly artificial” because “[f]ew employers and employees begin each day con-
templating whether to renew or modify the employment contract in effect at the close of work on 
the previous day”). 
 276 The burden of this result on the offeree is precisely why the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts drafters rejected the classical rule permitting revocation up until the point of completed 
performance. It is surprising, if not ironic, that courts permit such an outcome in the case of an 
employee, an especially vulnerable offeree, in view of the fact that both contemporary courts and 
contract scholars have seen fit to do away with the rule in the context of mainstream contract rela-
tionships, including between parties of more equal bargaining power. 
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one party does not abuse the legitimate expectations of the other. In a case 
where contractually reserved discretion is broad enough to potentially ren-
der a proffered performance or promise illusory, the implied duty tempers 
the promisor’s exercise of discretion thereby infusing the relationship with 
consideration. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, the well-known 1917 New 
York Court of Appeals case involving a fashionista’s grant of an exclusive 
marketing right to a promoter, provides the classic illustration.277 Although 
the parties’ contract did not expressly bind the promoter to do anything, 
then-Judge Cardozo implied an obligation on his part to use reasonable ef-
forts to market and sell Lady Duff’s merchandise.278 
In the employment context, reasonable notice is arguably playing the 
same role as Cardozo’s implied reasonable efforts term, both with respect to 
initial terms of employment, as well as at the point of modification. This is 
clearest in the context of employee handbooks where the reasonable notice 
rule evolved. When an employer issues a handbook, those courts that permit 
unilateral modification are assuming that the employer has committed to 
abiding by the policy only temporarily, reserving discretion to terminate or 
alter it in the future.279 Were that all, the initial handbook policies might be 
deemed illusory, dependent on the whim of the employer, who might 
change or cancel them at any moment. But a reasonable notice requirement 
creates a limitation on that discretion, justifying the employee’s reliance, at 
least while the policy is in effect.280  
                                                                                                                           
 277 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
 278 Id. at 215. 
 279 One question courts have faced is whether the employer must expressly reserve that dis-
cretion in its initial policy documents in order to subsequently terminate or modify their terms. 
Several courts faced with this question have held that the power to modify is implicit given the 
absence of a fixed term for the original policy. See, e.g., Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 121 (concluding 
that employer “may . . . unilaterally change a written discharge-for-cause policy . . . even though 
the right . . . was not expressly reserved at the outset”); see also Slawson, supra note 105, at 29 
(opining that a right to make procedural adjustments is an implicit term of any employee hand-
book). Such cases, however, are unlikely to continue to arise with any frequency insofar as the 
inclusion of disclaimer language limiting the duration and enforceability of employer-issued poli-
cies has become a standard tool in management-side legal practice. Rather, the more common 
question is whether the inclusion of such language defeats the significance of the original terms 
altogether. In reported cases about modifications, the employer usually concedes for the purpose 
of litigation that the original terms were binding irrespective of such disclaimer language. 
 280 To the extent that the duty of good faith applies to areas of reserved employer discretion, it 
is possible to imagine an implied obligation not only to provide employees reasonable notice of 
proposed changes in terms, but also to keep the original policy in effect for a reasonable period of 
time. Asmus lends support to that view. 999 P.2d at 73 (“An employer may unilaterally terminate a 
policy that contains a specified condition, if the condition is one of indefinite duration, and the 
employer effects the change after a reasonable time, on reasonable notice, and without interfering 
with the employees’ vested benefits.” (emphasis added)). The Asmus court notes, and the facts 
show, both that the employees enjoyed the benefits of the MESP for a significant period of time 
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More importantly, reasonable notice provides an additional considera-
tion at the point in time at which the employer attempts to alter or retract its 
terms. Thus, if an employer announces that as of the next fiscal year it will 
prospectively modify its formal vacation policy to reduce the amount of 
paid time off accrued per week of service, affected employees have the ben-
efit of a policy with a fixed duration rather than one with an indefinite 
term.281 In short, the reasonable notice requirement has the effect of requir-
ing the employer to maintain and abide by its original terms for an amount 
of time equivalent to the length of the notice period. Moreover, if the em-
ployer asserts that employees must sign the new policy to remain employed, 
of that they will be deemed to have accepted it by continuing to work past 
its effective date, reasonable notice also serves to temporarily protect an 
employee from termination based on his or he opposition to changed terms. 
It postpones the point in time at which the employee must accept or risk 
being fired. 
In the noncompete and arbitration contexts, reasonable notice would 
play the same role, albeit in temporarily preserving the employee’s back-
ground rights rather than fixing the length of a contractually conferred ben-
efit. An employer that provides reasonable notice of a required noncompete 
or arbitration agreement to an incumbent employee implicitly grants that 
employee a defined amount of time in which he or she can continue to rely 
on and enforce the underlying rights. For the duration of the notice period, 
the employee can sue the employer in court or defect to a competitor. In the 
language of consideration, the employer is promising to forebear from so-
liciting a waiver of those rights for the length of the notice period. 
This understanding of the relationship between reasonable notice and 
contract consideration helps explain the unique inquiry into limitations on 
employer discretion in the context of arbitration policies. As discussed pre-
viously, when determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
courts have generally required the employer to make a reciprocal promise to 
arbitrate, both where arbitration agreements are presented mid-employment 
as well as at the outset of the relationship.282 In a number of cases, employ-
                                                                                                                           
and that Pacific Bell gave its employees reasonable and ample notice of its intent to terminate the 
MESP. See id. 
 281 The use of an example that does not involve a job security policy is intentional, as this 
Article focuses on the modification of at-will employment terms. The special situation of employ-
er handbook policies purporting to limit employers’ termination rights is discussed infra notes 
316–344 and accompanying text. 
 282 As previously noted, it is anomalous that some courts are unwilling to treat an offer of at-
will employment as the consideration for an arbitration agreement entered into at the start of the 
relationship. Courts almost universally find that such an offer suffices as consideration for a non-
compete, irrespective of the employer’s discretion to terminate at will. But to the extent these 
courts treat a promise of at-will employment as illusory for arbitration purposes, it is not surpris-
2016] Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts 483 
ees have challenged the binding nature of the employer’s promise, arguing 
that because the employer retained the power to cancel or alter its policy, its 
promise was illusory, rendering the employee’s own promise to arbitrate 
unenforceable.283 Courts have recognized, however, that if the employer 
limits its ability to cancel or alter the policy in some way, as by promising 
that changes will be adopted only upon advance notice, this will sufficiently 
constrain employer discretion, creating a binding reciprocal contract to arbi-
trate.284 
At least one court has gone further and implied an obligation on the 
part of the employer to provide reasonable notice of unilateral changes to its 
arbitration policy in order to preclude a finding that the employer’s promise 
to arbitrate was illusory. Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc., a 
2013 California Court of Appeal case involved both an arbitration agree-
ment and a handbook policy.285 The issue there was not the validity of a 
modification, but rather the conscionability of the employer’s arbitration 
program, which the employee consented to at the time of hire.286 The 
                                                                                                                           
ing that they are unwilling to find consideration in an employer’s promise to abide by an arbitra-
tion policy that reserves significant employer discretion. 
 283 See, e.g., Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting 
that “where one party to an arbitration agreement seeks to invoke arbitration to settle a dispute, if 
the other party can suddenly change the terms of the agreement to avoid arbitration, then the 
agreement was illusory from the outset”); Snow v. BE & K Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 5, 15 (D. 
Me. 2001) (declaring that “it would be fundamentally unfair to hold Plaintiff to the terms of the 
booklet, when Defendant retains its ability to evade the booklet’s terms entirely”); Baker v. Bristol 
Care, Inc., 450 S.W.3d 770, 776–77 (Mo. 2014) (en banc) (stating that if the employer “retains 
unilateral authority to amend the agreement retroactively, its promise to arbitrate is illusory”); 
Piano v. Premier Distrib. Co., 107 P.3d 11, 15 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (noting in rejecting arbitra-
tion agreement that “although Defendant cannot modify the terms of the Arbitration Agreement 
any way or at any time, it may, in its sole discretion, modify the terms of the Arbitration Agree-
ment provided that it complies with the minimal formalities set forth”); Jenkins v. United 
Healthcare, No. 7371-99, 2000 WL 298912, at *2 (D.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2000) (asserting that 
unilateral provisions “to alter, amend, modify, or revoke the [arbitration policy] at any time” does 
not give adequate notice of the terms and “[s]uch a lack of consideration vitiates any contract 
between the parties”). 
 284 See, e.g., Batory v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 F. App’x 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that consideration was sufficient where employer’s “discretion to modify the [arbitration agree-
ment] is limited in two important respects: [i]t must provide employees 60 days’ notice of termi-
nation or any modification, and it cannot modify the [agreement] with respect to a previously 
submitted claim”); Pierce v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1215 (E.D. 
Okla. 2003) (noting that the “prospective application of the amendment or termination provisions, 
when combined with the ten-day notice provision, constitutes a significant limitation on [the em-
ployer’s] right to modify, amend, or cancel such that the agreement to arbitrate is not an illusory 
one”); In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex. 2002) (holding that the ability to modify 
or change the arbitration program was not illusory because termination was not retroactive and 
would not be effective “until 10 days after reasonable notice of termination is given to Employ-
ees”). 
 285 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 286 Id. at 509–10. 
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agreement signed by the employee incorporated by reference the employ-
er’s full arbitration policy, located in the company’s employee handbook, 
which stated that both the employee and the company agreed to submit dis-
putes to arbitration.287 Thus, the policy included the requisite reciprocal 
promise by the employer.288 The handbook in which the policy was located, 
however, contained a right-to-revise clause, stating that the employer re-
served “the right to revise, modify or delete any provision or policy in this 
Handbook . . . at any time.”289 Similarly, the acknowledgement signed by 
the employee upon receipt of the handbook attested to her understanding 
that “all policies or practices [in the Handbook] can be changed at any time 
by the employer” and that “the employer reserves the right to amend, modi-
fy, rescind, delete, supplement or add to the provisions of the Handbook, as 
it deems appropriate . . . in its sole discretion.”290 
In her subsequent suit for discrimination and related wrongful termina-
tion claims, the employee sought to avoid enforcement of the arbitration 
policy, arguing not that the policy was non-binding, but that it was uncon-
scionable based on the employer’s reservation-of-rights provision.291 The 
court rejected this argument, concluding that the implied duty of good faith 
placed implicit limits on the employer’s power to modify, preserving the 
reciprocal nature of the policy.292 Citing Asmus, the court observed, 
“[I]mplied in the unilateral right to modify is the accompanying obligation 
to do so upon reasonable and fair notice.”293 Thus, the court held that not-
withstanding the literal text of the employer’s reservation of rights clause, 
the policy would be interpreted to require the employer to provide notice of 
any changes pursuant to the implied duty of good faith.294 “[T]he implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” concluded the court, “saves this 
arbitration contract from being illusory.”295 
Although Serpa is not itself a modification case, its analysis of the em-
ployer’s reservation of rights clause supports the notion of reasonable notice 
                                                                                                                           
 287 Id. at 508–09. 
 288 Id. at 513. 
 289 Id. at 509. 
 290 Id. 
 291 Id. at 509–10. 
 292 Id. at 514–15. 
 293 Id. at 516 (citing Asmus, 999 P.2d at 81). 
 294 Id. As discussed infra notes 346–371 and accompanying text, this same rationale has been 
invoked by courts in refusing to give full effect to similar provisions reserving the right to alter 
terms in the context of long-term consumer service agreements. See David Horton, The Shadow 
Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 630–36 (2010) 
(discussing cases involving unilateral imposition of arbitration clauses into consumer credit card 
agreements). Indeed, Serpa relied in part on the consumer case law. See Serpa, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 514 (citing Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 281 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
 295 Serpa, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 515. 
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as a consideration equivalent in the context of a mid-term modification. Ac-
cording to Serpa, the obligation to provide notice can be judicially implied 
and its implication cures illusoriness. Just as the implied duty to provide 
reasonable notice of employer-initiated changes renders an otherwise illuso-
ry promise to arbitrate enforceable, a judicially-created reasonable notice 
rule ensures that a modicum of consideration passes to affected employees 
whenever the employer exercises its right to unilaterally insist on additional 
employee promises or concessions. 
IV. THE SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF A REASONABLE NOTICE RULE 
Both employers and worker advocates are likely to be skeptical of the 
unilateral modification plus notice approach—the latter due to its failure to 
more aggressively limit employers’ modification rights, the former because 
of the uncertainty and administrative burden inherent in a reasonableness 
standard. This Part offers preliminary thoughts on such issues, beginning in 
section A with an examination of the impact of reasonable notice in light of 
employees’ limited bargaining power.296 Section B proposes a reasonable 
notice period ranging from approximately two weeks to three months, de-
pending on the nature of the modification.297 That time period should grant 
workers a meaningful opportunity to respond—whether through concerted 
activity, personal planning, negotiation, or resignation. It will also offer em-
ployers guidance and an outer limit on the extent of notice required, easing 
the administrative burden of the rule. 
The Part goes on to consider particular application issues, including 
the role of reasonable notice in the context of job security promises and the 
viability of employer efforts to eliminate the advance notice requirement 
through handbook language or form agreements. Section C argues that uni-
laterally drafted “no notice” clauses should be presumed unenforceable, 
consistent with trends in the regulation of consumer contracts.298 Section D 
argues that the applicability of the reasonable notice rule to job security pol-
icies must be determined through a case-by-case inquiry, focusing on the 
scope of the original promise.299 
A. Reasonable Notice and Employee Bargaining Power 
An initial question regarding the adoption of a unilateral modification 
plus notice rule is the extent to which advance notice will assist employees. 
An explicit premise of this Article is that employees frequently lack the 
                                                                                                                           
 296 See infra notes 300–315 and accompanying text. 
 297 See infra notes 316–344 and accompanying text. 
 298 See infra notes 346–371 and accompanying text. 
 299 See infra notes 372–388 and accompanying text. 
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ability to insist on their preferred terms of employment.300 The Article also 
presupposes the continued existence of employment at will.301 It is therefore 
fair to ask whether reasonable notice will do anything to enhance an em-
ployee’s bargaining position in the face of a proposed change in terms. The 
answer to that question is contextual, depending in part on the individual 
employee and in part on the nature of the modification. 
The primary purpose and effect of an advance notice requirement is to 
give at-will employees time to explore alternatives. What makes mid-term 
modifications especially pernicious is that they constrain employees’ ability 
to exercise what is often their only means of opposing unfavorable terms—
the ability to refuse to work. An applicant for employment who is offered 
unfavorable terms can at least make a reasoned decision whether to accept 
the position in the context of an active job search.302 He or she can compare 
the employer’s terms against other offers, his or her current job, or the de-
sirability of continuing the search. An incumbent employee who is invested 
in his or her current position and not actively gauging the market is not able 
to make this type of informed decision or take the risk of leaving his or her 
job in search of better terms. He or she must simply accept, deferring the 
possibility of seeking alternate employment to the indefinite future, while 
suffering the unfavorable terms for the duration of employment.303 Reason-
able notice thus creates an opportunity for the incumbent employee to “shop 
around.”304 He or she can more carefully consider the proposed terms, ex-
                                                                                                                           
 300 See supra notes 34–41 and accompanying text. 
 301 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 302 This presupposes that the applicant is made aware of all terms of employment in advance 
of accepting the job. Not infrequently, however, employees accept or begin employment based 
only on core terms (salary, title, etc.) and are provided with the “fine print” terms after accepting 
or commencing work. See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 374 
(6th Cir. 2005) (employees “hired on the spot” signed arbitration agreements days into employ-
ment); Menzies Aviation (USA), Inc. v. Wilcox, 978 F. Supp. 2d 983, 988 (D. Minn. 2013) (em-
ployee required to sign a “large stack of documents” including noncompete a few days into em-
ployment). The author has discussed this problem of “cubewrap” employment terms elsewhere at 
length. See Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note 4, at 966–67 (critiquing cubewrap con-
tracts for exacerbating bargaining power imbalance between employer and employee); Arnow-
Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 640–41 (describing situation where standard form 
employment documents are left in employees’ cubicles to be signed shortly after they begin work-
ing). Terms provided to the employee immediately after acceptance raise concerns similar to those 
that arise in the mid-term modification context and further suggest the possibility of deceptive or 
misleading hiring practices. See Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 651. 
 303 This is especially problematic in the case of mid-term noncompetes, where the employee’s 
acquiescence directly impairs his or her ability to subsequently accept work elsewhere. With re-
gard to other mid-term modifications, the harm is simply that the employee is immediately subject 
to the new terms and will be until he or she is able to find alternate employment. 
 304 See Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 663 n.119. 
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plore the viability of quitting to go elsewhere, and credibly leverage the 
threat of departure in negotiating with the current employer.305 
Of course, not all mid-term modifications are likely to be so unwel-
come as to prompt employees to seek alternate employment. Neither is the 
possibility of alternate employment realistic for all workers even with suffi-
cient notice. In such cases, advance notice can serve as a window for con-
certed activity, granting employees a period of time to discuss, critique, and 
potentially protest the change in terms. The opportunity for collective con-
sideration of changed terms is especially important and appropriate in situa-
tions involving less salient modifications and those that apply to the work-
force as a whole. An individual employee confronted with a formal non-
compete contract may have some appreciation of the significance of that 
agreement.306 Employees confronted with an arbitration policy may be less 
likely to understand its implications, and may disregard it entirely if it is 
packaged as part of the employer’s general policies.307 Disseminating the 
policy in advance with a designated effective date, however, creates an op-
portunity for the unusually conscientious employee to examine its contents 
and communicate with others workers. These “readers” can offer their opin-
ions about the employer’s terms, gain the interest and attention of their co-
workers, and potentially trigger group action.308 
Although the days of aggressive labor actions have long past, there has 
been renewed attention to concerted activity perpetuated by individuals or 
                                                                                                                           
 305 For instance, a valuable employee asked to sign a noncompete may be able to influence 
the breadth of the agreement—its duration, geographic scope, or definition of competition—even 
if he or she is unable to refuse the agreement completely. 
 306 Cf. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsid-
eration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 
1163, 1167 (2001) (questioning whether employees accepting formal noncompetes have 
knowledge of the risks involved). 
 307 See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Man-
datory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 
1225 (2002) (“Most employment applicants, though able to identify the most basic differences 
between arbitration and litigation, do not understand the remedial and procedural ramifications of 
consenting to arbitration. Very few are aware of what they are waiving when they agree to manda-
tory arbitration.”). 
 308 This is similar to the notion put forth by some commentators in the consumer contract 
context, namely that a handful of especially diligent “readers” of form contracts can place ade-
quate market pressure on sellers to ensure efficient terms. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling 
Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 690–92. The theory is that where sellers 
cannot easily distinguish between “readers” and “non-readers,” they must draft their terms to satis-
fy the readers. Gillette, supra, at 691–92 (“Sellers who are unable or fail to differentiate among 
reading and nonreading buyers, and who participate in relatively competitive industries where 
capturing the marginal buyer increases profitability, will offer the same terms to all buyers that 
they offer to reading buyers.”). In the employment context, readers will likely be easier to identify 
(and may even self-identify), but because of employers’ strong desire for uniform policies they are 
likely to make any adjustment in terms universal. 
488 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:427 
small groups of employees working in non-union environments. Wide-
spread access to personal electronic devices and the use of social media 
platforms has enabled workers to swiftly voice job-related complaints and 
concerns and connect with friends and co-workers.309 Such activity can 
meet the definition of protected concerted activity under the National Labor 
Relations Act.310 In a number of widely noted decisions, the National Labor 
Relations Board has protected employee social media posts and comments 
from employer retaliation,311 and a series of memoranda from the Board’s 
General Counsel suggests that the agency is willing to pursue unfair labor 
practice charges in such situations.312  
Whether employees are able to leverage such channels effectively and 
achieve more favorable terms of employment remains to be seen, but anec-
dotal evidence of successful consumer campaigns offers reason for opti-
mism. In one example, a group of aggrieved consumers convinced General 
Mills, the stalwart cereal company, to retract its arbitration policy.313 Ex-
pressions of dissatisfaction with the policy began on Facebook and Twitter, 
gathered momentum in the blogosphere, and ultimately culminated in a 
public apology by the company.314 In the employment context, reasonable 
                                                                                                                           
 309 See generally Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, Social Isolation and American Workers: 
Employee Blogging and Legal Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287 (2007) (discussing the im-
portance of employee blogs and their need for greater legal protection). 
 310 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) grants employees “the right to 
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of 
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 311 See, e.g., Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59 (Mar. 31, 2015) (finding employee’s Fa-
cebook post criticizing superior and encouraging unionization protected as concerted activity); 
Three D, LLC, 361 N.L.R.B. No. 31 (Aug. 22, 2014) (finding employees’ Facebook posts discuss-
ing superior’s bookkeeping errors protected as concerted activity); Hispanics United of Buffalo, 
Inc., 359 N.L.R.B. No. (Dec. 14, 2012) (finding employees’ Facebook posts discussing co-worker 
protected as concerted activity); see also James Long, Note, #Fired: The National Labor Relations 
Act and Employee Outbursts in the Age of Social Media, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1217, 1219–20 (2015) 
(discussing application of NLRA’s protection of concerted activity to employees’ use of social 
media). 
 312 See generally DIV. OF OPERATIONS-MGMT., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LA-
BOR RELATIONS BD., MEMORANDUM OM 12-59, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL 
CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2012) (summarizing recent NLRB decisions concerning 
social media); DIV. OF OPERATIONS-MGMT., OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RE-
LATIONS BD., MEMORANDUM OM 12-31, REPORT OF THE ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERN-
ING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2012) (same); DIV. OF OPERATIONS-MGMT., OFFICE OF THE GEN. 
COUNSEL, NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., MEMORANDUM OM 11-74, REPORT OF THE ACTING 
GENERAL COUNSEL CONCERNING SOCIAL MEDIA CASES (2011) (same). 
 313 Stephanie Strom, General Mills Reverses Itself on Consumers’ Right to Sue, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/20/business/general-mills-reverses-itself-on-
consumers-right-to-sue.html [http://perma.cc/Y93B-2LVX] (reporting on company’s decision to 
revise its website terms in response to public concern). 
 314 Ricardo Lopez, General Mills Abandons Mandatory Arbitration After Consumer Outcry, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-general-mills-legal-policy-
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notice can ideally enable similar, if less dramatic, conduct. Given a window 
of time in which to evaluate and discuss proposed changes of employment, 
employees may be more capable of making common decisions for purposes 
of influencing employer policy. 
In situations where employees can neither influence employer policy 
nor go elsewhere, reasonable notice still serves the purpose of giving em-
ployees time to prepare for the modification. The advance notice period acts 
as a window in which employees can rely on their prior rights in ways that 
anticipate their imminent loss. For instance, commission-based employees 
faced with a change in compensation structure might direct their energy 
toward closing particular deals prior to the change. Rank-and-file wage 
earners faced with a prospective pay cut might save more from their re-
maining checks at current rates of pay. Long-term employees faced with a 
loss of seniority protection might endeavor to improve performance. Em-
ployees anticipating an arbitration agreement, or an adverse change to an 
existing arbitration policy, can initiate their claims prior to its adoption. Any 
number of responses is possible, depending on the situation of the employee 
and the nature of the modification. 
Finally, it is possible that a reasonable notice requirement may posi-
tively influence firm behavior. Whether because of the administrative bur-
dens of notice or the prospect of some adverse response, a reasonable notice 
rule might discourage employers from implementing some subset of chang-
es or at least make them more deliberative in doing so. At best, a reasonable 
notice rule can engender better management practices, tempering unilateral 
                                                                                                                           
reversal-20140421-story.html [https://perma.cc/7NDK-BAW2] (reporting on company’s blog post 
apology). For other examples of successful Internet-based consumer campaigns, see, e.g., M. Alex 
Johnson, PayPal Backs down on Controversial New Robocall Policy, NBC NEWS (June 29, 2015), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/paypal-backs-down-controversial-new-robocall-policy-n
384116 [http://perma.cc/34GX-CVYT] (reporting how consumer outrage over new PayPal policy 
led company to rescind policy); Farhad Manjoo, Tweeting Avengers, SLATE (Sept. 1, 2009), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/technology/2009/09/tweeting_avengers.single.html [http
://perma.cc/3CDK-TJ8M] (discussing success of online consumer campaigns involving Comcast 
and Maytag); Graeme McMillan, Random House Rescinds Controversial E-Book Contract After 
Online Outrage, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/03/scalzi-e-book-authors/ 
[http://perma.cc/2XZT-XSLB] (reporting how consumer outrage about new publishing contracts 
led publishing company to change contracts); Craig Timberg, Instagram, Facebook Stir Online 
Protests for Privacy Policy Change, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/business/technology/instagram-facebook-stirs-online-protests-for-privacy-po
licy-change/2012/12/18/6c105d92-4948-11e2-b6f0-e851e741d196_story.html [http://perma.cc/8Q
KY-8QCZ] (reporting how consumer outrage about new Instagram privacy policy led to compa-
ny’s apology and policy clarification). 
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action and incenting greater discussion between companies and their work-
force about fair terms of employment.315 
B. Defining Reasonableness 
Whereas employee advocates are likely to argue that a reasonable no-
tice rule does not go far enough in restricting mid-term modifications, em-
ployers are likely to complain that the rule is administratively burdensome 
and interferes with managerial flexibility. Under a unilateral modification 
plus notice rule, employers will be unable to effectuate changes as expedi-
tiously as their business interests would otherwise dictate. They are also 
likely to have particular concerns about the use of a reasonableness standard 
to define the requisite notice period. Employers have a legitimate need to 
know how much notice to provide and in what form in order to ensure that 
their policy changes are effective.316 A reasonableness standard leaves em-
ployers vulnerable to litigation over whether the notice provided by the em-
ployer for a particular modification was sufficient.317 
Such concerns can be mitigated through judicial elaboration on the na-
ture and purpose of a reasonable notice rule and by identifying an outer limit 
on the requisite notice period. Unfortunately, such guidance has been slow 
coming in the handbook context despite several courts’ adoption of a unilat-
eral modification plus notice approach.318 Few reported decisions apply the 
rule or engage the reasonableness question. Those that have offer limited and 
questionable analysis. Several courts have equated reasonable notice with 
actual notice, asking merely whether the change in policy was communicated 
                                                                                                                           
 315 See, e.g., Langager v. Crazy Creek Prods., Inc., 954 P.2d 1169 (Mont. 1998) (describing 
how employer distributed new handbook to its employees,then held a follow up meeting at which 
employees could discuss the contents after reviewing them). 
 316 See Yoder, supra note 105, at 1518–21 (discussing uncertainty that results from courts’ 
varying approaches to handbook modifications). Similar concerns have been cited as reasons to 
reject the formal modification rule. See, e.g., Demasse v. ITT Corp., 984 P.2d 1138, 1161 (Ariz. 
1999) (en banc) (Martone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that such a 
rule “will create havoc with employer-employee relations,” as “[n]o employer will ever issue one 
for fear of endless obligation”); Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Mich. 1987) 
(warning that under such a rule “the employer could find itself obligated in a variety of different 
ways to any number of different employees, depending on the modifications which had been 
adopted and the extent of the work force turnover”). 
 317 See Yoder, supra note 105, at 1534 (“[T]he vagueness among courts following this ap-
proach over what constitutes ‘reasonable’ notice does little to resolve the confusion over hand-
book jurisprudence and may at times offer scant protection to abused workers.”). 
 318 See, e.g., Asmus v. Pacific Bell, 999 P.2d 71 (Cal. 2000); Bollinger v. Fall River Rural 
Elec. Coop., Inc., 272 P.3d 1263 (Idaho 2012); Bankey, 443 N.W.2d 112; Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 
450 S.E.2d 589 (S.C. 1994); Gaglidari v. Denny’s Rest., Inc., 815 P.2d 1362 (Wash. 1991); Hogue 
v. Cecil I. Walker Mach. Co., 431 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1993); Quijano v. Atkins-Kroll, Inc., 2008 
Guam 14 (Guam 2008). See generally supra notes 104–133 and accompanying text (discussing 
unilateral modification plus notice approach to handbooks). 
2016] Modifying At-Will Employment Contracts 491 
to the employee.319 This approach ensures that employees are aware of the 
employer’s changes, but does not give workers time to evaluate and respond 
to the new terms. To be sure, those jurisdictions that have adopted unilateral 
modification plus notice have not explicitly embraced this justification for the 
rule. But the mere fact of an employee’s awareness that he or she is entering 
into a modification is already a fundamental component of contractual as-
sent.320 Courts have required employers to demonstrate actual notice of the 
disputed terms irrespective of their approach to modification.321 It would ap-
pear that courts permitting unilateral modification only upon reasonable no-
tice have something more in mind.322 
The more sensible reading is that reasonable notice requires some non-
negligible interval of time between notice and implementation. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has taken this view in applying As-
mus v. Pacific Bell, the 2000 California Supreme Court decision that adopt-
ed California’s handbook modification rule.323 In Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., a 
2014 decision from the Ninth Circuit, the employer sought to avoid the 
plaintiff’s class action lawsuit alleging various wage and hour violations 
based on a modification to its arbitration policy that precluded class-based 
suits and required employees to arbitrate all claims individually.324 The em-
                                                                                                                           
 319 See, e.g., Fleming, 450 S.E.2d 589; Govier v. N. Sound Bank, 957 P.2d 811 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1998); see also Yoder, supra note 105, at 1534 (noting court’s conflation of reasonable no-
tice with actual notice). As previously discussed, the Restatement of Employment Law has en-
dorsed this view. See RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T LAW § 2.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); supra notes 
104–133 and accompanying text. 
 320 See 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 4:16 (4th ed. 2015) (“As a general 
principle, an offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree knows of its existence.”). 
 321 A number of cases have struck down arbitration policies where, due to the employer’s 
method of dissemination, the employee likely had not noticed the change. See, e.g., Campbell v. 
Gen. Dynamics Gov’t Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546, 555–59 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that an e-mail 
announcing a new arbitration policy requiring no affirmative response did not give the employee 
sufficient notice); Hudyka v. Sunoco, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 712, 716–17 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding 
that an e-mail announcing a new arbitration policy not marked as important or affecting employ-
ees’ rights and using optional language did not provide sufficient notice); Skirchak v. Dynamics 
Research Corp., 432 F. Supp. 2d 175, 180 (D. Mass. 2006) (same); Archer v. Fujitsu Network 
Commc’ns, 354 F. Supp. 2d 26, 36–37 (D. Mass. 2005) (finding the posting of an arbitration poli-
cy on the employer’s website with no evidence of access by the employee to be insufficient no-
tice). 
 322 Indeed, the California Supreme Court in Asmus v. Pacific Bell seems to suggest not only 
that a mid-term handbook modification requires reasonable advance notice, but that the original 
policy must endure for a reasonable period of time. See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 73 (“An employer may 
unilaterally terminate a policy that contains a specified condition, if the condition is one of indefi-
nite duration, and the employer effects the change after a reasonable time, on reasonable notice, 
and without interfering with the employees’ vested benefits.” (emphasis added)). 
 323 Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 1089, 1094–95 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding employer 
provided reasonable notice of handbook modification as required by Asmus); Asmus, 999 P.2d at 
73. 
 324 755 F.3d at 1089. 
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ployer’s revisions, which occurred in July and August of 2011, were first 
distributed to the employees in June.325 At that time, the existing arbitration 
policy stated that the employer would provide thirty days’ notice of any 
changes to the policy.326 The court held that the employer had complied 
with its own notice provision and California’s reasonable notice rule.327 
In so holding, however, the court rejected the employee’s argument 
that the notice she received was inadequate because it did not explicitly 
state that the changes would be effective in thirty days.328 An interpretation 
more consistent with the goal of granting employees time to prepare for or 
respond to proposed changes would require the employer to make clear that 
the changes will only be implemented as of a specified future date. A notice 
that could lead the employee to think the changes are immediately effective 
does not achieve the purpose of the rule. Indeed, the Davis court seemed to 
recognize the weaknesses of the notice provided in that case, acknowledg-
ing that the employer’s communication with its employees was not “the 
model of clarity.”329 It allowed the modification, however, noting that the 
employer did not seek to enforce the modification against the employee 
within the thirty-day period.330 The fact that the original policy itself in-
formed employees that thirty days’ notice would be required for subsequent 
modifications presumably also influenced this result. 
At a minimum, Davis stands for the proposition that there must at least 
be a period of time between notice and implementation and thirty days sat-
isfies that time. A better view, and a safer interpretation for employers seek-
ing to ensure enforceability, is that employers must explicitly identify the 
effective date in the notice communicating the change. This still leaves open 
the question of how much notice is required. Davis was an easy case inas-
much as the employer had already specified an intuitively reasonable notice 
period of thirty days.331 Had the policy not contained such a provision, or 
designated a significantly shorter period, the court would have had to con-
front the question outright.332 Cases adopting and applying a unilateral 
modification plus notice rule thus far have neither articulated a bright-line 
                                                                                                                           
 325 Id. at 1091–92. 
 326 Id. The employer eliminated this obligatory notice requirement as part of its revisions. Id. 
at 1092 n.3. 
 327 Id. at 1094. 
 328 Id. at 1093. 
 329 Id. at 1094. Further confusing the matter was the fact that the cover letter to the modifica-
tions referred to the enclosed document as the “current version.” Id. at 1093. 
 330 Id. at 1094. 
 331 See id. 
 332 The court would also have had to address the degree to which employers can eliminate or 
define the notice period by contract, a subject to which this Article returns infra notes 346–371 
and accompanying text. 
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rule with respect to reasonableness, nor elaborated meaningfully on how 
reasonableness should be determined. Moreover, the amount of notice pro-
vided as a factual matter in such cases ranges significantly. On one end, 
courts have upheld modifications implemented immediately;333 at the other 
end is Asmus, which upheld a modification where employees received six 
months’ advance notice of the change.334 
Further refinement of the reasonableness standard ought to reflect the 
underlying purpose of the rule, which in turn requires one to consider the 
substance of the modification itself. As discussed previously, not every 
modification is likely to spur employees to seek alternate employment. 
Some might lead to negotiation; some might simply induce employee pro-
test. At least one commentator has suggested a tiered approach to handbook 
modifications under which employees receive varying degrees of notice 
depending on whether the change is “procedural” or “substantive.”335 Under 
this approach, employees would receive three months’ advance notice for 
“substantive” modifications, such as changes in compensation structure, 
down to as little as one week for procedural modifications, such as changes 
to disciplinary procedures.336 
Drawing distinctions based on which rights are substantive and which 
are procedural is a fraught business.337 Nevertheless, the idea of linking the 
amount of notice to the significance of the change makes sense. Under such 
an approach, one would require the greatest amount of notice for noncom-
petes. As previously noted, such agreements not only eliminate a critical 
baseline right, they also limit the employee’s ability to leave subsequent to 
the modification.338 Changes to job security and compensation terms would 
be next in significance. Arbitration agreements and amendments to existing 
                                                                                                                           
 333 See Govier, 957 P.2d at 813. 
 334 See Asmus, 999 P.2d at 73. 
 335 See Yoder, supra note 105, at 1540. 
 336 Id. at 1540–42. 
 337 See Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 889 (1999) (observing that “procedure 
and substance [are] ‘inextricably intertwined,’ that ostensibly procedural rules sometimes in-
volve[] policy choices, and that such choices ha[ve] important substantive effects” (quoting Dan 
Byron Dobbs, Comment, Judicial Regulation of Procedure, 9 ARK. L. REV. 146, 152–55 (1955))); 
Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 
336 (1933) (“In the case of the alleged distinction between ‘substantive law’ and ‘procedural law’, 
. . . for some purposes the basis for any such classification disappears entirely and all can be treat-
ed or regarded as ‘substantive.’”); E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of 
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 325 (1986) (“Ultimately, procedure and substance cannot be 
divorced: no procedural decision can be completely ‘neutral’ in the sense that it does not affect 
substance.”); Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 801, 802 (2010) (“Procedure is an instrument of power that can, in a very practical sense, 
generate or undermine substantive rights.”). 
 338 See supra notes 300–315 and accompanying text. 
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arbitration policies might be equally significant, depending on their content. 
Least significant would be adjustments in paid time off, disciplinary proce-
dures, or other administrative policies, where the purpose of notice is mere-
ly to allow employees to oppose or prepare for the change rather than seek 
alternate employment.339 The amount of notice considered reasonable 
should also include considerations beyond just the significance of the modi-
fication to the employee. The reason behind the employers’ change in poli-
cy and any circumstances requiring prompt adoption might justify a shorter 
notice period than what would otherwise be expected. 
Returning to the amount of notice, the proposal to cap notice at three 
months has some administrative, as well as intuitive, appeal.340 A somewhat 
shorter amount may be more appropriate, however, in recognition of the 
fact that many employers will incline toward providing the maximum 
amount of notice as a matter of course for any change of significance in 
order to ensure enforceability. Recent legislative developments favoring 
advance notice in particular contexts suggest that two months may be a 
good benchmark. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
requires employers to provide sixty days’ advance notice of any material 
modification to health care plans that occur during the plan year.341 In the 
consumer protection arena, the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility 
and Disclosure Act of 2009 (“CARD Act”) requires credit card issuers to 
provide card-holders forty-five days’ advance notice of annual percentage 
rate increases, as well as other significant terms such as fees and finance 
charges.342 As in the employment context, the purpose of requiring advance 
notice in the credit card context is to give consumers time to adjust to the 
proposed change—whether by finding other sources of credit, paying off 
their balance, or simply developing a workable payment plan.343 
                                                                                                                           
 339 Mid-term modifications to qualified plans under the Employee Retirement Income Securi-
ty Act and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act would obviously be governed by those 
laws. 
 340 See Yoder, supra note 105, at 154 (setting a three-month period because it corresponds to 
one fiscal quarter). 
 341 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15(d)(4) (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (2012) (“A summary of any 
material modification . . . shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average 
plan participant.”). 
 342 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(1)–(2) (2012); see Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can 
Do What!? Limitations on the Use of Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1128 
(2010) (discussing adoption and effect of the CARD Act); Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty 
Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2010) (same). Along with the notice, the issuer must inform 
the consumer of the ability to terminate the card before the effective date. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(3). 
 343 See David Smith, The Credit CARD Act of 2009, 47 HOUS. LAW. 28, 29 (2010) (“This 
[notice] provision is in response to the perception that companies ‘hooked’ customers on the credit 
card and then raised the rate without sufficient notice to allow the debtor to either pay off or move 
the balance.”). 
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On the other side of the spectrum, at least two-weeks’ notice seems 
appropriate for changes of modest impact. Two weeks is the amount of time 
employers typically expect employees to provide in advance of a voluntary 
termination.344 This is considered a matter of courtesy, if not of contract, 
allowing the employer to prepare for the loss of the employee. It therefore 
makes sense to require two weeks as the minimum notice period for mid-
term modifications of limited impact. Because the goal of notice in that 
context is to allow the employee a measure of advance warning to prepare 
or respond, it is not necessary for the employee to have enough time to con-
duct a job search. Nevertheless, anything less than two weeks’ notice is 
likely to be insufficient for even these more limited purposes. 
In sum, it is likely to be challenging for courts to define and for em-
ployers to predict how much notice is reasonable, at least upon initial adop-
tion of a reasonable notice standard. Courts and commentators have already 
begun that process, however, and legislative efforts provide a baseline for 
comparison. Whatever the benchmark, employers will have an incentive to 
identify a “highest common denominator” for what suffices as reasonable 
notice for particular types of modifications.345 Such efforts, combined with 
case law developments, should ultimately lead to a set of best practices on 
which employers can rely in managing their workforce. 
C. Reasonable Notice and Employer-Drafted Change-of-Terms Provisions 
The prospect of employer compliance efforts, however, is a double-
edged sword. Some employers may develop a useful protocol regarding the 
appropriate amount of notice to provide for particular mid-term modifica-
tions. Others, however, may attempt to contract out of the obligation alto-
gether by stating in their policies that the employer reserves the right to 
change terms without notice.346 
                                                                                                                           
 344 See Jessica A. Magaldi & Olha Kolisnyk, The Unpaid Internship: A Stepping Stone to a 
Successful Career or the Stumbling Block of an Illegal Enterprise? Finding the Right Balance 
Between Worker Autonomy and Worker Protection, 14 NEV. L.J. 184, 185 (2013). 
 345 See Arnow-Richman, Inside Out, supra note 5, at 46 (using this term to describe manage-
ment-side compliance practices that aim to avoid uncertainty and liability risk through over-
compliance). 
 346 Many employers already include clauses purporting to reserve the right to change terms 
without notice in their employment manuals along with standard language disclaiming the manu-
al’s contractual significance. See, e.g., Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662 A.2d 
89, 95 (Conn. 1995) (“[P]ublication is distributed for general informational purposes only, and as 
such is subject to change without notice.”); Rowe v. Montgomery Ward, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 268, 
270 (Mich. 1991) (“[T]hese conditions can be changed by the Company, without notice, at any 
time.”); In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. 2010) (“The Boot Jack reserves the right to revoke, 
change or supplement guidelines at any time without notice . . . .”). 
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The effectiveness of these “change-of-terms” clauses is unclear under 
current doctrine.347 There appears to be no reported decision in which a 
court has directly addressed whether an employer-drafted provision provid-
ing for no notice, or extremely limited notice, trumps an established reason-
able notice rule. What is clear is that the insertion of a change-of-terms 
clause, whether or not it explicitly disclaims the obligation to provide no-
tice, reduces the likelihood that the original policy will be deemed contrac-
tual.348 This gives employers a strong incentive to include change-of-terms 
clauses in their handbooks, in order to reduce the overall risk of implied 
contract liability. This in turn moots the modification question. If the origi-
nal policy was never binding, there are no legal constraints on the employ-
er’s ability to modify it, regardless of what the policy itself says on the mat-
ter.349 
                                                                                                                           
 347 The phrase “change-of-terms” provision, which this Article adopts, comes from the con-
sumer service contract arena where clauses purporting to allow providers to unilaterally change 
the terms of a consumer service plan are both commonplace and commonly litigated. See infra 
notes 348–371 and accompanying text. 
 348 Numerous cases have held that an employer-drafted disclaimer of the contractual signifi-
cance of its employee handbook, irrespective of its modification terms, justifies an award of sum-
mary judgment. See, e.g., Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (D. Minn. 1987); 
Castiglione v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786, 792 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986). 
 349 It bears noting that scholars have widely criticized judicial deference to boilerplate dis-
claimers. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 127, at 369–70 (describing such decisions as letting em-
ployers have their “cake and eat it too”); Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of Implied 
Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 387 (2008) (arguing that the reasona-
ble expectations of the employee should prevail “regardless of disclaimers to the contrary in hand-
books”); Matthew W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract 
Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 733, 750 (calling judicial deference to boilerplate disclaimers as coming 
close to “deference to a fraud”); Clyde W. Summers, The Rights of Individual Workers, the Con-
tract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employ-
ment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1106–07 (1984) (calling for close scrutiny of overreach-
ing provisions in contracts of employment including disclaimer clauses). Indeed, there are various 
reasons why an employee might expect an employer to abide by its manual regardless of such 
language. See, e.g., Connor v. City of Forest Acres, 560 S.E.2d 606, 611–12 (S.C. 2002) (finding 
the combination of promissory language and boilerplate disclaimers sufficiently confusing to 
create a question of fact as to whether the employee could reasonably believe the employer was 
bound by its disciplinary procedure and termination standards despite disclaimer language); Baril 
v. Aiken Reg’l Med. Ctr., 573 S.E.2d 830, 836, 838 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing summary 
judgment in favor of employer where handbook with disclaimer included mandatory language and 
assurances that the procedures would be followed); see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with 
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 105, 139 (1997) (finding that 74% of survey respondents incorrectly believed 
that employers could not fire an at-will employee for purely cost-saving reasons even when shown 
a typical employment at will disclaimer); Jesse Rudy, What They Don’t Know Won’t Hurt Them: 
Defending Employment-At-Will in Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just 
Cause Protection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 307, 335 (2002) (finding 50% incorrect re-
sponse rate in similar study of employee perception of disclaimer language). The effectiveness of 
disclaimers in general, however, is outside the scope of this Article. The point, rather, is that given 
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In the case of arbitration agreements, incentives cut the other way. 
Employers want these agreements to bind their employees and are thus in-
clined to contractually constrain their ability to modify rather than the re-
verse.350 Arbitration agreements that broadly reserve employer modification 
rights run the risk of being found illusory or unconscionable irrespective of 
when they are presented or whether they are ultimately modified.351 This 
makes it unlikely that employers will attempt to circumvent a reasonable 
notice rule through a change-of-terms clause in the arbitration context. They 
are far more likely to affirmatively promise advance notice and to specify 
how much. The risk is that they will specify too little. 
Legal and policy considerations suggest such one-sided, employer-
drafted provisions ought not be enforced. The law of contract modification 
is, after all, part and parcel with the law of contract formation: a modifica-
tion is viewed as a new contract.352 The UCC good faith rule still requires 
mutual assent, notwithstanding its rejection of the common law considera-
tion requirement.353 Such contract formalities comprise a set of first princi-
ples for effecting a binding mutual exchange; they are not default rules from 
which parties may deviate. Even contracting parties of equal bargaining 
                                                                                                                           
existing law, the legal effectiveness of a “no notice”-of-modification provision in allowing em-
ployers to immediately modify a binding policy is a question unlikely to reach the courts. 
 350 For this reason employer arbitration agreements often affirmatively state that advance 
notice of changes will be provided. See, e.g., Davis, 755 F.3d at 1092 (noting the employer’s arbi-
tration policy required thirty days’ advance notice for changes.); Fisher v. GE Med. Sys., 276 
F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (M.D. Tenn. 2003) (same); Pierce v. Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 245 
F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1214 (E.D. Okla. 2003) (noting the employer’s arbitration policy required ten 
days’ advance notice for changes). 
 351 See, e.g., Carey v. 24 Hour Fitness, USA, Inc., 669 F.3d 202, 204 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that a disclaimer giving the employer a unilateral right to modify an arbitration clause was illusory 
and unenforceable); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing the employer’s ability to unilaterally modify the arbitration agreement rendered it substantive-
ly unconscionable); Snow v. BE & K Constr. Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d 5, 14–15 (D. Maine 2001) 
(holding that a disclaimer giving the employer a unilateral right to modify an arbitration clause 
was illusory and unenforceable); cf. Serpa v. Cal. Surety Investigations, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
506, 516 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing pre-
vented the employer from unilaterally modifying the arbitration agreement, and therefore the 
agreement was neither illusory nor unconscionable). 
 352 See infra notes 148–159 and accompanying text. See generally 3 LORD, supra note 320, 
§ 7:37 (describing in part the traditional common law approach to modification requiring new 
consideration to overcome the pre-existing duty rule). 
 353 See U.C.C. § 2-209(1) cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIFORM STATE LAW 2015) (“This section seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and 
desirable modifications of sales contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present 
hamper such adjustments.”); 2A DAVID FRISCH, LAWRENCE’S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-209:23 (3d ed. 2015) (“U.C.C. § 2-209 eliminates only the contract for-
mation requirement of consideration. In order to establish a modification, it must be shown that 
there was an agreement to modify the original contract. Mutual assent is required to establish the 
existence of a modification of the sales contract.” (footnote omitted)). 
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power operating at arm’s length cannot bind themselves to a deal that gives 
one side absolute discretion to change the terms of exchange after the fact. 
It is for this reason that courts generally imply modest limitations on party 
discretion—most often an obligation to exercise due diligence or good 
faith.354 In some situations, courts imply a duty to provide reasonable no-
tice,355 usually when the parties intend to be bound despite the illusory na-
ture of their promises. Case law refusing to enforce arbitration policies that 
grant employers unlimited discretion to modify their terms is consistent 
with these principles.356 
Thus, basic principles of mutuality and exchange supply cogent rea-
sons why a change-of-terms clause providing for no advance notice should 
be void. A change-of-terms clause that merely limits the amount of notice, 
however, presents a closer question. A formalistic view would suggest that 
such clauses are enforceable. An employer’s promise to provide even negli-
gible notice arguably supplies the requisite peppercorn of consideration 
necessary to make the modification and the surrounding agreement binding. 
But the ability of a stronger party to cite a trivial amount of consideration to 
support a coercive modification was a key factor in the judicial and legisla-
tive retreat away from consideration in favor of a good faith standard.357 
Allowing employers to effect an ex ante agreement permitting them to im-
pose their desired terms without granting the employee reasonable time to 
consider the changes would be anathema to this move. 
Further analysis of change-of-terms clauses is informed by statutory 
and common-law treatment of long-term consumer service agreements. 
Consumer credit agreements, Internet service and mobile phone plans, fre-
                                                                                                                           
 354 The classic example is Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, in which then-Judge Cardozo 
held that a contract for an exclusive marketing license implicitly obligated the licensee to use best 
efforts to market the licensor’s products. 118 N.E. 214, 215 (N.Y. 1917); see also Locke v. Warn-
er Bros., Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 921, 926 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding in a movie development con-
tract, which granted studio absolute discretion whether to pay plaintiff or develop her movie pro-
posals, that the duty of good faith and fair dealing precluded categorical rejection of plaintiff’s 
proposals and required studio to honestly evaluate them consistent with subjective standards of 
artistic quality); Mezzanotte v. Freeland, 200 S.E.2d 410, 412, 416 (N.C. App. 1973) (holding that 
a real estate contract contingent on buyers’ ability to obtain financing was not illusory because the 
contract contained an implied promise that buyers would exercise good faith and reasonable ef-
forts to secure commercially reasonable financing); 2-5 CORBIN, supra note 12, § 5.28 (discussing 
courts’ implication of various good faith limitations on discretion in order to render an otherwise 
illusory promise enforceable). 
 355 See, e.g., Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642, 644–45 (2d Cir. 
1945) (holding that an agreement containing no delivery specifications and permitting cancellation 
at any time implicitly required performance absent reasonable advance notice of cancellation). 
The author discusses the idea of reasonable notice as judicially-implied consideration at greater 
length in Arnow-Richman, Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law, supra note 25, at 1563–68. 
 356 See supra note 351 and accompanying text. 
 357 See supra notes 148–159 and accompanying text. 
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quent flier programs, and a variety of other indefinite service agreements 
often contain change-of-terms clauses that, like those contained in employ-
ee handbooks, purport to allow the provider to unilaterally modify the terms 
of the plan with or without notice.358 Like employment, these contracts are 
terminable at will and consist largely of adhesive terms drafted by the party 
with greater bargaining power.359 Courts addressing the enforceability of 
change-of-terms clauses in this context have reached different results de-
pending on the facts presented and the particular legal theory applied.360 
Several have invoked themes similar to those advanced above in support of 
non-enforcement in the employment area. For instance, a number of courts 
have narrowly interpreted change-of-terms clauses, in an attempt to limit 
the scope of the provider’s discretion. Thus, Badie v. Bank of America, a 
1998 California Court of Appeal decision, found that a bank’s initiating 
agreement, allowing it to change or terminate any terms of the credit card-
                                                                                                                           
 358 A modest body of case law and several scholarly articles consider the enforceability of 
such clauses in the consumer context. See, e.g., Bank One v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819, 826, 
836 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (enforcing an arbitration clause introduced via amendment to a credit 
agreement containing a change-of-terms clause where the issuer gave one month’s advance warn-
ing and the option to reject the arbitration clause by written notice); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 273, 290–91 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding an alternative dispute resolution provision added 
via a change-of-terms clause unenforceable where original agreement contained no dispute resolu-
tion terms); Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (holding a 
unilaterally imposed arbitration agreement unconscionable despite language in consumer’s origi-
nal cell phone contract permitting modifications on ten days’ notice); DirecTV, Inc. v. Mattingly, 
829 A.2d 626, 634–635 (Md. 2003) (holding the addition of an arbitration clause in a television 
subscription contract introduced via a change-of-terms provision unenforceable because no ex-
planatory correspondence of the change was provided with the modified contract); Kortum-
Managhan v. Herbergers NBGL, 204 P.3d 693, 700–01 (Mont. 2009) (determining that “bill stuff-
er” arbitration agreement imposed pursuant to a credit card change-of-terms clause was unen-
forceable because consumer did not receive sufficient notice of the change); Alces & Greenfield, 
supra note 342, at 1130–45 (arguing that change-of-terms clauses should not be enforced beyond 
the reasonable expectations of the consumer because they are unconscionable and contrary to the 
duty of good faith); Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 342, at 3 (recommending the use of Change 
Approval Boards  to police unilateral modifications in consumer contracts); Horton, supra note 
294, at 665 (arguing that change-of-terms provisions should not be enforced insofar as they permit 
unilateral substitution of provider’s preferred terms over market-approved terms); Eric Andrew 
Horwitz, An Analysis of Change-of-Terms Provisions as Used in Consumer Service Contracts of 
Adhesion, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 75, 111–12 (2006) (arguing that change-of-terms clauses in 
contracts should be either enforceable or severely limited under the doctrines of reasonable expec-
tations, unconscionability, and good faith and fair dealing); Daniel Watkins, Terms Subject to 
Change: Assent and Unconscionability in Contracts That Contemplate Amendment, 31 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2009) (arguing that change-of-terms clauses should only be enforced with 
“heightened” notice and assent). 
 359 See Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 342, at 43–45 (drawing an analogy between consumer-
service provider and employer-employee relationships). 
 360 The wide variety of contract principles that have been invoked in such analyses includes 
assent, contract interpretation, good faith, and unconscionability. See Horton, supra note 294, at 
623–29 (discussing various judicial approaches to change-of-terms cases). 
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holders’ accounts at any time, did not contemplate the introduction of an 
arbitration policy where the original agreement contained no dispute resolu-
tion terms.361 The court justified its analysis in part by reference to the im-
plied duty of good faith, concluding that a provider does not act in an objec-
tively reasonable manner consistent with that duty when it seeks to add an 
entirely new term not within the contemplation of the parties at contract 
formation.362 To conclude otherwise, said the court, would open the door to 
the claim that the original agreements were illusory.363 
Courts assessing consumer change-of-terms clauses have also been in-
fluenced by the degree to which the drafter’s modification process allows 
consumers to opt out of the change. Thus, several decisions have enforced 
unilateral changes where the issuer or service provider gave the consumer 
advance warning of the new terms and the opportunity to reject them.364 
Such decisions are consistent with the idea previously advanced with re-
spect to employer change-of-terms provisions—that although employers 
                                                                                                                           
 361 Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277–78. The agreements went on to state that the bank would 
provide notice in advance “to the extent required by law,” presumably referring to state statutory 
law. Id. Several states have laws requiring lenders to provide advance notice of changes in account 
terms. See Horton, supra note 294, at 625 n.131 (citing ALA. CODE § 5-20-5 (1996); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 658.995(4) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-5-
4(c) (2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 537.3205(1) (West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16a-3-204(2)-
(3)(b) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 3-204(2) (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 97A.140(4) (LexisNexis 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-14-02 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1109.20(D) (West Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26.1-11(a) (Supp. 2008); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 54-11-10 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-2-1907(a) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-
102(2)(b) (Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.63(D) (Supp. 2009) (cataloguing state statutes 
that require notice)). Federal law now requires advance notice for all credit card accounts. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1637; supra note 342 and accompanying text (discussing the CARD Act). The implica-
tion of the change-of-terms provision, however, is that advance notice is not required under the 
contract. 
 362 Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284–85; see also Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 
424, 431 (N.C. App. Ct. 2004) (concluding, in applying Arizona law, that an issuer’s ability to 
unilaterally modify through a change-of-terms provision is “not consistent with good faith and is 
not within the reasonable expectations of cardholders”). But see Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 899–900 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (rejecting the notion in Badie that the covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing precludes addition of an arbitration provision). 
 363 Badie, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284–85; see also Stone v. Golden Wexler & Sarnese, P.C., 341 
F. Supp. 2d 189, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting in refusing to allow bank to add arbitration clause 
to consumer credit agreement that “[t]o hold otherwise would permit the Bank to add terms . . . 
without limitation as to [their] substance or nature”); Avery, 593 S.E.2d at 432 (concluding that the 
“power to unilaterally amend contractual provisions without limitation gives rise to an illusory 
contract”). 
 364 See Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Payton, 214 F. Supp. 2d 679, 683–684, 691 (S.D. Miss. 2001) 
(enforcing an arbitration clause introduced via amendment to a credit agreement containing a 
change-of-terms clause where the issuer gave one month’s advance warning and the option to 
reject the arbitration clause by written notice); Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 826, 836 (same); Stiles 
v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1410, 1412–14, 1418 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (same, where 
consumer received two months’ advance warning). 
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have the right to alter terms of employment unilaterally, they cannot con-
tract away the obligation to provide at least reasonable advance notice of 
their desired change.365 In other words, drafting parties cannot retain both 
unlimited substantive discretion and unlimited procedural discretion. At a 
minimum, advance notice must be provided. 
Lawmakers appear to share this view. Although the case law on con-
sumer change-of-terms clauses remains in conflict, legislation on credit card 
plans now precludes unilateral changes of key terms absent advance notice. 
The federal CARD Act requires credit card issuers to provide forty-five 
days’ advance notice of significant changes of terms, such as increases in 
annual percentage rate, fees, and finance charges.366 Various state laws simi-
larly require advance notice by issuers of revolving credit plans.367 Com-
mentators too have spoken uniformly in condemning consumer change-of-
terms clauses. Their concerns have been framed largely in economic terms 
and have not specifically singled out the problem of waivers of advance 
notice.368 Nevertheless, making advance notice mandatory can help reduce 
some of the economic inefficiencies that change-of-terms clause are likely 
to occasion. When consumers, as well as employees, have advance notice, 
they have a greater ability and incentive to compare proposed terms with 
those of other providers or employers, reducing the likelihood that drafters 
will be able to insist on overreaching terms. 
To be sure, the law in the consumer arena is not completely supportive 
of the argument advanced here. At least some case law could support the 
conclusion that an issuer or provider might be able to unilaterally change 
terms without any notice if that power is expressly reserved.369 Nor is the 
consumer context wholly analogous to employment. Yet, the differences 
between the two contexts suggest that employer change-of-terms provisions 
should be subject to even greater scrutiny than those found in consumer 
agreements. Although changes to consumer agreements can create unfair 
                                                                                                                           
 365 See supra notes 263–295 and accompanying text. 
 366 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(1)–(2); see Alces & Greenfield, supra note 342, at 1128 (noting 
CARD Act’s affect on the law of unilateral modifications); Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 342, at 
5–6 (same). As part of the required notice, the issuer must notify the consumer of the ability to 
terminate the card before the effective date. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637(i)(3). 
 367 See Horton, supra note 294, at 625 n.131. 
 368 See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Davis, supra note 342, at 6 (“[S]ellers’ unchecked power to modify 
contracts prevents the efficient operation of markets for consumer products. Comparison shopping 
becomes meaningless when the product or contract can be changed easily soon after the purchase 
is complete.”); Horton, supra note 294, at 609 (arguing that unilateral revisions are inefficient 
because “no rational adherent would spend the time and energy necessary to shop for terms that 
the drafter can freely change”). 
 369 See Herrington v. Union Planters Bank, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1035 (S.D. Miss. 2000) 
(holding an arbitration agreement added to a deposit account agreement via a change-of-terms 
clause enforceable where no advance notice was given). 
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surprise and have economic consequences, they affect a discrete area of a 
consumer’s finances and their impact can be limited by diversification. Cre-
ditworthy consumers can hold multiple credit cards, hedging the possibility 
that one issuer might alter its terms unfavorably. In many cases, consumers 
are also capable of finding replacement providers with minimal transaction 
costs.370 By contrast, employees hold only one full-time job at a time, which 
often comprises their sole source of income. Changes in terms affect their 
entire livelihood, and the risks of exit in seeking alternate work are enor-
mous.371 
In sum, there are sound reasons to deny enforcement of employer 
change-of-term clauses. Even if employers can contractually reserve the right 
to modify, they should not be permitted to wholly eliminate the obligation to 
provide advance notice or contractually reduce notice to an unreasonable 
amount. Legislative and judicial treatment of consumer service agreements 
provide further support for this conclusion. Allowing employers to contract 
for the right to indiscriminately change terms without conforming to the min-
imal procedural obligation to provide reasonable notice would do an injustice 
to foundational contract principles and undermine the duty of good faith. 
D. Promises of Job Security and the Special Case of Employee Handbooks 
A final questioned posed by the reasonable notice rule is whether in 
some cases mere compliance with a notice requirement, however much the 
employer provides, might not be sufficient to effect a binding mid-term 
modification. As discussed previously, the unilateral modification approach 
currently espoused by courts, whether or not advance notice is considered a 
requirement, is premised on the at-will status of the parties’ relationship.372 
It is only because employers are free to terminate workers for any or no rea-
                                                                                                                           
 370 Of course, there may be little use in searching for favorable terms when they can be unilat-
erally changed. See Horton, supra note 294, at 609 (describing the economic inefficiencies 
change-of-terms provisions generate for consumers). 
 371 The author has elsewhere described the more onerous effect of unilaterally imposed terms 
on employees, as compared to consumers, in the context of employer-drafted terms introduced 
subsequent to the employee’s acceptance of employment and upon the start of performance. See 
Arnow-Richman, Worker Mobility, supra note 4, at 980 (asserting that unlike consumers who can 
return or reject a product in response to unfavorable terms, employees have very limited ability to 
“return” a job after incurring the start up costs of beginning employment); Arnow-Richman, 
Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 2, at 653 (noting that the obstacles to consumer rejection of 
changes in terms “are all the more burdensome in the employment context, where the employee 
has already invested financially and emotionally in what he or she expects to be a reliable means 
of earning a living”). 
 372 See, e.g., Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 194 P.3d 96, 105–06 (Nev. 2008) (“[W]e 
recognized that at-will employees have no contractual rights arising from the employment rela-
tionship that limit the employer’s ability to prospectively hire and fire employees, and to change 
the terms of employment.” (footnote omitted)); supra notes 104–133 and accompanying text. 
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son that they can introduce new terms at their election. It therefore follows 
that if an employer has contractually altered the at-will relationship by 
granting just cause protection to its workforce, the employer is no longer at 
liberty to make unilateral changes. 
This reasoning suggests that the unilateral modification plus notice ap-
proach may be inapplicable to mid-term modifications of employee hand-
books containing job security promises.373 Absent a legitimate reason to 
terminate workers pursuant to the extent policy, the employer would have to 
convince its workforce to give up whatever benefit it wished to withdraw.374 
If that benefit is the job security provision itself, one would expect employ-
ees to be particularly recalcitrant. From this perspective, the minority juris-
dictions favoring the formal modification approach to handbooks appear to 
have gotten it right. Indeed, one would not expect an employee to sacrifice 
job security absent a return promise of real value. 
A complicating consideration, however, is the scope and duration of 
the original promise. Most reported decisions assessing the validity of a 
mid-term modification of an employee handbook presume that the chal-
lenged modification retracts a contractually-binding promise of just-cause 
protection.375 The facts, however, are not always so clear. For instance, in 
Demasse v. ITT Corp., the 1999 Arizona Supreme Court decision, the hand-
book provision at issue required layoffs to be conducted in reverse seniority 
order (“last in first out”).376 The disputed modification replaced this seniori-
ty policy with a performance-based layoff procedure.377 In adopting the 
formal modification approach, the court presumed that the original manual 
containing the seniority policy “offer[ed] a term of job security,” such that 
the plaintiffs’ employment relationship was no longer at will.378 There is a 
                                                                                                                           
 373 See Walters, supra note 105, at 410–11. 
 374 See id. 
 375 This owes to the procedural posture of most cases. Reported decisions regarding the effec-
tiveness of a mid-term handbook modification have generally been issued either on certified ques-
tion or on an employer’s motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Demasse, 984 P.2d at 1141 
(“The questions certified posit that the layoff seniority provision has become part of the employ-
ment contract. Using this assumption, we respond to each question in the negative.” (citation omit-
ted)); Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 120–21 (“We emphasize that our answer today is necessarily limited 
by the wording of the certified question which asks whether an employer under the circumstances 
set forth may unilaterally change from a discharge-for-cause to an employment-at-will policy.”). 
 376 984 P.2d at 1141 (“The earliest version provided simply that layoffs within each job classi-
fication would be made in reverse order of seniority. Later versions also gave more senior em-
ployees the ability to ‘bump’ less senior employees.”). 
 377 Id. (“Four years passed before ITT notified its hourly employees [that] its layoff guidelines 
for hourly employees would not be based on seniority but on each employee’s ‘abilities and doc-
umentation of performance.’”). 
 378 Id. at 1143 (“When employment circumstances offer a term of job security to an employee 
who might otherwise be dischargeable at will and the employee acts in response to that promise, 
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difference, however, between a promise that employees will not be termi-
nated—whether for a fixed period of time or absent a particular justifica-
tion—and a promise that termination, if it occurs, will be conducted pursu-
ant to specified procedures and cushioned by certain benefits.379 Although 
the former might preclude a unilateral modification, the latter arguably 
would not. 
Even if an employer’s policy explicitly confers job security of the type 
presumed in Demasse, there still remains the question how long that policy 
is intended to endure. Courts and commentators espousing the unilateral 
modification plus notice approach implicitly assume that the original policy 
was intended to be of limited duration, whereas those rejecting the approach 
assume the policy was to endure indefinitely. But, once again, this question 
turns on the facts. In Asmus, for instance, the scope and intent of the origi-
nal policy was clear.380 It stated that the employer would “offer all man-
agement employees . . . employment security through reassignment . . . and 
retraining . . . even if their present jobs are eliminated.”381 But the policy 
also explicitly stated that it would not endure indefinitely. It was to “be 
maintained so long as there is no change that would materially affect Pacific 
Bell’s business plan achievement.”382 
In Asmus, the court did not determine whether a material change justi-
fied Pacific Bell’s retraction of its plan.383 For purposes of summary judg-
ment, the employer conceded that no such event had occurred, arguing that 
it had the right to modify the policy as a matter of law regardless of its in-
tended duration.384 This was a key point of departure for the dissenting jus-
tices, who took the majority to task for treating the employer’s job security 
                                                                                                                           
the employment relationship is no longer at will but is instead governed by the terms of the con-
tract.”). 
 379 See id. at 1154 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that the 
existence of a contractually binding reverse seniority policy “does not catapult the case beyond the 
reach of at-will employment principles”). 
 380 999 P.2d at 73. 
 381 Id. The policy was not only explicit but also exceptionally expansive in that it “offer[ed]” 
security even in the event of job elimination. See id. A simple just-cause policy would merely 
protect employees from arbitrary termination, but it would not protect employees in the event of a 
legitimate business justification for reducing employment. See generally RESTATEMENT OF EMP’T 
LAW § 2.04 (“[A]n employer has a ground for terminating an agreement for an indefinite term of 
employment requiring cause for termination when a significant change in the employer’s econom-
ic circumstances means that the employer no longer has a business need for the employee’s ser-
vices.”). 
 382 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 383 The parties stipulated that Pacific Bell would not present evidence on the issue. Id. at 74. 
 384 As the dissent put it: “Pacific Bell asserted that it has a right to cancel the MESP unilater-
ally, notwithstanding the specification of an express condition for rescission of the MESP. . . . 
This clause, Pacific Bell contended, did not limit its right to modify unilaterally either the policy 
or its duration provision.” Id. at 83–84 (George, C.J., dissenting). 
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policy as an indefinite contract with no specified duration.385 The dissent 
would not only have adopted a formal modification approach to mid-term 
modifications generally, it would have treated the material change clause of 
Pacific Bell’s policy as a condition for retraction and any attempt to modify 
the policy in advance of such an event a contractual breach.386 Considering 
the facts from this perspective, even if the majority correctly articulated the 
appropriate rule for most run-of-the-mill modifications, Asmus itself may 
have been wrongly decided. 
In sum, there may be circumstances that justify more aggressive limi-
tation of employer modification rights than the reasonable notice rule ad-
vanced in this Article. Where an employer has made a binding, long-term 
commitment to ongoing job security for the duration of the employment 
relationship, a formal modification rule appears to be correct. But such situ-
ations are probably the exception rather than the rule. Few employers are 
likely to fully relinquish their termination rights for all time; the question is 
whether employees examining their policies could reasonably believe that 
they had.387 The upshot is that there can be no categorical rule as to whether 
the reasonable notice approach applies to the modification of handbook job 
                                                                                                                           
 385 Id. at 85 (“Contrary to Pacific Bell’s contention and the majority’s conclusion, the MESP 
is a contract for a definite duration. Therefore, Pacific Bell may not terminate the MESP unilater-
ally before the event defining its duration has occurred.”). 
 386 Id. (“I would conclude that an employer may not unilaterally modify or rescind an uncon-
ditional job security policy, lacking an express duration provision, that has become part of the 
employment contract, without providing additional consideration and obtaining the employee’s 
assent.”). The dissent further asserted, 
To the extent it is unclear how the occurrence of a change materially affecting Pacif-
ic Bell’s business plan achievement can be ascertained or measured, we must con-
clude the condition reasonably may be ascertained by reference to its purpose. Pacif-
ic Bell has chosen not to present evidence that the condition occurred . . . . There-
fore, Pacific Bell could not terminate the MESP unilaterally without breaching the 
contract. 
Id. at 88 (citations omitted). 
 387 See id. at 75 (majority opinion) (“[T]he trier of fact can infer an agreement to limit 
grounds for an employee’s termination based on the employee’s reasonable reliance on company 
policy manuals.” (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988))); Duldulao v. 
Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987) (“[W]e hold that an employee 
handbook or other policy statement creates enforceable contractual rights if . . . [f]irst, the lan-
guage . . . contain[s] a promise clear enough than an employee would reasonably believe than an 
offer has been made.”); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 884 
(Mich. 1980) (“[A]n employee’s legitimate expectations grounded in an employer’s written policy 
statements have been held to give rise to an enforceable contract.”); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La 
Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J.) (“[W]e conclude that when an employer of a substantial 
number of employees circulates a manual that, when fairly read, provides that certain benefits are 
an incident of the employment . . . the judiciary . . . should construe them in accordance with the 
reasonable expectations of the employees.” (citations omitted)), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 
1985). 
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security policies. In most cases, employers will have to litigate this issue, 
and rightly so, given their decision to disseminate the original policy and 
the benefits they doubtlessly derived from it while it was in effect.388 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued for the adoption of a unilateral modification 
plus reasonable notice approach as the universal rule for determining the 
enforceability of mid-term modifications of at-will employment contracts. 
Currently, courts focus on the presence or absence of consideration, an in-
quiry grounded in outdated rules that ignores the policy considerations un-
derlying mainstream modification law. Parties should have the flexibility to 
adjust the terms of their relationship, but the resulting modification should 
be the product of agreement, not coercion. At-will employees, faced with 
the immediate threat of termination, have no choice but to accept a pro-
posed modification, irrespective of whether they receive a benefit in sup-
posed consideration for the change. Moreover, to the extent any such bene-
fit is contingent on continued employment, it is as illusory as the employ-
ment itself. 
The better approach, as articulated by courts in the handbook modifi-
cation context, is to permit unilateral modification only where the employer 
provides reasonable advance notice of the change in terms. This rule has 
intuitive appeal as a compromise position, but thus far has not been ade-
quately justified as a matter of doctrine or policy. This Article does both, 
grounding reasonable notice in the law of good faith modifications and 
demonstrating how reasonable notice satisfies the formal requirement of 
consideration. In so doing, it presents a meaningful benchmark for deter-
mining whether notice is reasonable—the amount of time necessary for an 
employee to realistically consider alternate employment. To be sure, rea-
sonable notice will not level the playing field for at-will employees whose 
terms of employment remain subject to employer discretion. It will, howev-
er, better position them to make use of the limited bargaining power they 
have, particularly their right to walk away. 
                                                                                                                           
 388 Cf. Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1271 (“All that this opinion requires of an employer is that it be 
fair. It would be unfair to allow an employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the work-
force believe that certain promises have been made and then to allow the employer to renege on 
those promises.”). 
